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6I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many countries have engaged in serious reexaminations of the legal
regimes they use to support innovation. In part, the establishment of the World Trade
Organization and its adoption of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law (TRIPS)
Agreement has necessitated revision of most national intellectual property laws.1 In part, new
economic theories have driven a reassessment, particularly at the interface between competition
law and intellectual property law. Mostly, however, the importance of knowledge products in the
modern global economy has focused attention on finding optimal methods to promote domestic
intellectual production. This paper describes key trends, with special attention to the EU and the
United States, and with a focus on patent rights.
Developments in the United States demonstrate the need for reexamination. In that
country, encouraging technological growth has been a longstanding interest. Thomas Jefferson
was an inventor and took a personal interest in the patent system.2 Many scientific institutions
were established in the first century of the Nation’s existence—the Smithsonian Institute and the
American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1850; the National Academy of
Sciences and the Department of Agriculture, in 1862. In 1862 and 1890, the Morrill Acts gave
birth to the land-grant college system, which concentrated on innovation in agriculture, science,
and engineering.3 Indeed, because technology—advances in aviation, radar, encryption,
medicine, and nuclear energy—was considered so important to winning World War II, President
Roosevelt asked Vannevar Bush, his science advisor, to create a technology plan for the post-war
period.4
The strategy Bush developed was centered on a linear theory: he thought innovation
began “upstream”, with fundamental scientific insights, and moved “downstream” through the
discovery of technical applications of these insights, the development of commercial
embodiments and manufacturing techniques, followed by arrangements for distribution,
servicing, and sales. In Bush’s view, upstream research—basic science—was too far removed
from application to be an attractive target for commercial investment. At the same time,
however, he saw this work as the wellspring from which multiple technological prospects flow.
To assure continuing support for basic science, he recommended—and the U.S. Government
pursued—a mixed program of intramural research within Government laboratories and
1 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 Apr. 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31,
33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
2 Graham v John Deere Co 383 US 1 (1966).
3 Diana Rhoten and Woody W Powell, ‘Public Research Universities: From Land Grant to Federal Grant to Patent
Grant Institutions’ in Diana Rhoten and Craig J Calhoun (eds), Knowledge Matters (Columbia University Press
2010) 315.
4 Vannevar Bush, ‘Science- The Endless Frontier: A Report to the President On A Program for Postwar Scientific
Research’ (United States Government Printing Office, 1945).
7Government funding of extramural research in universities and other nonprofit organizations.5
The expectation was that robust competition would function as an “engine,” driving industry to
adapt the advances, find applications, create new businesses and jobs, enhance productivity, and
improve social welfare.6 Intellectual property and competition (antitrust) laws would facilitate
the process. Intellectual property rights would protect inventors and investors who sunk effort
and funds into development from free riders—those who would otherwise copy the advance and
low cost, and undercut the price charged by the original inventor. (There are other justifications
for intellectual property rights, but US law has largely been based on this utilitarian approach).7
Competition law would supplement intellectual property protection and would also
counterbalance it by safeguarding the public from right holders who might otherwise prevent
follow-on innovation or otherwise impose excessive costs.
Figure 18
5 See National Research Council of the National Academies, Committee on Management of University Intellectual
Property, Lessons from a Generation of Experience, Research and Dialogue, ‘Managing University Intellectual
Property in the Public Interest’ (The National Academy Press 2010) 69-70.
6 Joseph A Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (London, Transaction Pub 2005, first published by
Harvard University Press in 1934) and Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942, published by Harper & Bros. in
1950).
7 See, e.g., Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge
University Press 1999) 14-24 (considering the shift from occupancy to mental labour as the source of property right
provided the first form of justification for instituting property rights on ideas); Kenneth W Dam, ‘The Economic
Underpinnings of Patent Law’ (1994) 23 Journal of Legal Studies 247; F M Scherer, ‘The Innovation Lottery’ in
Rochelle C Dreyfuss, Harry First and Diane L Zimmerman (eds), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property
(Oxford University Press 2001) 3; Edmund W Kitch, ‘The Nature and Function of the Patent System’ (1977) 20
Journal of Law and Economics 265 (proposing a “mining claim” or “prospecting theory, more fully described
below).
8 Jansuz A Ordover, ‘Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting Industrial and Intellectual Property’
(1984) 53(3) Antitrust Law Journal 503, 515.
8To a large extent, this construct still characterizes the innovation policy landscape. As
Part II of this paper recounts, patents are available in all fields of technology. However,
patentable subject matter is defined in a manner that withholds protection for advances, such as
the discovery of principles of science (for example, E = mc2, the fundamental relationship
between energy and mass), that are so generative, applications are best developed competitively.
Furthermore, rights are cabined by exceptions and limitations (such as research exceptions) that
facilitate further research and competitive development downstream. And as Part III shows, there
is a set of rules at the intersection between intellectual property law and competition law that are
crafted to protect follow-on innovation and a competitive market place for technological
products (and in some cases, for technological opportunities).
That said, it has become clear that the Bush model and the laws that flowed from it do not
capture many important aspects of the innovation process. First, modern economists have
questioned the linearity of innovation. Fundamental insights are not the exclusive domain of
scientists. In fact, downstream players can have a significant role in identifying new prospects
and finding commercial opportunities for their use. Conversely, upstream inventors are
sometimes in the best position to guide the further development of fundamental insights.9 Thus,
for example, in 1982, the United States enacted the Bayh-Dole Act in order to permit universities
to own patent rights in the fruits of government-supported work.10 The enactment was largely
intended to bring scientists and industry into closer alliance and facilitate greater interchange of
ideas and information.11 Similarly, the emerging shift from vertical integration to value chain
9 See, e.g., Fiona Murray and Siobhan O’Mahony, ‘Exploring the Foundations of Cumulative Innovation:
Implications for Organization Science’ (2007) 18 Organization Science 1006.
10 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212.
11 Peter Lee, ‘Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and Organizational Integration in
Technology Transfer’ (2004) 100 California Law Review 1503.
9licensing recognizes that every participant in the innovation process brings its own expertise to
bear in taking ideas and turning them into marketplace products.12 Since intellectual property
licenses serve to allocate rewards along the development path, rights holders require a high
degree of flexibility in the manner in which they arrange their business dealings.13 As Parts III
and IV demonstrate, both intellectual property and competition law must be reconsidered in light
of these developments.
Second, it has become evident that the pattern of technological advance is not the same in
all fields. As Richard Nelson and Robert Merges have noted, ‘at least four different generic
models are needed. The first describes discrete invention. A second concerns “cumulative”
technologies. Chemical technologies have special characteristics of their own. Finally, there are
“science-based” technologies where technical advance is driven by developments in science
outside the industry’.14 A “one size fits all” intellectual property system is therefore not
appropriate. Specifically, because intellectual property law was first developed during the
Industrial Revolution, it is largely based on stand-alone (discrete) mechanical inventions. Thus, it
has few doctrines that permit one generation of innovators to “stand on the shoulders” of those
who went before.15 As a result, it must be considerably revamped to deal with the incremental
(cumulative) approach that characterizes much of the innovation occurring in the Knowledge
Revolution. The emergence of the software and semiconductor sectors furnishes two examples.
Similarly, change is necessary to make the law resonate better with a science-based sector such
as biotechnology. Part II discusses the many opportunities (or as Dan Burk and Mark Lemley
would put it, “levers”) that can be used to tailor patent law to deal with these realities.16
Third, classic intellectual property and innovation laws were developed with a single
jurisdiction in mind. As borders have become more permeable, capital, firms, and expertise
migrate to jurisdictions with the most favorable conditions.17 Indeed, the promulgation of the
TRIPS Agreement within the World Trade Organization is testament to this change. Part II
describes ways in which countries have started to alter patent law to reflect the global nature of
the innovation enterprise and Part IV discusses changes necessitated by the global marketplace
for innovative products. The increasing number of jurisdictions worldwide having adopted and
enforcing competition law statutes may nevertheless complicate the operation of these global IP
rules, in view of the divergent positions various jurisdictions take on the intersection of
12 Sean M O’Connor, ‘IP Transactions as Facilitators of the Globalized Innovation Economy’ in Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, Diane L Zimmerman and Harry First (eds), Working Within the Boundaries of Intellectual Property-
Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (Oxford University Press 2010) 203.
13 David J Teece, Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen, ‘Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management’ (1997) 18
Strategic Management Journal 509, 516; David J Teece, ‘Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy’ (1986) 15 Research Policy 285.
14 Robert P Merges and Richard R Nelson, ‘On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope’ (1990) 90 Columbia Law
Review 839, 880.
15 See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, ‘Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Protecting Cumulative Research and the
Patent Law’ (1991) 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives 29. The phrase, “standing of the shoulders of giants,”
derives from a letter Isaac Newton wrote to Robert Hooke, see Robert Andrews et al (eds), The Columbia World of
Quotations No. 41418 (Columbia University Press 1996).
16 Dan L Burk and Mark A Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How Courts Can Solve it (University of Chicago Press
2009).
17 Pamela Samuelson, ‘Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules Can Affect Domestic Protections’ (2004)
71 University of Chicago Law Review 223.
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competition law with IP rights and the absence of a global competition law framework,
equivalent to the TRIPS agreement. Part III provides an illustration by focusing on a comparative
analysis of US antitrust law and EU competition law applying to IP related practices. These legal
developments are not, however, the only ways in which countries adjust to the multinational
environment. To the contrary, a variety of mechanisms—mostly outside of intellectual property
and competition law and thus outside the scope of this paper—have developed to stem the “brain
drain” and even to repatriate knowledge workers who have emigrated for education or job
opportunities.
Fourth, it has become evident that intellectual property laws are not the sole determinants
of innovation. Firms appropriate the benefits of inventiveness in a variety of ways; for many
firms, patent law is low on the list of strategies. As a survey by Alan Hughes and Andrea Mina
conducted in the United Kingdom shows, depending on the size of the firm, lead time advantage,
along with methods to perpetuate that advantage through secrecy, is first on the list for many
firms. Thus, laws protecting trade secrets and enforcing confidentiality agreements can be as
important as more formal intellectual property law.18 Indeed, Edwin Mansfield’s work suggests
that the pharmaceutical sector is alone in relying principally on patent law to capture returns
from innovation.19 Once again, a “one-size-fits-all” system makes little sense and Part II
illustrates how patent law can be manipulated to deal with differences that arise from the
technical field in which innovation is taking place, changes that occur as an industry matures,
and other variables.
Figure 220
18 See also Edwin Mansfield, ‘R&D and Innovation: Some Empirical Findings’ in Zvi Griliches (ed), R&D, Patents
and Productivity, National Bureau of National Research (The University of Chicago Press 1984) 127.
19 Edwin Mansfield, ‘Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study’ (1986) 32 Management Science 173. See
generally Andrés López, ‘Innovation and Appropriability, Empirical Evidence and Research Agenda’ in The
Economics of Innovation (WIPO 2009), available at <http://www.wipo.int/ip-
development/en/economics/pdf/wo_1012_e_ch_1.pdf> accessed 28 April 2013.
20 Ian Hargreaves, ‘Digital Opportunity – A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth’ (May 2011), available at
<http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf > at p. 17, accessed 28 April 2013.
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Closely related to this observation is another one: it is increasingly recognized that a
significant amount of innovation occurs in the absence of any mechanism to directly appropriate
returns. So-called “open innovation” is spurred by a variety factors, including curiosity; pleasure;
the expectation of reputational benefits, professional advancement, and prizes; and to obtain
reciprocal benefits.21 These systems are often supported by ancillary profit-based interests. For
example, IBM supports Linux, a free software platform, so that it has a base that will always be
freely available to run its proprietary programs; user groups will develop new products (such as
research tools) through free exchange within their own communities, but once these products
move to the commercial stage, intellectual property rights are needed to promote further
developments. Thus far, no intellectual property or competition law regime has made
adjustments that recognize the importance of open innovation. Accordingly, the sorts of
accommodations necessary are mentioned only briefly in the sections that follow.22
This discussion highlights not only the importance of intellectual property and
competition law, but also the need for a governance system that stays abreast of technological,
economic, and social developments, and which is steeped in the economic literature. Part V
examines institutional design and highlights the regulatory choices that are available to optimize
innovation law and policy.
21 See, e.g., Eric von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (MIT Press 2005); Henry W Chesbrough, Open Innovation:
The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting from Technology (Harvard Business School Press 2003); Katherine J
Strandburg, ‘Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology Transfer’ in Gary D Libecap (ed) (2005) 16
Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Economic Growth 97; Fiona Murray, et al, ‘Of Mice and
Academics: Examining the Effect of Openness on Innovation’ (March 2009), NBER Working Paper Series, Vol.
w14819,  2009, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1369055> accessed 28 April 2013.
22 But see Rochelle C Dreyfuss, ‘Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual
Property Paradigm’ (2010) 31 Cardozo Law Review 1437.
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II. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN HORIZONTAL IP RULES AND SECTOR
SPECIFIC IP REGIMES
Any consideration of intellectual property law in the trade context must begin with the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), which
sets minimum levels of protection that all members of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
must meet. For the purpose of considering technological innovation, the patent provisions are the
most significant. Under TRIPS, all members must provide patents for all “products or processes,
in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable
of industrial application” (in US parlance, they must be new, nonobvious and useful); no member
can discriminate by field of technology, place of invention, or whether products are produced
locally or imported (art. 27.1). The patent must give holders of product patents the right to
prevent others from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the identical invention;
holders of process patents must enjoy the right to prevent others from using the process or using,
offering for sale, selling or importing product made directly from the process (art. 28). The
patent must include a disclosure of the invention (art. 29). And the right must endure for 20 years
from the date the patent application is filed (art. 33).
Within these limits, there is considerable room for national variation. The TRIPS
Agreement permits WTO members to exclude from patentability inventions whose exploitation
would endanger the public order or involve immorality; specifically, members can exclude
therapeutic, diagnostic and surgical methods, plants, and animals (for plants, however, sui
generis protection is necessary) (art. 27.2 & 3). In addition, members may award compulsory
licenses under certain, highly specified, circumstances (art. 31). Finally, there is a general
exceptions test that allows members to enact “limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties” (art. 30). Art. 30 was strictly
construed by a WTO Dispute Settlement Panel in the Canada-Pharmaceuticals case: the test is
cumulative and the incursion on exclusivity must be extremely narrow. The Panel also required
that any limitation meet the technological neutrality requirement of art. 27.1.23 However, after
the Canada dispute was resolved, a Ministerial Declaration (the Doha Declaration) emphasized
that the Agreement (and presumably these provisions) must be interpreted through the lens of
national interests in health, nutrition, and achieving balance between producers and consumers,
and in a manner conducive to technological and socio-economic development (see arts. 7 &8).24
Arguably, the Declaration gives nations more flexibility than the Canada-Pharmaceuticals Panel
envisioned.
There are also other flexibilities within the Agreement. Terms such as invention, new,
inventive step, industrial application, make, use, sell, and offer for sale are not defined. And
while the Agreement also requires effective enforcement (arts. 41-46), the Panel in another WTO
case, China-Enforcement, interpreted the enforcement provisions in a manner that is highly
23 Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R (March 17, 2000).
24 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of November 2014, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746
(2002); World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2,
November 20, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002).
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deferential to national priorities.25 Finally, TRIPS does not adopt rules regarding price controls
or ownership of patent rights.
In keeping with the nondiscrimination provision in art. 27 of the TRIPS Agreement,
national patent laws are trans-substantive: on their face, they treat all technologies alike.
Nevertheless, as Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have cogently argued, the application of trans-
substantive provisions to individual technologies can lead to law that is tailored to specific fields
and national interests.26 The following uses the elements of a patent case—validity,
infringement, defenses, and remedies—to demonstrate how countries (principally the United
States and the EU) tailor their law to their needs, to specific technologies, and in light of their
views on economic and innovation policy. In addition, the United States applies special rules to
government-funded inventions produced in certain institutions (mainly universities).
In theory, the varying needs of specific technologies could also be accommodated by
varying the patent term. For example, a shorter term might be more appropriate in fields where
upfront investment is low, where advances are highly cumulative, or where the field is
developing rapidly.27 However, art. 33 of TRIPS makes this form of differentiation difficult.
More important, patent drafting is a highly developed art; drafters would surely find ways to
write claims that fall into categories where the term is longer. Thus, this form of tailoring is not
of practical importance.
A. Validity.
Patents must meet subject matter, novelty, inventiveness, utility, disclosure
(specification) and claiming requirements.
1. Patentable subject matter. Despite TRIPS and general agreement on the scope of patent
protection, there are many national variations. In the United States, the “default” rules it that
“everything under the sun that is made by man” is patentable, with three general exceptions: laws
of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.28 The assumption is that if Congress disagrees
with coverage of a new technology, it will legislatively overrule the decision. In Canada, the
reverse appears to be true: when a new technology is discovered, Parliament must decide if it is
patentable.29 Under the European Patent Convention (EPC),30 exclusions are specifically
enumerated. They include scientific theories, aesthetic creations, rules for performing mental
acts, business methods, programs for computers, inventions contrary to the public order, plants
and animal varieties, methods for treating and diagnosing humans or animals that are practiced
on the body (EPC arts. 52.2 & 53). For the European Union, the Biotechnology Directive makes
25 Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights ,
WT/DS362/R (January 26, 2009).
26 Burk and Lemley (n 16).
27 William D Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change (MIT
Press 1969).
28 See, e.g., Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303 (1980) (upholding patent on manmade microorganism). See 35
U.S.C. § 101.
29 See, e.g., Harvard College v Canada, [2002] 4 S.Ct.R. 45.
30 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (revised at the
Convention on the Grant of European Patents Nov. 29, 2000), arts. 52-53.
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clear that the exclusion for plants and animals does not include biotechnological inventions,
which are patentable so long as they do not involve processes for cloning human beings or
modifying cell lines, or the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes (arts. 1
& 6).31
The limitations on patentable subject matter reflect a variety of national interests. Laws of
nature and principles of nature—which can also be regarded as failing the novelty test (because
they have always existed) or the utility test (because in and of themselves, they have no useful
applications)—are considered unsuitable subject matter because they are highly generative of
multiple downstream innovations and applications. Permitting a patent would create too broad a
right and impede, rather than promote, technological progress. This is particularly an issue for
biotechnology. For example, the pending US Supreme Court case, Association for Molecular
Pathology v Myriad Genetics, Inc.,32 will determine whether isolated DNA, which is useful in
diagnosing disease and developing therapeutics, is a part of nature or changed enough from
nature to merit protection. Similarly, courts have rejected patents on simple diagnostics that do
little more than relate two phenomena of nature.33 This approach improves researchers’ access to
the kind of information that is needed to conduct research advancing society’s understanding of
the human body. The exclusion also has the side effect of also improving patient access to
critical health information.
The exclusion for abstract ideas, scientific theories, mental acts, and computer programs
can be explained in a similar way. In addition, they may be unsuitable for protection because
they are difficult to claim—to effectively describe limitations to their reach. Software, for
example, is patentable in the United States. While it is excluded as such under the EPC, much
that is inventive in this field can be claimed in Europe through clever drafting. However, the
current cellphone wars demonstrate that software patents can often be so broad or indeterminate,
rights appear to overlap one another and patent thickets develop. Especially for products that
incorporate multiple advances, it becomes extremely difficult to obtain clear freedom to operate.
Indeterminate rights often draw patent “trolls”—nonpracticing entities (also called patent
assertion entities) that buy these patents and then assert them against successful commercial
players. As a result, Richard Posner, a major US jurist, has suggested that patenting is
inappropriate in certain fields.34 Thus, he would permit patents in fields such as
pharmaceuticals, where upfront costs (for developing new molecules and conducting clinical
tests) are high and inventions can be claimed clearly (molecules, for example, can be easily
described).  He would not award them in for software (or more broadly, for various aspects of
the information technology (IT) industry) where neither of these factors pertains.
Significantly, the TRIPS Agreement requires copyright protection for software (art. 10); it does
not mention patents on software.
31 Parliament and Council Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions
[1998] OJ L213.
32 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 1994 (2012).
33 Mayo Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories, 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012).
34 Richard Posner, ‘Why There are Too Many Patents in America’, The Atlantic (12 July 2012)
<http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-in-america/259725/>
accessed 28 April 2013.
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Concerns about patents in the IT industry also derive from two other problems. First, it
can be difficult to search the existing literature for software. In contrast to industries where
library research is significantly less expensive than inventing, software engineers often write
their own programs rather than determine whether there is prior art they can utilize. As a result,
independent inventors can find themselves subject to a patent suit. Second, because the upfront
costs of writing software are minimal, there will often be sufficient non-patent incentives to
make advances in the field. Linux, for example, is supported by people who program for fun and
by IBM, which benefits from a free platform on which to run its proprietary software. Much the
same can be said about business methods. Businesses develop new methods for their own
internal purposes and often keep them secret, making it difficult to search the literature before re-
inventing. Patents on business methods are specifically excluded by the EPC. Although they are
presumptively patentable in the United States, the Supreme Court rejected a set of patents on
hedging claims as too abstract to be considered statutory subject matter.35 It is expected that after
that case, many fewer business methods will be patented. Since business methods are arguably
not “industrially applicable,” patents in the field likely can be excluded consist with TRIPS.
In the United States, databases are largely unprotected by intellectual property rights for
similar reasons. They are not patentable subject matter because they are not considered
technological inventions. While creative selections or arrangements are protectable under
copyright, the data (including scientific data) are not protected in and of themselves because they
are regarded as facts and outside the ambit of copyright protection. However, the database
industry does not lack incentives to compile databases. Often, they are produced for internal
purposes. For example, the database in Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural Telephone Service Co,
Inc.36 was a telephone book in which the plaintiff had alphabetically listed the names, addresses,
and numbers of its subscribers; it was published it because publication was required by law; the
database in British Horseracing Board v William Hill37 was a compilation of information about
the horse races run by the plaintiff. Analogously, at one time pharmaceutical companies
sponsored free DNA databases because the firms’ comparative advantage lay in developing
therapeutics from the information; they did not want to share the profits from the downstream
innovations with upstream right holders of DNA patents. For other databases, contractual
agreements between the compiler and subscribers provide adequate remuneration to support
compilation activities. To date, these contracts are regarded as fully enforceable. Unlike the
situation in the United States, databases are subject to sui generis protection in the EU.38
However, early evaluation of the effects of the Database Directive casts considerable doubt on its
effectiveness at spurring the growth of the industry.39
Finally, some exclusions are related to issues of morality and public order. The United
States leaves it to other regulatory agencies to determine whether an advance is not moral
(except that US law excludes patents encompassing a human being). As we saw, the EPC
35 Bilski v Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010).
36 499 US 340 (1991).
37 C-203/02 (ECJ, 9 November 2004).
38 Parliament and Council Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases [1996] OJ
L077/20.
39 Commission of the European Communities. First evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of
databases (Brussels, 12 December 2005)
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf> accessed 28 April 2013.
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contains a morality exclusion and it has been imposed to prevent the patenting of stem cells and
material derived from a cell that could eventuate in a human being.40 It remains to be seen
whether research in the EU is inhibited by this restriction. Furthermore, many countries exclude
plants from patentability because they regard their availability as necessary to safeguard
nutrition. However, there is no such exclusion in the United States and per TRIPS, every country
must have at least sui generis protection for plants. Many do it through the UPOV Convention,41
which safeguards the interests of farmers and breeders with exemptions permitting farmers to
save seed from one growing season to another and allowing breeders to use protected seeds for
research purposes. (A general discussion of defenses to infringement is presented below).
2. Novelty. In most patent systems, a rejection on novelty grounds requires that every element of
the claimed invention appear in a single piece of prior art (the US calls this the “all elements
rule”).42 While this requirement is important—for example, it prevents patenting of natural
phenomena, natural laws, and old products based on new uses—it is a very rigid requirement.
Accordingly, it is not very helpful in distinguishing among technologies.
The one exception is pharmacology. In a recent study of the pharmaceutical sector, the
European Commission found that originator firms had developed an “evergreening” strategy to
prevent generic substitution after patent expiration.43 At one time, a common mechanism was to
patent one drug and, towards the end of the patent term, patent its metabolite.  No one could take
the drug after expiration without (eventually) creating the metabolite and infringing. In the
United States, this practice was ended by deeming the metabolite “inherent” in the original drug,
rendering the metabolite non-novel.44 (Other mechanisms for dealing with “evergreening” are
discussed in the next section.)
3. Nonobviousness (inventive step). The nonobviousness requirement demands that the
invention be beyond the grasp of a person having ordinary skill in the art (called PHOSITA in
the United States). In the United States, for example, the inquiry starts by finding all the prior art
that is relevant to the invention, determining the gap between the prior art and the claimed
invention, determining the level of skill in the art, and then asking whether PHOSITA can bridge
the gap.45
The nonobviousness requirement is arguably the most powerful tool for crafting laws that
meet national needs and the demands of specific technological fields. First, because the level of
skill is different (and changing) for each technology, the nonobviousness requirement
automatically adjusts the availability of protection to the maturity of the industry. For example,
when biotechnology was a new endeavor, the level of skill was considered quite low. At that
time, DNA sequencing was difficult and it was easy to show that isolated DNA was
40 Case C-34/10 Brüstle v Greenpeace eV, Judgment of 18 October 2011 (not yet published).
41 International Convention of the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Ger.-Neth.-U.K., Dec. 2, 1961, 815
U.N.T.S. 89 (revised Nov. 10, 1972, Oct. 23, 1978 and Mar. 19, 1991).
42 35 U.S.C. § 102.
43 European Commission, Competition DG, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report (8 July 2009),
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf> accessed at 28
April 2013.
44 Schering Corp. v Geneva, Inc., 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
45 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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nonobvious.46 Now that even high school students can sequence DNA, isolated DNA is
considered obvious.47 In this way, the nonobviousness requirement encourages new technologies
because it makes patents easy to get when the level of knowledge in the art is low. When the
industry matures, the level of skill in the field grows, which means that more inventiveness is
needed to merit protection—which also means that, at that point, the patent system encourages
“leapfrogging,” investing in inventing advances that are substantially more sophisticated than
what went before. Second, nonobviousness depends on how predicable it is that a particular
experiment will be successful. For example, mechanical inventions are generally considered
more predictable (and hence obvious) than biotechnological inventions. In this way,
nonobviousness automatically adjusts patentabilty to the maturity of the underlying science and
to the degree of risk inventors and investors undertake.
Because TRIPS Agreement does not define “inventive step,” the nonobviousness
requirement also allows countries to adjust their laws to their technological environment. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court that hears all patent appeals, at
one time set the level of nonobviousness very low. As a result, patent thickets developed and it
became increasingly difficult to determine freedom to operate. In KSR v. Teleflex Inc.,48 the
Supreme Court raised the standard, noting that PHOSITA is not an automaton and is capable of
taking creative steps, such as adapting an invention made for one purpose to another use. Further,
the Court held that market demand must be considered a motivation to invent. The change in
approach to DNA patenting was a direct result of this decision. More generally, the
nonobviousness requirement can be used to deal with cumulative technologies: a higher level of
inventiveness will render marginal improvements nonpatentable and will thin the thickets that
might otherwise develop. Thus, Burk and Lemley suggest that the problems in the IT industry
could be ameliorated if PHOSITA were assumed to be highly skilled. Fewer patents would then
issue.
Developing countries could also exploit this approach: when local industry is
unsophisticated, the inventive step could be set very low so that even less skilled technologists
could acquire patents. The availability of protection would, presumably, provide local industry
with significant incentives to become innovative. Alternatively, the inventive step could be set
very high so that marginal improvements on existing technologies remain accessible. For
example, in some places, refrigeration is scarce and it is important for the population to have
access to formulations of pharmaceuticals that are stable at ambient temperature. If such
marginal improvements were considered within the skill of the ordinary artisan, then these
formulations could be developed without triggering a new term of patent protection.
As the previous example makes clear, the nonobviousness requirement can also be
deployed to deal with the pharmaceutical industry’s evergreening problem. Another
mechanism for extending patents is to find a new use for old pharmaceuticals. A new product
patent cannot be obtained because the product lacks novelty, but the developer could possibly
obtain a patent on a process for using the (old) medicine for the new purpose. Viagra, for
example, was originally invented to treat angina, but a patent on a process for treating erectile
46 See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
47 In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
48 550 US 398 (2007).
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dysfunction remained available. By the same token, the form of an existing medicine can be
changed—an isomeric mixture can be separated and the active isomer could be considered a new
molecule; the salt form of the medicine could be altered. Under both US and EPC law, these
changes will generally be considered patentable. Generic manufacturers may market the old
pharmaceutical when its patent expires, but with effective advertising, the patent holder can
convince doctors to switch to the newer compound, thus extending the period of effective
exclusivity.
To deal with this problem, India’s patent law demands a high degree of inventiveness. A
new use of a known substance is not patentable; a new use of a known process is not patentable
unless it requires a new reactant or results in a new product; and a change in form is not
patentable unless it enhances efficacy.49 Based on this provision, the Indian courts denied a
patent on Glivac (Gleevac), which is used to treat leukemia. The denial of protection not only
protects access to Glivac in India and other countries with similar laws (or where it is not
patented), the ability to produce it enhances the profits of the strong Indian generic drug sector.
It remains to be seen whether India’s rigorous definition of the inventive step will be considered
TRIPS-compatible.
4. Utility (industrial application). As noted earlier, the industrial application requirement leads
some countries to refuse patents on natural phenomena, natural principles, mental steps,
scientific theories, computer programs, as well as business and therapeutic and diagnostic
methods.50 It is also useful in controlling the timing of patenting. The prime example is once
again drawn from biotechnology. In the early years, attempts were made to patent expressed
sequence tags (ESTs), isolated partial DNA sequences. Such patents would have created dense
packet thickets, with multiple rights in specific genes. The US Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) avoided the problem by issuing Utility Examination Guidelines which requires patentees
to disclose a “specific, substantial, and credible utility” for the claimed gene composition.51 As a
result, significantly more work is required before these advances can be patented. In the end,
only sequences that can be associated with a specific physical manifestation are regarded as
meeting the utility requirement. The race to patent abated and patent thickets were avoided.
5. Disclosure (specification) and claiming. The disclosure requirement demands that a patentee
enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the patented invention. In the United
States, the disclosure must also contain a written description of the invention.52 All patents must
include claims that specify the exact reach of the invention for which a patent is sought; claims
may not exceed the scope of the disclosure. Because these requirements also use PHOSITA as a
benchmark, they create powerful opportunities for tailoring. Countries that are not yet at the
technological frontier and lack absorptive capacity can demand more detailed disclosure than is
required of countries with more technologically sophisticated artisans. Similarly, these
requirements can be adapted to specific technological arenas.
49 India Patent Act, § 3(d).
50 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101.
51 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1092-99 (Jan. 5, 2001).
52 35 U.S.C. § 112.
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Biotechnology is a case in point. As we saw, one problem with upstream biotechnology
inventions (such as isolated DNA) is that the patents can be so broad, they impede progress. In
the United States, the Federal Circuit has tried to solve this problem with strict disclosure
requirements. For example, the party that determined the sequence of the DNA responsible for
the production of insulin in a rat also claimed the sequence for the DNA responsible for
production of insulin in a human (in this respect, rat and human DNA were known to be very
closely related). The patent disclosed the rat sequence, but the human sequence had yet to be
determined. Federal Circuit held the patent on the human sequence was invalid on the ground
that the patent only provided a written description of the rat sequence.53 The result was a
substantially narrower patent; indeed, the human sequence might not have been patentable at all
if it was obvious to PHOSITA in light of the rat sequence. Similarly, the Federal Circuit rejected
a patent on products capable of reducing NF-ĸB activity on the ground that the patent provided a
description of how to find these products, but not a written description of the products
themselves.54 By rejecting this sort of patent, the court prevented inventors of new research
methods from “reaching through” the process patent and acquiring rights over the products found
as a result of using the process. The outcome, in short, reduced the power of biotech patents to
inhibit competitive development of downstream products.
It should be noted that the interaction of the disclosure and nonobviousness requirement
is problematic. In general, the level of skill of PHOSITA is considered the same for both
requirements. Accordingly, the harder it is to acquire patent protection (because PHOSITA is
deemed to be highly skilled), the less disclosure is required (because PHOSITA is easily
enabled). To Burk and Lemley, this is part of the problem in software. Software engineers are
considered so skilled; programs can be disclosed and claimed in very general terms. In fact,
codes and algorithms are often unnecessary so long as the patent discloses the functionality the
invention must perform.55 But these generalities are one reason that the scope of software claims
is so indeterminate. Better would be to assume that PHOSITA is unskilled and needs more
information, for that would lead to disclosures that are more detailed—that include algorithms or
code—and thus narrower. Further, it would be easier to determine when claims accompanying
these detailed disclosures are infringed. A less skilled PHOSITA would, however, dilute the
nonobviousness requirement—less would be required to merit protection and that would lead to
more patents and deeper patent thickets. Though no country has done so to date, a better
approach would be to decouple the determination of PHOSITA in these provisions. Someone
seeking to invent could be determined to have a high level of skill, such as the level of skill
described in KSR, on the theory that only people with a degree of creativity are likely to be
inventors. As a result, a great deal of ingenuity would be required to merit protection. In contrast,
those seeking to learn from a patent or to read a patent to determine freedom to operate are not
likely to be inventors—they are merely followers. Accordingly, they could be deemed to have a
lower degree of skill, and therefore to require a higher level of (more detailed) disclosure.
SUMMARY. Validity determinations can be used to deal with problematic features of
the patent system. Thus, many countries have devised doctrines to deem inventions of
extraordinary social significance not patentable subject matter. The subject matter requirement
53 Regents of the University of California v Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
54 Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
55 Fonar Corp. v Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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is, however, a blunt instrument—a decision to deny protection in a specific arena eliminates the
possibility of using patents to encourage innovation. For example, this could be a difficult issue
in the biotech sector. If DNA is found unpatentable, that would free DNA for research and
diagnostic purposes, but the rejection would also mean that there would be no patent protection
on nature-based DNA products when used therapeutically, and that might discourage promising
health-related innovation.
In some areas—databases, plants—this problem is solved through sui generis regimes
that are better tailored to industrial needs. A proliferation of such regimes would, however also
be problematic. It would introduce uncertainty into innovation law and require new international
negotiations. To the extent possible, it is therefore better to cope with problems through the use
of other provisions of patent law. In the United States, biotechnology patents have been
substantially narrowed and the number of patents reduced through the utility and nonobviousness
requirements. The IT sector could similarly benefit from this sort of refinement. Other countries,
such as India, have experimented with using the nonobvious requirement for other purposes,
such as in the pharmaceutical industry to control evergreening and improving access to
medicine.
Still, these provisions will certainly allow some patents, including very broad patents, to
issue.  However, there are post-issuance rules that can also be used as policy levers.
B. Infringement
There are two main issues regarding infringement: interpreting the claims (that is, setting
the scope of the patent) and deciding who should be regarded as an infringer.56
1. Claim interpretation. In the United States, there are essential two ways to interpret claims:
literally and under the doctrine of equivalents (a third idea is discussed below). For Europe, the
EPC nominally covers only the issues administered by the European Patent Office (EPC), which
is to say patent validity. A “European patent” consists of a package of national patents and is
enforced through national courts under those courts domestic laws (so far, there is no
Community or Unitary patent). But because the strategy for claiming is heavily dependent on
how claims are interpreted, the EPC includes a Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 (the
article on the scope of protection). The Protocol cautions that interpretation must go beyond the
“literal wording used in the claims.” It must be conducted in a manner that “combines a fair
protection for the patent proprietor with a reasonable degree of legal certainty for third parties.”
The Protocol also provides that “due account shall be taken of any element which is equivalent to
an element specified in the claims.” In practice, this means that EPC patents are interpreted a
single step, whereas US patents are interpreted in two steps, but the two systems reach roughly
the same results for the same reasons. For expository purposes, the US approach will be followed
here.
a. Literal Infringement. Literal infringement is determined by comparing each element
of the accused product with the elements of the patent claim (another “all elements” rule). In the
United States, claims can be formulated in means plus function form, meaning that particular
56 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271.
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elements can be claimed by coupling a basic structure to its function. In theory, this significantly
broadens claims; in practice, the Federal Circuit, which prefers narrow claims, conducts an
element-by-element comparison, asking if the element in the accused product is the equivalent of
the part of the specification covering the element claimed in means plus function terms. (This is
a principle of literal infringement despite its use of the word “equivalent.”).
Because literal infringement uses the same “all elements” test as the novelty requirement,
it is—like novelty—a rigid test that does not leave a great deal of room for tailoring. The one
exception may be in the biotech sector. In Monsanto Technology LLC v. Cefetra BV, the
European Court of Justice differentiated between DNA molecules that are performing the
function for which they are patented (in that case, resisting the herbicide Roundup) and
molecules that had ceased to perform that function (in the case, because they were found in soy
meal used to feed cattle).57 Only the former embodiments can be deemed infringing. German
patent law includes a variation of this approach. The scope of gene patents is limited to the
disclosed utility.58 Under this view, DNA patents would be infringed if used in research (to
determine their function in heredity) or therapeutically (to instruct the patient’s body to
encourage or suppress particular functions), but they might not be infringed when used as a
diagnostic. Control over diagnostics can interfere with access to medical information (the patent
holder in the Myriad case, for example, holds patent rights over genes associated with early-
onset breast cancer and does not permit second opinion testing or quality control). With this
approach to literal infringement, important social needs could be safeguarded without sacrificing
the incentives patent would bring to the development of new therapies. This approach would not,
however, improve the situation for upstream research, where genes are functioning for their
purpose. Furthermore, the TRIPS compatibility of this approach has yet to be determined.
b. Infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents (DOE). Systems provide for
nonliteral infringement because without such a doctrine, it would often be extremely easy to
avoid patent infringement while still practicing the insights of the invention: all a copyist would
need to do would be to change any one element, and the accused product would escape the “all
elements” analysis.
In the United States, loosely speaking, infringement under the DOE is analyzed using a
function-way-result rubric. As stated by the Supreme Court, “a patentee may invoke this doctrine
to proceed against the producer of a device if it performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result”.59 The analysis is made with reference to
PHOSITA. An element by element comparison is made; for any element that is different from
what was claimed and described in the specification, the court essentially asks whether a person
of ordinary skill in the art could have made the change. If it was obvious, it is considered the sort
of thing that a copyist should not do; if it was nonobvious, then it escapes infringement. There
are two caveats: the patentee cannot capture through the DOE advances that would have been
57 Case C-428/08, Monsanto Technology LLC v Cefetra BV and Others [2010] ECR I-6765..
58 Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie über den rechtlichen Schutz
biotechnologischer Erfindungen [Statute Implementing the EU Biotechnology Directive], Jan. 21, 2005, BGBl. I at
146, §1a (4) (F.R.G.).PatG § 1a(4). France has adopted a similar approach, see Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle
Art. L613-2-1.
59 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v Linde Air Products Co., 339 US 605, 608 (1950).
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considered nonnovel or obvious on the patent’s priority date. Furthermore, the patentee cannot
capture inventions surrendered during examination (“prosecution history estoppel”).60
Note that while this test looks a great deal like nonobviousness, under US law, there is a
temporal shift. In nonobviousness, the capacity of PHOSITA is determined at the time of
invention (or filing); here it is determined by the state of the art at the time of infringement.
Thus, later-developed technologies can be regarded as an obvious substitution.
Because it references PHOSITA, the doctrine of equivalents can be a powerful tool for
tailoring. Economists split, however, on how (and whether) it should be used. Traditionally, it
has been used to protect “pioneer” inventions—inventions that open a new field.  The theory is
that opening a new field requires very strong incentives and these can be increased by expanding
the reach of the patent. Indeed, the DOE is arguably especially important for pioneers because
the first version of a new technology is rarely user-friendly enough to be commercialized
successfully. Unless the patent is interpreted to read on improvements, the pioneer may earn no
return at all. Furthermore, some liken patents to mining claims, and think of them as giving one
party the power to orchestrate efficient development of the “prospects” the earliest invention
uncovers.61 For mining claims to work, they must accord broad protection to pioneers. Finally,
broad protection encourages the next generation to “leapfrog” and push the technological field
further more quickly.
Recently, however, economists have questioned this logic. If, as suggested, the earliest
patents in a field require considerable development, a strong case can be made that this
development is best accomplished competitively. Giving a broad scope to the doctrine of
equivalents is much like patenting upstream research inputs: the patentee’s control can impede,
rather than promote, progress.62 Thus, some economists argue the doctrine of equivalents should
be interpreted very narrowly when the inventor is a pioneer.
The controversy over the DOE is in essence, a dispute over the viability of contracting.
Those who believe in broad pioneer patents are contracting optimists—they think the patentee
will widely license out the right to develop applications because competitive development is in
his interest—the patentee will make more money if more and better applications are developed.
Contractual pessimists doubt patentees will always act rationally. They may have insufficient
information to evaluate potential licensors and either refuse to license or do it badly; they might
fear superseding inventions will cannibalize their own product or process; they may have an
overly optimistic view of the value of their contributions. In some arenas (for example,
university licensing), the licensor and licensee may have very different objectives and thus may
find it hard to find a mutually agreeable position. Contractual pessimists therefore suggest that
the pioneer patentee’s rights be limited so that the public is free to further develop the pioneer
prospect.
The DOE can be modified to deal with the problem mentioned above in connection with
the IT industry and business methods. As we saw, in both arenas, independent invention is
60 See Festo Corp. v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 US 722 (2002).
61 Kitch (n 7).
62 Merges and Nelson (n 14).
23
more prevalent—and often more efficient—than looking for solutions to problems in the prior
art. Accordingly, independent inventors often get caught up in enforcement actions—a patentee
asserts a patent the later inventor was not aware of and did not learn from. The Federal Circuit
has suggested that in these cases, the DOE should not be applicable. The doctrine is equitable in
nature, accordingly the court has discretion on whether to find infringement. Furthermore,
independent inventors sink similar costs to those paid by the pioneer and thus cannot undercut its
market. The Supreme Court has, however, rejected this analysis thus far: direct patent
infringement is a strict liability offense. Because of TRIPS’ technological neutrality principle, it
is likely a WTO member adopting this approach would have to apply it to all fields of
technology. However, it is likely to have its most important application in these sectors.
c. The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents. As noted in the lead-in to this section, there are
only two ways to interpret claims. However, the US Supreme Court has also suggested that
“where a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or
a similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words
of the claim, the doctrine of equivalents may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the
patentee's action for infringement”.63 In modern times, no court has ever decided a case on
reverse DOE grounds. However, economists who favor narrow patents strongly suggest the
doctrine should be revived as a way to foster downstream competition and avoid the possibility
that a patentee will acquire rights over technology he could not possibly have invented.
Biotechnology provides an example. In the one case in which the Federal Circuit cited the
reverse DOE, the patentee had produced a human clotting factor by concentrating it from human
plasma. The accused infringer made it by biochemically, through a recombinant process using
monoclonal antibodies.  Its procedure made a much purer and safer product. The question was
whether the patent on the growth hormone was infringed by the new preparation.  The Federal
Circuit returned the case to the trial court, suggesting that the reverse DOE might apply.64 The
case was, however, ultimately resolved in a different way.
2. Parties to Infringement. Most enforcement actions are brought against parties who are
directly practicing the claims. However, it is possible to sue those who aid and abet infringement
(inducers of infringement) and those who contribute to the infringement of others by selling them
material whose main use is to infringe (contributory infringers). In both cases, a degree of
knowledge of the infringement is necessary; in both situations the defendants are treated as
equivalent to infringers. Parties who supply components to foreign markets knowing they are
specially adapted to infringement and parties who import goods made with processes patented in
the country of importation are also treated as equivalent to infringers. (Note that tying goods to
patent licensing requirements could be considered a violation of competition law. That issue is
discussed in the competition section).
For the most part, these approaches work equivalently in all forms of technology.
However, they assume particular importance in the case of mechanical inventions, where many
parts are often necessary to practice the invention. The importation provision is especially
important in the biotech sector, where it would otherwise be possible to produce nonpatented
63 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v Linde Air Products Co., 339 US 605, 608-609 (1950). See also Westinghouse v Boyden
Power Brake Co., 170 US 537 (1898).
64 Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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products (such as insulin) using a patented biological process in an “information haven,” and
then sell the product internationally. The IT sector also has a strong interest in these doctrines.
In some parts of the sector, it is possible to split infringement among jurisdictions. For example,
Blackberry cellphones are popular in the United States but parts of the operation are located in
Canada. Since patent law is territorial, all the elements in a patent claim must be practiced in a
single jurisdiction. In addition, the sector is concerned because of the possibility of divided
infringement—interactive software is practiced by more than one party and if each party must
practice every element of the claim, then no party is liable for infringement. In many
jurisdictions, concepts of contribution and inducement allow the courts to find both, or one of the
parties to be infringers. (In some cases, liability is alternatively predicated on concepts of
beneficial use or vicarious responsibility).
SUMMARY. Approaches to interpretation hold scope for differentiating among
technologies. To date, however, the main use has been to protect pioneer patents and economists
now question whether that approach is correct. Furthermore, many commentators question
whether it is appropriate to vary the interpretation of the claims according to the technology.
Patents are public documents; they are used by rivals to determine freedom to operate. Investors
use them to decide whether to provide capital to inventors. Other firms use them to evaluate
potential targets for acquisition and merger. For these purposes, it is helpful if the approach to
interpretation does not vary significantly from field to field. The determination of who is an
infringer must, however, be sensitive to the way inventions in different technologies are
practiced.
C. Defenses to Infringement
Because validity and infringement analysis look first and foremost at the invention,
defenses to infringement are a crucial means for balancing the proprietary interests of the
patentee against the access interests of competitors, of consumers of patented technologies, and
of the state. Defenses (including awards of compulsory licenses) also offer the most targeted way
to deal with special problems. As noted above, TRIPS permits exceptions (art. 30) and
compulsory licenses (art. 31) under certain highly constrained conditions, including to deal with
blocking patents (art. 31(l)). In Canada-Pharmaceuticals, a WTO Panel required that even
exceptions meeting the standards of art. 30 be technologically neutral (art. 27.1). Even so,
defenses can focus on problems arising in specific fields. First, it is not clear that the Appellate
Body of the Dispute Resolution Board will agree with the Panel decision: art. 30 requires that
exceptions be “limited” and a provision targeted at a particular field is more limited than a
technologically neutral one. Second, the Panel acknowledged that a particular field might raise a
special problem. So long as the provision is not facially limited to one field (so that any other
field with a similar problem will also benefit), the Panel held that the provision would not be
regarded as discriminatory.
The reverse doctrine of equivalents, discussed above, can be analyzed as a defense to
infringement. Other defenses include defenses for socially significant uses, for government use,
and in favor of prior users. Patentees’ prerogatives can also limited by the exhaustion doctrine,
various doctrines related to bad acts (such as patent misuse), and competition law. Exhaustion
and competition law are discussed separately below.
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1. Socially significant uses.
a. Research. The predominant exemption in the socially significant category is the
research defense. As we saw in connection with the biotech sector, the patenting of upstream
research inputs (such as isolated DNA) can impede progress by decreasing the opportunity for
competitive development of research prospects. While a subject matter exclusion would
eliminate this danger, it would also eliminate the use of patents to incentivize innovation in the
excluded area. A well-crafted research exemption can split the difference. Commercial use of the
invention is made subject to the patent, while researchers are allowed to freely explore new
research prospects. Thus, many countries recognize a general exception for research uses—in
some countries, all research uses; in others, noncommercial uses.
To many countries, research tools are a category of their own, for if they were subject to
the exemption, then the market for selling or licensing these tools could be significantly
diminished. Thus, many countries distinguish between research with a patented invention, which
is not permitted, and research on a patented invention (for example to learn how it works, to
determine whether it accomplishes the utility stated in the patent, to find other uses of the
invention), which is permitted.
In the United States, the availability of a research defense is in doubt because in Madey v
Duke University, the Federal Circuit held that a research exemption is not applicable to work
carried out as part of the business interests of the defendant.65 Thus, research institutions—such
as universities—apparently cannot use the research defense. Nevertheless, surveys by economists
suggest that research scientists tend to ignore patents.66 They are rarely sued, perhaps because
they are judgment proof; perhaps because patent holders are better off allowing them to find new
applications and then suing them after these applications have been developed. However, there is
empirical work suggesting that research diminishes when significant inputs are patented67 and
some observers believe that the pressure to narrow the definition of patentable subject matter
would diminish if the availability of inputs for research purposes were assured. Many
universities have taken matters into their own hands and now refuse to grant licensees rights to
control university research uses (and sometimes all research benefiting neglected populations).
65 Madey v Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351(Fed.Cir. 2002).
66 Wesley M Cohen and John P Walsh, ‘Access—or Not—in Academic Biomedical Research’ in Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, et al (eds), Working Within the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge
Economy (n 12) 3-28; John P Walsh, Ashish Arora and Wesley M Cohen, ‘Effects of Research Tool Patents and
Licensing on Biomedical Innovation’ in Wesley M Cohen and Stephen A Merrill (eds), Patents In The Knowledge-
Based Economy (National Research Council 2003) 285.
67 Kenneth G Huang and Fiona E Murray, ‘Does Patent Strategy Shape the Long-Run Supply of Public Knowledge?
Evidence from Human Genetics’ (2009) 52 Academy of Management Journal 1193; Fiona Murray and Scott Stern,
‘Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the
Anti-Commons Hypothesis’ (2007) 63 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 648. Cf. Heidi L Williams,
‘Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome’ (Working Paper No. 16213,
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 2010) <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16213> accessed 1
August 2011 (work protected by agreements of confidentiality).
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In Europe, the Draft Community Patent Regulation, as well as national patent statutes recognize
an experimental use exception.68
In common with many WTO countries, the United States does recognize a research
exemption focused on the pharmaceutical industry. Under the so-called Bolar exemption,69
generic drug manufacturers can conduct research using patented medicines during the patent
term so long as the research is intended to generate data needed by authorities regulating drugs
and veterinary biological products. In the United States, patentees are granted an extension of
their period of exclusivity in exchange for tolerating the use, on the theory that patentees lose
part of the term generating their own data for the regulatory authorities. Other countries have
similar provisions, though some (including Canada) do not provide patent holders with
extensions. This is the provision that was approved in the Canada-Pharmaceutical (art. 30) case.
Strong arguments can be made that an analogous exemption should be recognized for
software, where there is considerable consumer demand for interoperable and backwards-
compatible products. In some cases, it is necessary to work with patented software to find the
application program interfaces (APIs) or other material, such as validation codes, needed to
create such products. Patentees regard these uses as infringement in order to protect their initial
markets and their markets for peripherals and other compatibles. But economists have suggested
a reverse engineering defense that would operate along the lines of a research defense would
improve competition.70 Article 6 of the EC Software Directive, harmonizing copyright protection
of software across the EU, also authorises the decompilation of “parts of a software program”,
without the permission of the copyright holder, if this was “indispensable to obtain the
information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer
program with other programs”.71
b. Diagnostics. As we saw, many countries exclude diagnostics from patentability.
However, these provisions usually apply only to diagnoses conducted directly on the body (e.g.,
examining the heart with a stethoscope). Modern techniques involve laboratory examination of
biological samples and relating phenomena to each other (for example, relating a DNA sequence
to vulnerability to disease or to the beneficial effect of a drug). These correlations could be
excluded from patentability to protect patient access to the test and to second opinion testing, and
to allow agencies to monitor quality. Other approaches include would exempt all diagnostics,
exempting diagnostics used for second-opinion testing, or quality-control from infringement
liability, or compelling those holding patents on diagnostics to agree to license. No country has
taken such actions as yet.
68 Article 9(b) of the Draft Community Patent Regulation (noting that “acts done for experimental purposes relating
to the subject matter of the patented invention” are not found to infringe the patent); Article 60(5) of the UK Patent
Act of 1977 provides also for an experimental use exception as well as in situations where the infringement act of
the patent is done privately and for purposes that are not commercial.
69 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). The exception is named for Roche Products, Inc. v Bolar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 733 F.2d
858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the case that focused attention on the problem of timing the research necessary for generic
substitution.
70 Mark A Lemley and Julie E Cohen, ‘Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry’ (2001) 89 California
Law Review 1.
71 Parliament and Council Directive 2009/24/EC of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer program
[2009] OJ L111/16.
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c. Supplying the market. Some countries will award compulsory licenses in cases where
the patentee fails to adequately supply the market. This is especially prevalent in the
pharmaceutical sector, where inadequate supplies can lead to serious health problems.
Originally, the TRIPS Agreement permitted such licensing only to predominantly supply the
local market (art. 31(f)). However, many countries cannot manufacture pharmaceuticals.  In the
Doha Declaration, the WTO Ministerial Conference agreed to alter the Agreement to permit one
nation to award a compulsory license in favor of another country. These licenses must follow
strict conditions to prevent the drugs from flowing into countries where supply is adequate (art.
31bis). Analogously, countries that do not usually permit parallel importation (see below) may
lift that ban in cases where the patentee refuses to adequately supply the market, or does not offer
goods at prices comparable to those charged in other markets.72
d. Working. There are countries that take the position that patents should promote local
employment and technological training. Under the Paris Convention, countries were permitted to
issue compulsory licenses if the patentee failed to work the patent locally in a specified time
period (3-4 years) (art. 5). However, the TRIPS Agreement does not permit discrimination on the
basis of whether a product is locally produced or imported. Accordingly, TRIPS can be
interpreted as overriding this provision. Paris has, however, been incorporated into TRIPS (art.
2.1). Accordingly, many believe that such licenses can still be awarded. The United States
generally regards the patentee as competent to decide when it is efficient to work the patent in
the country. Accordingly, it does not use working requirements.
Some jurisdictions outside the United States also provide that a compulsory license can
be awarded for refusals to license on reasonable terms.73 These provisions are rarely invoked in
court because their in terrorem effect tends to induce voluntary licensing. These provisions are
typically aimed at blocking patent situations. They would also be useful in the biotech arena, to
induce firms holding rights over important diagnostic and research inputs to license or to pool
their patents. It might also be helpful in sectors, such as IT and semiconductors, where multiple
inputs are needed to bring products to market.
2. Government use. The United States does not recognize patent infringement by the United
States. Instead, the law provides that when a patented invention is “used or manufactured by or
for the United States without license,” the patent holder can bring an action for “reasonable and
entire compensation” in the United States Court of Federal Claims.74 Other nations have similar
provisions.
3. Prior users. As we saw earlier, in the IT sector and with respect to business methods,
searching the prior art is difficult. If art is sufficiently obscure (e.g. a trade secret), it may not
qualify as prior art for purposes of determining novelty and nonobviousness. In such cases, a
72 See, e.g., Australian Government, Productivity Commission Report, Restrictions on the Parallel Importation of
Goods (2009).
73 See, e.g., Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 48A(1)(b)(i) (Eng.); 2 John W Baxter, World Patent Law and Practice § 8.02
(2001); see also Robert Merges, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking
Patents’ (1994) 62 Tennessee Law Review 75, 104.
74 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
28
later inventor can acquire a valid patent. The first user could then find himself an infringer. To
avoid that result, at one time, the United States provided a defense in favor of those who used a
business method invention earlier than a specified time before a patent application on the method
was filed. While the defense was only available to business methods, it covered methods of
doing business with a computer and thus also served much of the IT community. In first to file
systems, a prior user right is available in all sectors, to anyone who begins to use the invention
for more than a specified time prior to filing.75
4. Bad acts. In the United States, a patent is unenforceable in its entirely if any claim was
acquired through knowing deception of the patent office (e.g. by intentionally withholding prior
art that is material to the patentability decision). All sectors are equally affected by this
“inequitable conduct” defense.
In some systems, abuse of the patent is also regarded as a bad act. Under the doctrine of
“patent misuse,” the patent is unenforceable until the misuse is purged. At one time, many
activities were considered misuse, including tie-ins, tie-outs, package licenses, price fixing, and
grant backs.  The defense differed from a competition law violation in two ways: there was no
requirement to prove a dominant market position and the only result of proving misuse was
unenforceability (in contrast, competition violations require proof of dominance and a successful
patentee is awarded damages). Many observers believe that patent misuse would be very useful
in the biotech sector and the IT sector (particularly for semiconductors). In these industries,
multiple patented inputs are needed to bring products to market and there is considerable danger
that one patentee will hold out and demand a disproportionate share of the profits. If holding out
were deemed misuse, the risk that one patentee would block commercialization would disappear:
patentees would be induced to license their patents individually or through pools. The refusal to
license important upstream inputs or inventions important to public health could also be deemed
misuse. Nevertheless, in recent years the United States has largely decided that conduct that is
not regarded as a competition problem should also escape consideration as misuse. Thus, the
doctrine has been folded into competition law, which is discussed below.
SUMMARY: Defenses to infringement are the most direct way to cure problems in the
patent system. They are particularly useful in connection with scientific inputs, such as in the
biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and IT sectors, and for refusals to license locally on
reasonable terms.
D. Remedies
There are three main remedies to infringement: injunctive relief, monetary damages, and
control over importation. All are required by TRIPS, but the WTO accords a great deal of
deference to national choices. Authorities must “have the authority” to award relief, but they
need not exercise that authority in every case, so long as the over-all scheme deters infringement.
Thus, the three forms of relief offer ways to deal with problems arising in particular sectors.
1. Injunctive Relief. Because intellectual property is a right to exclude third parties, the
injunction is the premier form of relief in that it restores exclusivity. Nonetheless, in recent years,
75 28 U.S.C. § 273.
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the United States Supreme Court has emphasized the equitable nature of injunctive relief. In
ebay v. MercExchange, it held that before a court may grant an injunction, it must consider the
public interest.76 This decision is particularly important in the IT sector, where we saw that the
indeterminacy of software claims, the difficulty in searching the prior art, and the number of
patents needed to bring a product to market (especially in the semiconductor segment of the
industy) can cause very difficult problems, such as the vulnerability of independent inventors to
suit, opportunistic litigation by nonpracticing entities, and holdup problems. Refusing to grant
injunctions (and instead requiring the payment of royalties) is, in some ways, the functional
equivalent of compulsory licensing. Knowing that an injunction will not be awarded, patentees
will be more likely to negotiate deals on their own rather than have the court calculate royalties.
Arguably, however, this approach, which works ex post (i.e. after a suit is fully litigated).
is inferior to one that permits courts to award compulsory licenses ex ante (that is, before
resources are invested in infringing activities). For example, it cannot cure problems in the
medical sector, where refusals to license can reduce access to medicine or to diagnostics: no one
will invest in manufacturing or diagnostic equipment without knowing whether the court will
withhold injunctive relief. In the United States, however, there is a limited alternative: health
care providers who are guilty of infringement are not required to cease activities or to pay
royalties. Instead, actions for contributory infringement or induced infringement can be brought
against parties who supply critical inputs, knowing they will be used for infringing purposes.77
2. Monetary damages. Monetary damages are awarded to make the patentee whole for past
infringements and to deter infringement. In recent years, a great deal of attention has focused on
the calculation of damages, particularly in the IT sector. One problem is that if damages are
calculated based on what the infringer would have paid had he licensed rather than infringed,
there will be no deterrent effect. But if damages are increased to deterrent levels, then in fields
where there are nonpracticing entities, the high level of recovery will attract opportunistic
litigation.
Second, when many inputs are needed to bring a product to market, it can be difficult to
determine the value the patent invention added to the total product. In the past, patentees were
able to recover an amount based on the entire market value of the product. That acted as a tax on
innovation and it attracted nonpracticing entities. In Lucent Technologies v. Gateway, the
Federal Circuit announced that henceforth, damages will be apportioned, so that a successful
defendant will collect only the value its advance contributed to the success of the product.78
Third, in cases, such as software, where it is difficult to search prior art, patents will
often be infringed inadvertently, yet once the product is sold, it is difficult to replace the
infringing component.  In such cases, the new approaches to remedies can be combined.  An
injunction will be denied for a period of time that is sufficient to work around the infringing
76 eBay Inc. v MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 US 388, 391 (2006) (“a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must
satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction”).
77 35 U.S.C. § 287(c).
78 Lucent Technologies, Inc. v Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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component. During that time (and to account for past infringement), money damages will be
awarded, but the amount will be limited to the value the advance added to the product.
It should also be noted that Richard Posner, the noted critic of patents in the IT sector,
recently dismissed a cellphone case when sitting as a district judge, claiming that damages for
infringement could not be proved with sufficient certainty.79
3. Border actions. Under TRIPS, members must give customs authority the power to prevent
counterfeit and pirated goods from entering the market; they may also bar entry to other goods
(art. 51). In the United States, this power is exercised in patent cases only when the patentee
makes the invention commercially available (through local working or importation), or is in the
process of developing this capacity. In that way, public availability of the invention is somewhat
assured (even though the patentee can bring infringement actions against those who make, use,
sell, offer to sell, or import the product).80
SUMMARY. Adjustments to relief can be used to deal with patent thickets, holdups, and
other licensing problems. However, the system is ex post; it is not an efficient way to induce
optimum levels of exploitation and licensing.
E. Government funded inventions.
In the United States, patents on certain government-funded inventions are subject to
special rules on the theory that the public pays for them twice, once in taxes to fund the research,
and the second time through the supracompetitive purchase price. These rules further the
government’s interests in creating new high tech jobs, bringing academia and industry into close
contact, and assuring access to government-supported research.
The US government supports research both intramurally (in government laboratories) and
extramurally, mostly by financing scientists working in universities and other research
institutions. On the whole, the extramural funding is dispensed through peer-reviewed research
proposals, a process that is administered by various federal agencies. Rights over the fruits of
intramural research are owned and exploited by the government. At one time, the same was true
of university-based research: the government took all patent rights and generally licensed them
out on a nonexclusive basis. This changed in 1982, when the Bayh Dole Act went into effect.81
The Bayh Dole Act seeks to promote the commercialization of federally-supported
inventions and collaboration among scientists in universities and industry. The Act retains
government ownership as a default position. But it effectuates the goal of bringing academia and
industry in closer contact by allowing certain “contractors”—small businesses and nonprofit
organizations  (mainly universities) that are parties to government funding contracts—to elect to
retain title to inventions that arise from federally funded research. If neither the funder nor
contractor wishes to patent, the inventor may pursue patent rights. The rights acquired are subject
79 Apple, Inc. v Motorola, Inc., 869 F.Supp.2d 901 (N.D.Ill. 2012)(Posner, J., sitting by designation).
80 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337. Importation actions are brought in a special tribunal, the International Trade Commission.
81 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212. See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714 (the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of
1980), which applies to certain entities other than universities.
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to various constraints.82 Funding agreements can exempt foreign contractors and those under the
control of another government. A funding agency can also deny rights of election when the
research is of national interest or when it determines that government ownership would “better
promote the policy and objectives” of the Act.83 After transfer, the United States enjoys a
nonexclusive, nontransferable license to practice or allow others to practice the invention on its
behalf; funders can also demand similar rights under foreign patents.84 Periodic reporting of
commercialization efforts is required;85 if the funder determines that the invention has been
insufficiently exploited, it can “march in” and acquire rights to the invention.86 Government
retention or reacquisition is not, however, easy: there are cumbersome requirements and a right
of review. In fact, the United States has only rarely withheld patent rights and has never
successfully marched in, even in situations where the right was clearly underexploited.87
The Act imposes certain other safeguards as well. The contractor must ensure that rights
can be secured.88 Significantly, it must share the royalties received with the inventors; in most
cases, it must plow its profits back into support for scientific research or education; excess
earnings (measured by comparing profits to institutional budgets) must be returned to the US
Treasury; licensing programs must prefer small businesses and US industry.89 If reasonably
possible, all exclusive licenses must be to entities that agree to produce products embodying the
invention or using the invention “substantially in the United States”.90 The Act thus assures that
faculty members are motivated to participate in licensing activities, that there is enough contact
among the parties to promote a healthy interchange of ideas and skills, and that the public’s tax
expenditures an redound to the benefit of the US taxpayer through both better products and better
jobs.
The Act’s main significance has been in the biotech sector, where much of the research is
conducted by universities with support from the National Institutes of Health (NIH). As we have
seen, biotech and medical research may be impeded by the many fundamental research and
medical inputs are patented (DNA, research tools). Because the safeguards in the Bayh Dole Act
have not been used and United States does not recognize a general research exemption, the NIH
has sought to impose limitations through its funding agreements. It has asked universities to
license nonexclusively (or by field of use) when possible—usually, when the invention is close
enough to commercialization that the licensee need not to invest significant resources. In that
way, NIH seeks to increase competition and reduce the risk of holdups.  Some funding
agreements require universities to state their plans for exploitation and dissemination of the work
82 § 202 (a), (c) & (d).
83 § 202(a)(i)-(iv).
84 § 202(c)(4).
85 § 202(c)(5).
86 § 203.
87 Arti K Rai and Rebecca E Eisenberg, ‘Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine’ (2003) 66 Law and
Contemporary Problems 289.
88 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1) & (2).
89 § 202 (c)(7).
90 § 204.
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they do.  In addition, many universities have voluntarily undertaken to license in ways that
safeguard public interests.91
III. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND IP LAW
A. Legal framework and goals of competition law
Competition law (or antitrust law in the United States) has developed as a separate area of
law in the late 19th century, when US Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 with the aim to
prohibit certain business activities deemed to be anticompetitive, in particular cartels (Section 1
of the Sherman Act) and monopolization (Section 2 of the Sherman Act). Although the Sherman
Act today still forms the basis for most antitrust litigation, US Congress enacted the Clayton Act
(which specifically prohibited exclusive dealing agreements, tying agreements and interlocking
directorates, and mergers achieved by purchasing stock) and the FTC Act in 1914 (establishing
the Federal Trade Commission and providing it with the power to investigate and prevent
deceptive trade practices (Section 5 FTC Act). US antitrust law is enforced by the generalist
courts (at the federal and state level), the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice-Antitrust Division (for criminal investigations, such as cartels).
Established by the Treaty of Coal and Steel in 1951 and the Treaty of Rome on the European
Economic Community in 1957, the competition law provisions of the European Union (EU)
Treaties have remained largely unchanged since, despite the various modifications of the
constitutive Treaties and the merging of the European Economic Communities within the
European Union in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Article 101 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits agreements, concerted practices and decisions of
associations of undertakings that have as their object or effect to restrict competition and affect
trade between Member States. The different elements of Article 101(1) have been interpreted by
the case law of the European courts. Article 101(3) provides that practices that fall within the
scope of article 101(1) may not be found illegal under Article 101 and are thus not subject to the
prohibition principle if they contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit. In order to benefit from Article 101(3) restrictive agreements should not impose on the
undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these
objectives or shouldnot afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question. Article 101(2) TFEU deals with some of
the civil law effects of Article’s 101(1) prohibition. The Commission benefits from a broad
regulatory competence in adopting measures of general application. The Commission has,
indeed, adopted regulations that exempt categories of agreements from the prohibition of Article
101(1), under Article 101(3), in specific circumstances. These texts are completed by an array of
guidelines, communications, notices, priority guidance, best practices, annual reports, oral
statements, press releases, guidance letters, expert reports and third party studies, which provide
invaluable information for the enforcement of competition law. Article 102 prohibits the abuse
by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial
part of it in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Both articles 101 and 102
91 AUTM, ‘Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology’ (6 March 2007)
<http://www.autm.net/Nine_Points_to_Consider.htm> accessed 1 August 2011.
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provide examples of prohibited or abusive conduct. However, this list is not exhaustive and the
case law of the European courts as well as the decisional practice of the Commission show an
extensive interpretation of these provisions, leading, for example, to the expansion of the
application of article 102 to situations where the dominant position is detained by more than one
undertakings (collective dominant position) or to situations where the abuse and the dominant
position are not on the same relevant market. The Court’s case law has not though expanded the
application of Article 101 TFEU to situations of tacit collusion if there is no evidence of some
degree of concentration between the undertakings: parallel behavior does not constitute evidence
of an illegal concerted practice or agreement. There was no effective system of merger control in
the European Communities,92 at least until the first EC Merger regulation (ECMR) was
implemented in 1989.93 The regulation established a centralized preventive and one-stop shop
merger control system with a suspensory (to unauthorized mergers) effect. The competence for
the examination and the decision in merger cases with a Community dimension lies exclusively
with the European Commission. Member States are free to develop their own merger control
systems for mergers without a Community dimension. This report focuses on the application of
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to practices involving IP rights and does not examine merger
control, although some of the issues raised are similar. EU competition law is enforced by the
European Commission (in particular the Directorate General for Competition or DG Comp),
national competition authorities and national courts of the EU Member States. The Court of
Justice and the General Court of the EU interpret the provisions of EU competition law and (for
the General Court) perform a control of legality to the decisions of the European Commission in
this area.
The view that competition law should aim to promote some form of economic welfare is
intrinsically linked to the influence of economics and in particular welfare economics, consumer
theory and related fields in competition law analysis and is valid for both US antitrust law and
EU competition law. There are different views over the meaning of economic welfare and how
this may be measured. First, competition authorities and courts may examine the efficiency of a
change from one competitive situation to another adopting a “total welfare standard”. The latter
is a measure that aggregates the surplus of different groups in the economy (e.g. producers,
consumers) and measures the welfare consequences of the change. It is important that total
(consumer and producer) surplus increases, even if the surplus of one of the groups (consumers
or producers) diminishes. Only the size of the economic pie matters, not its distribution among
each group. From a total welfare perspective the objective of competition law enforcement
should be to ensure the maximum level of efficiency for all these categories. This includes
allocative efficiency, for example, the possibility for consumers to pay a price that corresponds
to their willingness to pay or in some cases less than their willingness to pay (leading to
consumer surplus). It should also include the possibility for producers to use production
processes that yield the highest output levels for a given set of inputs or for consumers the
92 Neither the Treaty of Rome nor the German GWB provided any specific provision for controlling mergers, with
the exception of Art. 66(1)-(6) of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty, which established an
exclusive competence for the High Authority of the ECSC without any residual competence to Member States for
establishing national merger control and without the requirement of an effect on trade between Member States.
93 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings [1989] L395/1. The case law of the European court of Justice had however extended the scope of
application of Articles 101 TFEU (Joined Cases 142 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v Commission [1987] ECR and
102 TFEU to economic concentrations.
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possibility to enjoy innovative products and services, what is usually referred to as dynamic
efficiency. Finally, one should take into account the scale efficiencies producers may enjoy,
enabling them to reduce the production costs of a specific good (productive efficiency) and thus
to raise their surplus in the sense that if a producer has a willingness to sell, and the market price
for a good is above that price, then they would be able gain a surplus equal to the gap (producer
surplus).
One might take a static view of efficiency (what is the current or short term situation of
consumers and suppliers on the market) or a dynamic view which is concerned with the long run
evolution of the market (focusing on encouraging research and development). In some
circumstances there might be tension between static allocative efficiency and dynamic
efficiency. As it is explained in a Canadian Bureau of Competition commissioned report on
Innovation and Dynamic Efficiencies,
“(t)o sustain innovative efforts, and thus support dynamic efficiency, firms do not expect
to price at short-run marginal cost at every point in time and as a result some degree of
allocative inefficiency may be inevitable. Motivating firms to make costly investments in
R&D requires some prospect of “profit,” which as noted above is in the form of quasi-
rents. In the absence of this positive return per unit of output sold, a firm would never be
able to recoup its up-front investment in R&D, and would therefore have no incentive to
undertake this investment. In other words, innovating firms anticipate a period of
“incumbency” during which they are able to sell a product at a price exceeding not only
the short-run marginal cost of production, but potentially also the price of existing
products (if any) that do not incorporate the innovation. Consumers are willing to pay the
higher price because they value the additional attributes embodied in the new or
improved product sufficiently to pay a premium for it over other firms’ products”.94
It follows, that firms engaged in considerable research and development and other innovative
activity may have low marginal costs but large fixed costs, which would lead them to price
significantly above marginal costs in order to earn a competitive return in the long run. This
might at first sight seem in contradiction with the static allocative efficiency concern for lower
prices and will certainly deviate from the model of perfect competition. However, from a
dynamic total welfare perspective, this sacrifice in static allocative efficiency may be
compensated by the benefits flowing from dynamic efficiency: higher profitability for the
undertakings and new or better quality products for the consumers in the long run.
Competition law in the United States and to a lesser extent in the EU requires evidence of
consumer harm before finding a conduct restricting rivalry or competition on a relevant market
to violate the competition law statutes. The concept of “consumer harm” may include multiple
dimensions95.
94 Andrew Tepperman and Margaret Sanderson, ‘Innovation and Dynamic Efficiencies in Merger Review’ (Canada,
Competition Bureau 2007), available at <http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsf/eng/02378.html#key_concepts> pp. 6-7, accessed at 28 April 2013.
95 Part of the analysis in the following paragraphs draws on Ioannis Lianos ‘Some Reflections on the Question of the
Objectives of EU Competition Law’, CLES Working Paper Series 3/2013 (2013), available at <
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2235875>, accessed at 28 April 2013.
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(i). In the economic jargon, the protection of consumer surplus constitutes an important
part of the total welfare standard test. In this context, consumer surplus denotes the consumer
part of the deadweight loss suffered as a result of the restriction of competition. For example, a
price increase might lead to a volume effect that would be suffered by a certain category of
consumers: because of the price increase some consumers will not be able to buy the product
anymore, although past consumption patterns (revealed preferences) indicate that they would
have preferred to do so, if the price had not increased. Under this narrow definition of consumer
surplus, the overcharge paid by the consumers as a result of the price increase should not be of
concern for competition law enforcement, as it constitutes a wealth transfer from the buyers to
the sellers. The suppliers may be in a position to compensate (hypothetically, not actually) the
loss that consumers have suffered while still being able to compensate with this wealth transfer
their own losses following the volume effect (producer surplus). In this configuration the
situation will be efficient. [the “consumer surplus standard”].
(ii). It is possible to decide that consumer surplus should be preserved at any cost and
thus reject any compensation by the supplier that does not compensate actually and effectively
the losses incurred by these consumers as a result of the volume effect [the “narrow consumer
welfare standard”].
(iii). There is also an argument to move beyond consumer surplus and include in the
analysis the wealth transfer that consumers have incurred because of the overcharges following
the restriction of competition. These may not only relate to higher prices but could cover any
other parameter of competition, such as quality, variety, innovation. In this case, both the loss of
consumer surplus and wealth transfers will be compared to the total efficiency gains pertaining to
the supplier(s), thus enabling a cost benefit analysis of the effect of the conduct on the welfare of
a specific group of market actors, direct and indirect consumers (not all market actors). The idea
is that following the change from an equilibrium situation to another, the consumers of the
specific product will benefit from a surplus and/or wealth transfer, in the sense that their ability
to satisfy their preferences will increase. [the “extended consumer welfare standard”].
(iv). Some authors also argue that competition authorities should aim to preserve an
optimal level of “consumer choice”, defined as “the state of affairs where the consumer has the
power to deﬁne his or her own wants and the ability to satisfy these wants at competitive
prices”.96 This concept seems broader than the concepts of “consumer surplus” and “consumer
welfare” (the latter including consumer surplus + the wealth transfer because of the overcharge)
as it may include other parameters than price, such as quality, variety and innovation. The same
authors have used interchangeably the term of “consumer sovereignty”, which is defined as “the
set of societal arrangements that causes that economy to act primarily in response to the
aggregate signals of consumer demand, rather than in response to government directives or the
preferences of individual businesses”.97 Defining the “optimal degree” of consumer choice or
consumer sovereignty and measuring it using some operational parameters seems however a
96 Robert H Lande, ‘Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust’ (2001) 62(3) University of Pittsburgh Law
Review 503, 503.
97 Neil W Averitt and Robert H Lande (1997), ‘Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and
Consumer Protection Law’ (1997) 65 Antitrust Law Journal 713, 715.
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daunting task. Consumer sovereignty may be conceptually appealing but may prove empirically
weak to implement in competition law enforcement. One might be obliged to go a step further
and claim that consumer sovereignty can be preserved by the ability of consumers to influence
the characteristics of the product bundle according to their own hypothetical revealed
preferences. Hypothetical revealed preference theory defines an agent’s preferences in terms of
what she would choose if she were able to choose, thus switching from actual to hypothetical
choice.98 The way this theory will work in practice is still a matter of speculation. It is clear that
consumers are influenced in their decisions by “the context of choice, defined by the set of
options under consideration. In particular, the addition and removal of options from the offered
set can influence people’s preferences among options that were available all along”.99 The firms
with their marketing activities may, for example, shape endogenously consumer preferences by
establishing an artificial selection process, “preferences are actually constructed—not merely
revealed”.100 A greater focus on consumer sovereignty may thus, in some cases, lead to more
intensive competition law intervention to establish the parameters of independent consumer
choice and specific presumptions against commercial practices that deny the sovereignty of
consumer choice. Open and contestable markets are a prerequisite for the empowerment of
consumers. The consumer choice or consumer sovereignty standard may also accommodate the
psychological aspect of the formation of these preferences, which is usually ignored in
neoclassical price theory. The integration of behavioural economics’ evidence in order to
understand the consumers’ behaviour and build counterfactuals of hypothetical choice, based on
predictions about what someone would choose in a specific choice context may also be one of
the implications of this theory.
In competition law, the aim of protecting consumers implies that the
outcome/consequences of a specific practice on consumers matters, before any decision on the
lawfulness or unlawfulness of this practice has been reached. A reduction of competitive rivalry,
following the exclusion of a competitor or an agreement between two competitors to cooperate
with each other, will not be found unlawful, if they do not also lead to a likely consumer harm or
consumer detriment. A different approach would take a deontological perspective emphasizing
competitive rivalry (and the protection of the competitive process as such), irrespective of any
actual or potential consequences of the specific practice/conduct on consumers. Effects may
indicate empirical observable findings on the worsening, in terms of price or quality, of the
situation of specific groups of consumers, following the adoption of the anticompetitive practice
(actual effects). It may also refer to situations where there are no observable findings of effects
on these groups of consumers but there is “a consistent theory of consumer harm” which is
empirically validated: that is, “the theory of harm should be consistent with factual observations”
(ex ante validation) and “that the market outcomes should be consistent with the predictions of
the theory” (ex post validation).101 The theory of harm has the objective to establish a relation of
causality between the specific practice and the consumer detriment. One could think in terms of a
98 For a critical analysis see, Dianel M Hausman, Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare (Cambridge University
Press 2012) 31-33, citing as the main proponent of this theory Kenneth G Binmore, Game Theory and the Social
Contract: Playing Fair ( MIT Press 1994).
99 Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson and Amos Tversky, ‘Reason-Based Choice’ (1993) 49 Cognition 11, 21.
100 Ibid 34.
101 Penelope Papandropoulos, ‘Implementing an effects-based approach under Article 82’ (1998) Concurrences 1, 3.
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probability-statement, that is, an evaluation of the “inferential soundness” of this relationship, or
in terms of relative plausibility of the specific consumer harm story.
The operation of static and dynamic approaches in assessing the effect of a practice on
consumers is trickier than when one adopts a total welfare standard, hence not focusing on a
specific category of actors. Turning back to our previous discussion of the tension between static
and dynamic efficiency, it is arguable that increasing R&D does not necessarily lead to socially
optimal innovation, as firms might have an excessive incentive (relative to that which is socially
optimal) to seek to replace other firms (“the business stealing effect”).102 As it is noted by the
Canadian Bureau of Competition commissioned report on Innovation and Dynamic Efficiencies,
“consumers do not derive benefits from an additional dollar of R&D spending unless that dollar
results in an increased likelihood of either a new product being developed or an existing product
being made available for a lower price”.103 In other words, what is important is not to focus on
R&D but on the innovation process and its outcomes. However, from a total welfare perspective,
the cost to consumers of the increase of innovative activity is only one component of the
analysis, the other being the profits that undertakings derive from the R&D activity long run. A
change will thus be deemed efficient, even if there is over-investment on R&D, with regard to
what is socially optimal, should the firm’s profitability increase as a result of this R&D effort,
enabling it to potentially compensate the consumers’ loss.104
An important issue that has been examined from time to time in the case law of the
European Courts and the decisional practice of the European Commission is if competition law
and policy is an objective of EU law or is it also a means to further other objectives of EU Law.
Initially, competition law and policy has been conceived as a means to enhance the objective of
establishing a common (Internal) market. This “outer” aim of competition policy might explain
the teleological and extensive interpretation of the competition law provisions of the Treaty that
the European courts have followed in a number of cases against private or public practices that
raise barriers to trade and restrict competition.105 The objective of market integration has
influenced the Courts in the interpretation of the competition law provisions of the Treaty, also in
its recent case law.106
102 Tepperman and Sanderson (n 94) 8.
103 Ibid 9.
104 A total welfare approach could also look to the possible effects of innovation across markets, so not only the
effects on suppliers and consumers present in the specific relevant market, hence performing some form of general
equilibrium analysis. General equilibrium analysis focuses on the economy as a whole and studies economic
changes in all the markets of an economy simultaneously.
105 Cf : Case 56 & 58/64, Consten & Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299 applying Article 85 of the EC Treaty
(now Art. 101 TFEU) to distribution practices establishing vertical restraints to competition.
106 Cf: Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v
Commission [2009] ECR I-929 (finding that a dual pricing system restricting the opportunities of parallel trade
constituted a restriction of competition by its object under Article 101 TFEU); See also, Joined Cases C-468/06 to
478/06, Sot. Lelos kai Sia v GlaxoSmithKline [2008] ECR (where the Court examined the compatibility to Article
102 TFEU of a refusal to supply wholesalers engaging in parallel exports. The Court implicitly recognized that
certain types of conduct, such as a restriction of parallel trade are presumptively anticompetitive, because they
frustrate the objective of the Treaty to achieve the integration of national markets through the establishment of a
single market); Case 13/77, INNO / ATAB (1977) ECR 2115 (extending the application of the competition law
provisions of the Treaty to state restrictions of competition).
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B. The intersection between competition law and intellectual property: principles
1. The thesis of a “unified field” and the persistence of conflicts
Even if one adopts the view that intellectual property law and competition law pursue the
common and soleobjective of economic welfare, there may still be instances of conflict between
the two. This mainly occurs in situations of cumulative innovation or when IP is used
strategically in order to exclude competitors and harm consumers.
a. Competition law, IP rights and the common objective of economic welfare
By granting an exclusive right, intellectual property offers the opportunity to the right
holder to earn extra profits. The consumers of the particular good embodying the IP right will
consequently lose because the level of output of the particular good will be lower than would
have been the case in the absence of an exclusive right. The tension between intellectual property
and competition policy will be even more significant if the objective of the latter is also to
maximise consumer welfare by limiting money transfers from the consumers to the IP rights
holder. However, if the IP owner did not have the opportunity to overprice his product, there
would be suboptimal incentives to commit resources to investment at the first place. In the
absence of intellectual property rights, the product would simply not exist and the consumers
would benefit from less innovation.
It is not clear what the term “innovation” covers but we will define it broadly as referring
to an “economic change” or development that is not generated by the spontaneous evolution of
consumers’ needs but is instead engendered by the producers. This covers, according to
economist Joseph Schumpeter the following five cases:
“(1) the introduction of a new good – that is one with which consumers are not yet
familiar – or of a new quality of a good. (2) The introduction of a new method of
production, that is one not yet tested by experience in the branch of manufacture
concerned, which need by no means be founded upon a discovery scientifically new, and
can also exist in a new way of handling a commodity commercially. (3) The opening of a
new market that is a market into which the particular branch of manufacture of the
country in question has not previously entered, whether or not this market has existed
before. (4) The conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials or half-manufactured
goods, again irrespective of whether this source already exists or whether it has first to be
created. (5) The carrying out of the new organization of any industry […].”107
Not all type of innovation should, however, be protected by intellectual property rights on
this analysis; only those whose value to the consumers is more important than the cost of the IP
protection.
107 Schumpeter (n 6) 66. ‘The European Commission seems also to adopt this broad definition of “innovation” in its
1995 ‘Green Paper on Innovation’ COM(1995) 688 final (The Commission defined innovation as “the renewal and
enlargement of the range of products and services and associated markets; the establishment of new methods of
production, supply and distribution; the introduction in changes in management, work organization and the working
conditions and skills of workforce”).
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It is therefore important to balance the respective effects of competition law and
intellectual property on consumer welfare. The trade-off between the long-term effects of IP
rights on incentives to innovate and their short-term effects on output and prices is not however
an easy task. Indeed, in theory, intellectual property law focuses more on the long-term effects,
while competition law’s focal point is primarily on the short-term effects of a business practice
to “consumer welfare”.
This is not to argue that competition law ignores the long-term effects brought by greater
innovation to economic welfare.108 The European Commission’s Guidelines on the application of
article 81(3) of the Treaty examine the effects of a particular agreement on innovation109 while
they also integrate dynamic efficiencies as possible compensating factors of an otherwise
anticompetitive agreement, which restricts output and increases prices.110 The “balancing test”
that the Commission applies aims to ensure that these “qualitative efficiencies”, such as new and
improved products, will create “sufficient value for consumers to compensate for the anti-
competitive effects of the agreement, including a price increase”.111 This is because the
availability of new and improved products constitutes an important source of benefits to
consumers.112 However, the assessment of pro and anti-competitive effects is an arduous task as
it is difficult to assign precise values to dynamic efficiencies in order to conduct a cost benefit
analysis and assess the effects of a practice to “consumer welfare”.113
What are the implications of a strong intellectual property protection to total and
consumer welfare? By offering the possibility to the IP holder to increase prices, IP rights may
decrease output and therefore total welfare. However the dynamic efficiencies brought by IP may
largely compensate the losses. The effect of IP to consumer welfare is a more complicated issue
and depends on the extent the “monopolistic” profits generated by the exclusive right of the IP
holder will be passed on to the consumers in one way or another. This will not necessarily take
the form of lower prices, but also of better quality, new products or services and
extendedconsumer choice.
b. Intellectual property, competition and cumulative innovation
A system of strong IP protection maynevertheless harm consumers in the long run by
restricting cumulative innovation. This situation raises two issues: the importance of cumulative
innovation to economic welfare and the relation between innovation and market structure, as it is
108 See Commission Notice- Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer
agreements, [2004] OJ C 101/2, (“both bodies of law share the same basic objective of promoting consumer welfare
and an efficient allocation of resources. Innovation constitutes an essential and dynamic component of an open and
competitive market economy. Intellectual property rights promote dynamic competition by encouraging
undertakings to invest in developing new or improved products and processes. So does competition by putting
pressure on undertakings to innovate. Therefore, both intellectual property rights and competition are necessary to
promote innovation and ensure a competitive exploitation thereof”).
109 Guidelines on the application of article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C101/97, paras 24 to 25.
110 Ibid para 70.
111 Ibid para 102.
112 Ibid para 104.
113 Ibid para 103.
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not necessarily true that a competitive structure will generate more innovation than a more
concentrated one.
As we have previously explained, one can distinguish between two types of innovation:
“stand alone innovation”, which refers to the situation where the IP right will not be used as an
input to another innovation, and “cumulative innovation”, which refers to the situation of
successive innovations built upon earlier innovations. It is widely accepted that cumulative
innovation substantially increases social value. Public authorities recognise this reality by
establishing innovation clusters, such as the Silicon Valley in the United States, which provide
the possibility for information exchange and the development of research synergies.114
Cumulative innovation may take different varieties: either the second innovation could
not be invented without the first, or the first innovation reduces the cost of achieving the second,
or finally the first innovation accelerates the development of the second by providing new
research tools.115 The social value of the innovation process is, in each of these forms, unequally
distributed between the first and the second innovator. It will be important to find the right
incentive mechanism in order to ensure that earlier innovators are compensated adequately for
establishing the foundations for later innovators, while also making sure that cumulative
innovators still have an incentive to invest. The original design of intellectual property rights
should therefore take into account the need to compensate both the initial and the subsequent
innovators.
It is however impossible in practice to consider ex ante all the possibilities of cumulative
innovation in designing the initial intellectual property rights. By definition, cumulative
innovations did not exist the time the IP rights were granted to the initial innovator. Confronted
with demands of subsequent innovators to use the first-generation innovation, the IP holders face
a strategic choice: either they will encourage cumulative innovation or they will refuse to license
their inventions and therefore block innovation. They may have an interest in refusing only if the
cumulative innovator may be in a position to compete with them in the market of the second-
generation product or in the market of the first-generation product covered by the IP right. This
will indirectly affect consumers as, in the absence of cumulative innovation, they will not benefit
from new products and services. However, by refusing to license the IP rights, holders of the
first-generation product incur the risk that their rivals will develop in the future a competing
technology, which will provide an alternative to the first-generation innovation.
It should also be noted that the initial design of intellectual property rights will also affect
the bargaining position of the parties to the licensing agreement. Usually the IP right holder will
not have any interest in refusing to license. There is an important body of literature explaining
that in high technology sectors, competitors usually share information by publishing their
research and do not systematically have recourse to intellectual property protection in order to
114 For an analysis of the Silicon Valley model in product system development, see Masahiko Aoki, Towards a
Comparative Institutional Analysis (The MIT Press 2001) 347.
115 Suzanne Scotchmer ‘Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Protecting Cumulative Innovators’ in Suzanne
Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives (MIT Press 2005) at p. 139.
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appropriate part of the social value created by cumulative innovation.116 The revenues that an
initial inventor can derive from cumulative innovation via licensing are considerable.
Nevertheless, the private interest of the IP right holder will not always coincide with the
goal of promoting cumulative innovation. In such circumstances, it may be expected that the IP
right owners would likely decide to exclude competition. The simple fact that the refusal to
license will make possible the exclusion of rivals from the market is not enough to infer a
competition law infringement. It is also important to plausibly claim a theory of anticompetitive
effects.
c. Exclusionary theories of anticompetitive effects and intellectual property rights
Economists have advanced a number of theories of anticompetitive effects explaining
why even a unilateral practice may raise competition law concerns. Even if these theories apply
to different settings, it is submitted that the anticompetitive effects may be reinforced in the
presence of IP rights, if the later are used strategically in order to control a network and as a
result restrict competition and innovation. We focus here on practices that produce
anticompetitive effects and consumer harm by excluding competitors, as both US antitrust law
and EU competition law apply to these practices. Some legal systems (such as EU competition
law) also apply to practices that produce directly consumer harm, without the exclusion of a
competitor (e.g. excessive prices, price discrimination), the so-called exploitative abuses.
(i) The leverage theory
One of the most controversial doctrines of anticompetitive effects is the leverage theory,
which explains that, by refusing to license, the monopolists seek to extend their monopoly power
to a downstream related market.117 This theory was criticised by the Chicago school of antitrust
economics, which argues that an upstream monopolist has no interest in leveraging its monopoly
power to a related market because it is possible to gain only one monopoly profit overall (single
monopoly profit theorem).118 As a result, the leverage theory lost its appeal as an autonomous
basis for action, in the United States,119 although it still retains some significance in Europe.120
The economic grounding of the theory has nevertheless been revisited lately. Whinston
criticised the assumptions of the Chicago school and argued that, in certain circumstances, a
monopolist in a market A may follow a leveraging strategy by using tying practices as a
commitment device in order to signal to its actual or potential competitors in the downstream
market B that they will face aggressive competitive behaviour, which will eventually decrease
their profits.121 The potential rivals will thus be less inclined to enter the market or be excluded
116 Yochai Benkler, ‘Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm’ (2002) 112 Yale Law Journal 369.
117 Louis Kaplow, ‘Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage’ (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 515.
118 Ward Bowman ‘Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem’ (1957) 67 Yale Law Journal 19; Richard
Posner, Antitrust Law (University of Chicago Press 2001) 198-200.
119 Verizon Communications, Inc. v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398 (Trinko case).
120 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601
121 Michael D Whinston, ‘Tying, Foreclosure and Exclusion’ (1990) 80 American Economic Review 837.
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from it, if they were present. This strategy is profitable if the tied goods are complements in
fixed proportions to the goods in market A.
Choi and Stefanadis also developed a model in which the incumbent firm may have the
interest to extend its monopoly from one market to another if the two products are complements
and the new entrant can effectively enter the market for one of the two product only if it has
successfully innovated in both markets.122 The cumulative innovators would therefore be
prevented from capturing the social value of their innovation in one market before they also
innovate in the second market. This will decrease their incentives to engage in innovation at the
first place with the result that the dominant firm’s strategy will pre-empt the emergence of
cumulative innovation.
(ii) The essential facilities doctrine
The essential facilities doctrine is inspired by the leverage theory but presents certain
specific characteristics. It is a legal doctrine framed by some early US decisions, which held that
under specific circumstances, firms have affirmative duties to assist their competitors.123
Although never explicitly accepted by the US Supreme Court, the lower courts have set the
conditions for the application of the doctrine as requiring from the plaintiff proof of the
following four elements: (1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s
inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of
the facility by a competitor; (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.124 The Supreme Court has
recently marginalised the doctrine of essential facilities and it seems that the use of the doctrine
of essential facilities in US law has fallen in desuetude.125 Because the monopolist controls an
essential facility (sometimes called bottleneck) he may be able to extend his monopoly power
from “one stage of production to another”.126 Under the essential facilities doctrine, a vertically
integrated monopolist will be required to share some input in a vertically related market with
someone operating downstream. This will only be the case if it is feasible for the monopolist to
provide the facility, the competitor would be reasonably and practically unable to duplicate it and
the denial of the use of the facility will deprive the competitor of an essential input, thus enabling
the dominant firm to extend its monopoly power in a related market. In EU competition law, the
122 Jay P Choi, ‘Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation and the ‘Leverage Theory’ (1996) 110 Quarterly Journal of
Economics 1153; Jay P Choi and C. Stefanadis ‘Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory’ (2001) 32
Rand Journal of Economics 52.
123 United States v Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 US 383 (1912); Associated Press v United States, 326 US 1 (1945);
Otter Tail Power Co. v United States, 410 US 366 (1973) (although the US Supreme Court never accepted explicitly
the theory).
124 MCI Communications Corp. v AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-1133 (7th Cir. 1983) (MCI case)
125 See for instance the position of the Supreme Court in Trinko case (n 119). The Court noted that there are several
problems with imposing a duty to deal and with regard to the essential facilities doctrine, it found “no need either to
recognize it here or to repudiate it here”, noting that the doctrine applies if access is unavailable. That was not the
case as the 1996 Telecommunications Act already mandated access. Some lower courts have nevertheless continued
to apply the essential facilities doctrine after the Trinko decision.
126 MCI case (n 124).
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Commission first used the concept of “essential facilities” in some decisions on interim measures
involving the opening of port facilities to competition.127
An essential facility is taken as a facility to which access is essential for the provision of
goods or services in a related market and where it is not economically efficient or feasible for a
new entrant to replicate the facility. The concept has extended beyond infrastructure (railways,
including track and stations; airports, including slot allocation; ground handling services; utility
distribution networks e.g. electricity wires and gas pipelines; bus stations; ports) to airline
computer reservations systems and in some cases intellectual property rights. There is some
debate over the practical use of this doctrine and its added value in view of the quite
interventionist approach of competition authorities and courts in Europe with regard to imposing
a duty to deal, in comparison to the United States. Some authors have gone as far as analyzing all
the case law of the European Courts on unilateral refusals to deal from the prism of the essential
facilities doctrine.128
Contrary to the traditional leverage theory, the essential facilities doctrine has a structural
and not a behavioural component, in the sense that “a monopolist’s status (as the owner of the
facility and a competitor in the market that relies on the facility) rather than any affirmative
conduct determines liability”.129 The application of the essential facilities doctrine has been
extended to a wide variety of “facilities” owned or controlled by a monopolist. Commentators
seem however to increasingly question the utility of the essential facilities doctrine as a valid
basis for antitrust liability130 and recent case law in the United States has placed important
limitations on its use.131 The doctrine continues nonetheless to retain some significance in
Europe.132
(iii) Raising rivals’ costs
A distinct theory of anticompetitive effects is that dominant firms may use IP rights to
create barriers to entry and raise the costs of their rivals.133 As a result they will be able to
increase profitably their prices, up to the level of their rivals and exercise market power, or to
profitably undercut rivals’ prices and drive them out of the market. IP rights may facilitate
strategies of raising rival costs if the technology covered by the IP right is a valuable input.
127 Sea Containers v Stena Sealink [1994] OJ L15/8; See also B&I Line plc v Sealink Harbours Ltd and Sealink
Stena Ltd [1992] CMLR 255.
128 See, John Temple Lang, ‘Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies' Duties to Supply Competitors, and
Access to Essential Facilities’ (1994) 18(2) Fordham International Law Journal 437.
129 Herbert J Hovenkamp, Mark D Janis and Mark A Lemley, ‘Unilateral Refusals to License in the US’ in François
Lévêque and Howard Shelanski (eds), Antitrust, Patents and Copyright - EU and US Perspectives (Edward Elgar,
2005) 12 and 18.
130 See Abbott B Lipsky and Gregory J Sidak ‘Essential Facilities’ (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review 1187, 1191-
1192.
131 Herbert J Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy (3rd ed, Thomson/West 2005) 309-314.
132 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG
[1998] ECR I-7791.
133 Thomas G Krattenmaker and Steven C Salop ‘Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve
Power Over Price’ (1986) 96 Yale Law Journal 209.
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Rubinfeld and Maness underscore that IP owners may use their IP portfolio strategically
to raise their rivals’ costs by creating a “patent thicket”, which includes patents whose validity is
questionable (“submarine patents”), or by adopting a strategy of “patent flooding”, in which “a
firm files a multitude of patent applications that claim minor variations on a competitor’s
existing technology”.134 These strategies will have the advantage, according to the same authors,
to “require little or no short-run profit sacrifice to achieve the desired long-term goal of lessening
competition in the marketplace”.135 They may nonetheless achieve a number of anticompetitive
effects, such as foreclosure, predatory pricing and tacit collusion. Indeed, competitors will face a
difficult choice: either they will have to litigate the validity of the patents, or they will have to
accept a license and pay the fee, or finally they will have to design their products “around the
patent”.136 All these practices will increase their costs, reduce their incentives to innovate and
facilitate collusive practices as, in most cases, the dispute will lead to an anticompetitive patent
settlement137 or a cross-licensing scheme.138 The IP owners could also offer a predetermined
bundle of licenses to their competitors (package licensing), even if the later do not need the
whole package. This will have the effect of limiting their rivals’ choice and reducing their
incentives to innovate, thus restraining competition in the final goods market.
(iv) Maintenance to monopoly
The theories of anticompetitive effects set out in this section relate to strategies that erode
the competitive advantage of the monopolist’s rivals in a related market with the aim to extend
the monopolist’s market power in that related secondary market. An alternative claim of
anticompetitive effect is that the dominant firm will seek to maintain its monopoly power on the
primary market of the technology covered by the IP right. This maintenance of monopoly claim
will usually be integrated in a sequential innovation scheme.139
Carlton and Perloff give the example of a two-period setting with a firm that operates in a
primary market and a market for a complementary good. Under this example, due to a patent, the
firm has, in a first period, a dominant position in the primary market. However, in a second
period, the incumbent monopolist faces the risk of entry of an alternative producer into the
primary market. According to their model, although the alternative producer has a superior
complementary product in both periods, his primary product is of equivalent quality only in the
second period.
134 Daniel L Rubinfeld and Robert Maness ‘The Strategic Use of Patents: Implications for Antitrust’ in Lévêque and
Shelanski (eds) (n 129) 85.
135 Ibid 87.
136 Ibid 97.
137 Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D Janis and Mark A Lemley ‘Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property
Disputes’ (2003) 87 Minnesota Law Review 1719.
138 Cross-licensing may also have anticompetitive effects: Adam B Jaffe and Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its
Discontents: How the Broken Patent System is Endangering Innovation and Process, and What to Do About it
(Princeton University Press 2004) 60.
139 Dennis W Carlton and Michael Waldman ‘The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create market Power in
Evolving Industries’ (2002) 33 Rand Journal of Economics 194; Choi and Stefanadis (n 122).
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The strategy of the alternative producer will be to use the profits earned by selling units in
the complementary market to cover its fixed costs of entering the primary market. The
incumbent monopolist can react by increasing the costs of entry of his rivals in the
complementary market. He will achieve this goal by tying the primary product with the
complementary product. As a result, the entry of the alternative producer in the primary market
at the second period will be deterred. It is not the objective of the strategy to extend monopoly
power in the market of the complementary good but simply to preserve market power in the
primary product covered by the IP right. Consequently, less innovation will happen in both the
primary and complementary products markets.
These different models suggest that, in certain circumstances, IP rights holders will have
the interest to deter dynamic innovation that could render obsolete their technological
standard.140 This situation is exacerbated in a network setting, as the IP rights holders will have
more incentives to engage in predatory practices in order to control the standard of the
network.141 By doing so, they will not only be able to recoup their investments but also capture
the full value of the network. Indeed, the value of a network increases as it grows larger and
more firms participate in it. The IP holder will therefore be able to capture value that has been
created by the other participants to the network. The objective of IP rights should be to
compensate the inventive effort of the IP holder and not to confer a windfall profit.
These anti-competitive effects can only be produced if the IP holder has a monopoly
power. This is an important issue as the main objective for granting IP rights is to confer to the
IP holder the ability to raise prices. On the contrary, competition law constraints the use of
monopoly power.
2. The focus on static allocative efficiency analysis in competition law
a. IP rights are not monopolies142
The history of IP rights highlights the fact that their conception as a form of “property
right” is a recent evolution.143 One could mention the example of patents, which were initially
considered as monopoly privileges granted by the sovereign to supporters and favourites as a
reward for their loyalty.144 The excesses of these unjustified grants of privilege led to an
increasing unrest of the courts and the legislature, which sought to create boundaries for these
exercises of “royal prerogative”.
140 Dennis W Carlton and Robert H Gertner ‘Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Strategic Behavior’ NBER Working
Paper Series, Working paper 8976, available at < http://www.nber.org/papers/w8976 > last accessed 28 April 2013.
141 Herbert J Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise—Principle and Execution (Harvard University Press 2005) 277-
304.
142 For a more extensive analysis, see Ioannis Lianos ‘Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: Is the
Property Rights' Approach Right?’ in John Bell and Claire Kilpatrick (eds) 8 The Cambridge Yearbook of European
Legal Studies (Hart Publishing 2006) 153.
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In the case Darcy v Allein, decided in 1602,145 the Kings Bench applying the restraints of
trade doctrine, considered that the grant of an exclusive privilege damages everyone who wants
to use the product because the monopolist will raise the price and reduce the quality of the goods
and “deprive other workmen of a living”.146 However, the court rendered an exception from the
prohibition limited-term patents. This rule was codified by the Statute of Monopolies in 1623,
which declared void all monopolies but explicitly excepted from the prohibition, patents granted
to the first inventor or inventors of new manufactures, if these were not “contrary to the law, nor
mischievous to the state, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally
inconvenient”.
The collision between the restraints of trade doctrine (being for these purposes an early
antecedent of competition law) and what could be considered as the initial steps of patent law has
been resolved in recognising the limited circumstances in which patent monopoly grants could
be upheld. It is interesting to note that the word “property” was not used and that intellectual
property rights were referred to as “privileges”. Patents were also to be considered void any time
they raised the price of commodities “at home”. Their creation was purely motivated by
mercantilist reasons (enhance technological progress and export trade) and their negative effects
on prices strictly limited to foreign trade and consumers.
The use of the term “property” came later when it became clear that there should be some
kind of natural rights justification for maintaining this kind of monopoly privilege in the period
of laissez-faire that followed the mercantilist era. The evolution of the “monopoly” concept has
nevertheless limited the risks of conflict between competition law and intellectual property. As a
result if has enfeebled the rationale of the “property rights” rhetoric.
The use of the term “property” does not necessarily confer an absolute antitrust
immunity.147 One of the attributes of property rights is exclusivity. Exclusivity means that the
owner of the property has the right to exclude others from exercising his rights of use without
permission. The right to exclude was also the cornerstone of the legal conception of “monopoly”,
before the consolidation of the more economic concept of market power. Indeed, during the most
active period of antitrust enforcement that started in United States in the 1930s and also even
prior to that, the legal definition of what constituted “monopoly” was still predominant and
diverged from the definition of this term by economists.148 This period also marks the
ascendancy of the competition logic after a period of peaceful co-existence between intellectual
property rights and antitrust.
If monopoly is considered as a synonym for exclusive right, then by definition the owner
of a patent is a monopolist. But if the meaning of monopoly is the condition that generates social
loss, in economics this condition is only present “when the demand curve has a negative slope in
the region at which output is occurring”.149 This is not always the case for intellectual property
145 Darcy v Allen (The Case of Monopolies) (1602), Moore (K.B.) 671.; 77 Eng. Rep. 1260.
146 Michael J Trebilcock, The Common Law of Restraint of Trade (Sweet & Maxwell 1986).
147 Rudolph J Peritz, ‘The “Rule of Reason” in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint of Competition’ (1989) 40
Hastings Law Journal 285, 336.
148 Edward S Mason, ‘Monopoly in Law and Economics’ (1937) 47 Yale Law Journal 34.
149 Edmund W Kitch, ‘Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?’ (1986) 8 Research in Law and Economics 31, 33.
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rights, as there may be substitute products or technologies, which are not covered by the property
rights and could be used instead by the consumers.150 The owners of the intellectual property
rights are therefore limited in their capacity to charge a monopoly price as they should also take
into account the competitive pressures exercised by competing products or technologies.
One could also compare the situation with a monopolistic competition equilibrium
following some product differentiation. Consequently, terminology can be seen to have an
important significance.151 In this context, the use of the concept of economic rents is a more
suitable terminology than the concept of “monopoly” because it highlights the fact that the patent
holder benefits from a cost advantage that allows him to make more profits than his rivals but the
patent does not necessarily confer him the possibility to restrict output and therefore exercise
monopoly power.152
The presumption that an intellectual property right may confer monopoly power has been
weakened and ultimately abandoned in both US antitrust law153 and EU competition law.154
Although there is no presumption that IP rights confer market power, they may however
reinforce in EU competition law the inference of a dominant position if the undertaking  also
enjoys a high market share.155
b. The property rights character of IP rights should not provide competition law immunity
One of the side-effects of the conflict between competition law and intellectual property
rights is the need to find theoretical justifications for instituting property rights in ideas. It is not
the first time that intellectual property is placed in a defensive position. The “literary property”
debate of the 18th century and the “patent controversy” of the 19th century, highlighting the
collision of copyright and patents with the common law and the principle of free trade,
engendered an important debate on the theoretical underpinnings of intellectual property.156
From these beginnings, it is clear that the narrative of property that appeared in both periods
played an “ex post facto role in legitimating” the granting of property rights in ideas. It also
served as a useful organising concept for all the different forms of IP rights that have emerged. In
more recent times, the adoption of international treaties on intellectual property, within the WTO
150 Roger E Meiners and Robert J Staaf, ‘Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or Monopoly?’ (1990) 13
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 911; Edmund W Kitch, ‘Elementary and Persistent Errors in the
Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property’ (2000) 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 1727, 1734.
151 Hillary Greene, ‘Afterword: The Role of the Competition Community in the Patent Law Discourse’ (2002) 69
Antitrust Law Journal 841, 844.
152 Dam (n 7) 250-251. The ability to raise prices profitably and restrict output is also a prerequisite for finding an
“exclusionary market power” in situations of raising rivals’ costs strategies.
153 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v Independent Ink Inc., 547 US (2006). The Supreme Court abandoned the presumption
that a patent confers market power upon the patentee.
154 Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v Metro-SB-Grossmarketete GmbH & Co., [1971] ECR
487, para 16. ; Joined Cases C-241/91 and C-242/91 Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission (Magill), ECR [1995] I-
743, para 46.
155 See, Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La-Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461, para 42D & 48; Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak
Rausing S.A. v Commission [1990] ECR II-309, para 23.
156 On the “literary controversy” see, May and Sell (n 144) 87-97; Sherman and Bently (n 7) 11. On the “patent
controversy” see Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, ‘The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century’ (1950) 10
Journal of Economic History 1.
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or the WIPO, has strengthened the importance of IP rights while at the same time restricted
governments’ discretion to actively apply their competition law statutes.157
From this perspective, considered as a form of property, IP rights benefit from a high level of
esteem and legal protection that could lead to a weak application or even immunity from
competition law enforcement. Property rights are of constitutional value. They are generally
protected by the Constitutions of the European Union Member States and by the first additional
Protocol of the European Convention of Human rights (ECHR), which is also integrated in
European Union law. The rhetoric of “property rights” therefore plays an important role in
legitimating IP rights and in defining a framework for the interface between intellectual property
and competition, which is largely biased in favour of IP rights. US law is somewhat different.
The Constitution gives Congress the authority to create patent and copyright rights, however,
there is no requirement that it do so.158 However, once a patent or copyright is awarded, it is
treated like property.
There are an increasing number of references, in competition law discourse, to the need to
establish an analogy between physical property rights and intellectual property. Take for
example the US Guidelines for Intellectual Property of 1995 which provide that:
“(t)he Agencies apply the same general antitrust principles to conduct involving
intellectual property that they apply to conduct involving any other form of tangible or
intangible property”.
The European Commission also mentioned in the Microsoft decision that IP rights are
“not in a different category to property rights as such”. In addition, article 17 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which has since the Lisbon Treaty legal-binding
effect, proclaims the right to property, which is based on Article 1 of the Protocol to the
ECHR.159 The guarantee laid down in subsection 1 of article 17 applies also to IP, mentioned in
subsection 2, which emphasizes the analogy drawn between property rights in goods and
property rights in ideas. One could remark that the term “rights’ is not used for intellectual
property, while this is the case for property. However, nothing is mentioned in the second
paragraph concerning the possible public interest limits to the scope of intellectual property
protection.
It remains however clear that property does not constitute an absolute right. European
Union law emphasises the “social function” of property, according to which, property rights can
be restricted for reasons of public interest, provided that those restrictions in fact “do not
constitute, as regards the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which
157 See article 31 of the TRIPS agreement. Hanns Ullrich, ‘Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and
Reductionist Competition Rules: a TRIPS Perspective’ in Keith Maskus (ed), International Public Goods and
Transfer of Technology (Cambridge University Press 2005) 726-757.
158 US Const. Art. 1, § 8.
159 According to article 17 of the Charter, “1. Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her
lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in
the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for
their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law insofar as is necessary for the general interest. 2. Intellectual
property shall be protected.”
49
infringes upon the very substance of the rights thus guaranteed”.160 Competition law constitutes a
“general interest” objective that could justify a restriction on the scope of property rights.161 The
terminology of “property rights” does not create an antitrust immunity for IP rights, as their use
can be restricted any time they contribute to an infringement of competition law and act against
the public interest.
At the same time as being powerless in providing an immunity status to IP rights, the
“property rights” rhetoric also does not contribute to the understanding of the necessity of
balancing the objectives of reward and dissemination. Indeed, the criterion of “property” is
formalistic and does not provide any useful information as to the adequate level of reward and
dissemination in order for the scope of the IP right to be optimal.162 This is clear from proponents
of a strong IP protection not referring to the concept of “property right”, when attempting to
emphasise the instrumental character of intellectual property in order to achieve greater
innovation and economic welfare. On the contrary, economists fully adhere to the instrumental
approach to property rights and consider property rights as a form of collective action in the
marketplace along with other tools such as direct regulation, liabilities, rewards and taxes.163
The parallel drawn with physical property is consequently not helpful in determining the
adequate balance between reward and dissemination. It is remarkable that both those favouring a
less activist antitrust policy against IP rights and those advocating a more careful consideration
of the effects of intellectual property protection to competition adhere to the “property rights”
logic of intellectual property, while supporting opposite conclusions.164
We consider that the analogy with property rights on tangibles is misleading165. First, IP
rights have distinct characteristics not present in physical property rights. Information may be
considered as a pure public good as the “consumption” of information by one person does not
diminish the possibility of its consumption by another. Simultaneous (or joint) consumption is
also possible. The necessity to confer property rights in order to avoid congestion externalities,
160 Case 265/87 Herman Schräder HS Kraftfutter GmbH v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] ECR 2237, para 15.
161 FAG-Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG, 98/190, OJ [1998] L 72/30, para 90. This is also a conclusion reached by the
advocate general George Cosmas in Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd. v HB Ice Cream Ltd. [2000] ECR I-11369.
162 Steve Anderman, ‘Does the Microsoft Case offer a New Paradigm for the Exceptional Circumstances Test and
Compulsory Copyright Licenses under EC Competition Law?’ (2004) Competition Law Review 7, 22.
163 Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2004) 93-94;
See also Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed, Aspen 2003) 47 (distinguishing between “formal
property rights” and the way economists describe them as “every device – public or private, common law or
regulatory, contractual or governmental, formal or informal – by which divergences between private and social costs
or benefits are reduced”); James E Krier ‘The (Unlikely) Death of Property’ (1990) 13 Harvard Journal of Law and
Public Policy 75, 76 and 78 (“(regulation and property) are simply variations in a more general category of
operational techniques. Property is just a system of regulation and vice versa”).
164 Comp. Cyril Ritter, ‘Refusal to Deal and Essential Facilities: Does Intellectual Property Require Special
Deference Compared to Tangible Property?’ (2005) 28 World Competition 281; Simon Gevenaz, ‘Against
Immunity for Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual Property: Why Antitrust Law Should Not Distinguish
Between IP and Other Property Rights’ (2004) 19 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 741 who take a more activist
antitrust standpoint with Christian Ahlborn, David S Evans and Jorge A Padilla ‘The Logic & Limits of the
“Exceptional Circumstances Test” in Magill and IMS Health’ (2004) 28 Fordham International Law Journal 1109.
165 See, Ioannis Lianos, ‘Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: Is the Property Rights' Approach
Right?’ in John Bell and Claire Kilpatrick (eds) 8 The Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (Hart
Publishing 2006) 153.
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which is the usual rationale for physical property rights, is not therefore compelling.166 The
overuse of the information by free riders may nevertheless decrease the value of the resource for
the inventors who will find it more difficult to recoup their fixed costs. As a result, their
incentives to innovate will diminish and the level of provision of this good would be below the
socially efficient level.167 Granting a property right on information requires a trade-off between
the need to encourage innovation and the adequate dissemination of the innovation.168 This is an
important difference with physical property rights and highlights the inherent instrumental
character of intellectual property. Second, the intervention of the public authorities is also more
systematic and intensive for IP rights than for tangible property rights.169 For example, the
examination of the conditions of patentability is done by a specialised regulator, the Patent
Office. This highlights the most important difference between intellectual property rights and
property rights on tangibles: the intervention of an independent regulatory agency. By
considering that certain intellectual property rights such as patents are not common law rights but
simple creations of an administrative process, it is possible to argue that they should not benefit
from the thesis of the efficiency of common law and that they can be the outcome of a regulatory
capture.170
3. Standards for the interaction between competition law and IP rights
Standards for the intersection between competition law and IP rights in Europe and the
US have initially taken a formalist perspective focusing on the scope of the IP rights, their value
or their essential function171. This did not rely on a case-by-case analysis of the economic effects
of the interaction between competition law and IP rights on incentives to innovate or the
dissemination of the invention but on a formalistic analysis of the scope of the IP right, its value,
its essential function or the intent of the patent holder. Most recently, competition authorities in
Europe and in the United States have opted for a balancing approach that compares welfare
effects between, on the one hand static allocative efficiency and, on the other hand, dynamic
efficiency on a case by case basis. These tests, although more economically oriented than the
formal standards focusing on the scope of the IP rights, are difficult to apply in practice and may
lead to favour competition law over IP rights in most circumstances.
a. Formalistic standards for the IP/Competition Law interface
(i) Standards focusing on the scope or value of the IP right
166 Mark A Lemley, ‘Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding’ (2005) 83 Texas Law Review 1031.
167 Paul M Romer, ‘When Should We Use Intellectual Property Rights?’ (2002) 92 American Economic Review
213-216.
168 Nordhaus (n 27).
169 William Landes and Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Harvard University
Press 2003) 415; Bouckaert (n 143) 805 (noting that IP rights ‘are exogenous to the inner logic of private law’ and
‘the only difference (with government regulation) is that the users of the ideas compensate producers directly
without the intermediation of the government’).
170 Hovenkamp The Antitrust Enterprise – Principle and Execution (n 139) 250-251 (giving examples of interest-
group capture of IP protection).
171 See, Michael Carrier ‘Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation’ (2003) 56
Vanderbilt Law Review 1047.
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Standards focusing on the scope of the IP rights have taken different forms. First, the
inherency doctrine, or limited license doctrine, protects the practices inherent to the exercise of
the IP right from the application of competition law.172 For example, “an output restriction
imposed on licensees is encompassed by the patent holder’s right to refuse to license to
manufacturers altogether”.173 In Bement, the Supreme Court recognized the right of a patent
holder to impose price restrictions on licensees, as the patent holder disposes the right to charge
any price (even monopolistic) if it would reserve the market to itself.174 According to the Court,
“(t)he object of the patent laws is monopoly, and the rule is, with few exceptions, that any
conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of property, imposed
by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to manufacture or use or sell the
article, will be upheld by the courts, and the fact that the conditions in the contracts keep up the
monopoly, does not render them illegal”.175 The doctrine was extended in order to grant antitrust
immunity to patent holders imposing tying restrictions to their licensees, forcing them to limit
the use of the patented product with unpatented products supplied by the patent holder.176 The
assumption was that if the licensees were happy to accept this additional burden it is because of
the competitive superiority of the patented invention that provided the right to the patent holder
to control the market for unpatented goods. The impact of this jurisprudence was to extend the
rights of the patent holder to exclude, use and control a market of unpatented goods. The
inherence doctrine, very favorable to the interests of patent holders, was abandoned following
the introduction of the Clayton Act 1914 in which tying clauses restricting competition were
made illegal, irrespective of whether they concerned patented or unpatented goods.177 The
Supreme Court overruled Dick in Motion Picture Patents referring to the Clayton Act, in which
the Court condemned a licensing provision requiring operators of motion picture projectors to
screen film only produced by the manufacturer178 and confirmed in Morton Salt Co. v Suppiger
Co. that the use of the patent monopoly to restrain competition in the marketing of the
unpatented goods for use with the patented one constituted a patent misuse and was contrary to
public policy.179 Following this turn, the US antitrust authorities have been relatively hostile to
IP rights, culminating with the formulation of the so called “Nine No-Nos”, a set of practices
involving IP rights which were to be found to infringe antitrust law.180
172 Vladimir Bastidas Venegas, ‘Shifting Towards a Dynamic Efficiency Test?: Evaluating Licensing Agreements
under Antitrust Law’ in Steven Anderman and Ariel Ezrachi (eds) Intellectual property and Competition Law – New
Frontiers (Oxford University Press 2011) 461-485.
173 Ibid 466.
174 Bement v National Harrow Co., 186 US 70 (1902) cited by V. Bastidas Venegas (n 172) 466.
175 Ibid 70.
176 Henry v AB Dick Company, 224 US 1 (1912).
177 Clayton Act, Section 3.
178 Motion Picture Patents Company v Universal Film Manufacturing Company et al., 243 US 502 (1917).
179 Morton Salt Co. v Suppiger Co., 314 US 488 (1942).
180 Bruce B Wilson, ‘Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field of Use, Territorial, Price and Quantity
Restrictions’ Address Before the Fourth New England Antitrust Conference (6 November 1970). The list was
developed by Bruce Wilson, a former deputy assistant attorney general for antitrust in the 1970s and included
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compulsory payment of royalties in amounts not reasonably related to sales of the patented product, tie-outs, post-
sale price restrictions on resale by purchasers of patented products.
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In US v General Electric, the Supreme Court suggested a different standard for the
interaction between competition law and IP rights.181 The case concerned a restriction on the
price of patented goods imposed by the patent holder to the licensee. The Court focused for the
first time on the extent of the reward received by the patent holder and held that “the patentee
may grant a license to make, use and vend articles under the specification of his patent for any
royalty or upon any condition the performance of which is reasonably within the reward which
the patentee by the grant of the patent is entitled to secure”.182 According to the Court, “one of
the valuable elements of the exclusive right of a patentee is to acquire profit by the price at which
the article is sold […] (t)he higher the price, the greater the profit, unless it is prohibitory”.183
Although this case law favors the interests of the patent holder as opposed to that of licensees,
when the patent holder grants a license to make and vend the patented article, the use of the term
“reasonable” opens the door to some form of control of the restrictions on price or methods of
sale imposed by the patent holder. Commentators have suggested different standards to account
for the reasonableness of the restriction184.
Baxter proposed a “comparability test” according to which “a patentee is entitled to
extract monopoly income by restricting utilization of his invention” as long as the restriction is
confined “as narrowly and specifically as the technology of his situation and the practicalities of
administration permit”.185 Baxter’s assumption is that the bargaining between the patent holder
and the licensee sets the reward for each patented invention and provides information on the
value of the patent for society. Any restriction confined to the exploitation of the patented
invention and not extending to unpatented items will thus be immune from the antitrust laws.
However, antitrust law should capture restrictions that potentially may harm the bargaining
process, which is understood as being comparable to the value of the invention to licensees and
to society. Any restriction affecting the genuineness of the bargaining process, for example a
restriction protecting licensees from competition by other licensees, or a restriction allowing the
monopolization of the end product in competition with other substitutable technologies, and thus
leading to the sharing of the monopolistic profits between licensor and licensee, impacts on the
function of the bargaining process as a mechanism for determining the reward to the patent
holder and thus falls within the scope of antitrust intervention as going beyond the value of the
patent.
Taking a Chicago school of antitrust economics perspective, Bowman advanced a
“competitive superiority” test, which would allow a patentee to utilize a restrictive practice if the
reward to the patentee represents “the patented product’s competitive superiority over
substitutes”.186 Bowman distinguishes between profit maximization (which may include the
monopolistic price) and the extension of the legal patent monopoly to unpatented products. Only
when the latter is established, the practice will fall under the scope of the antitrust laws. Hence,
181 US v General Electric, 272 US 476 (1926).
182 Ibid 489 (emphasis added).
183 Ibid 490.
184 For more analysis, see Carrier (n 171); Bastidas Venegas (n 172).
185 William F Baxter, ‘Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis’ (1966)
Yale Law Journal 267. For a critical analysis, see Michael A Carrier, ‘Unravelling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox’
(2002) 150(3) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 761, 795-796.
186 Ward S Bowman, Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal (University of Chicago Press
1973).
53
according to this standard, antitrust law will not apply to a practice that aims to deal with free-
riding concerns, price discrimination or quality control, to the extent that these will not extend
the monopoly rent to unpatented products.
In Europe, the development of standards for the interaction between competition law and
IP rights is further complicated by the division of competence between the EU and its Member
States with regard to IP law and competition law: Competition law is mainly an EU competence,
if inter-state trade is affected, while the creation of systems of intellectual property remains the
competence of the Member States. Starting with Consten & Grundig on the granting of a trade
mark,187 the EU courts have asserted on numerous occasions that the “existence” of IP rights
granted under national law is not affected by the European treaties, while the “exercise” of the IP
rights may fall within the scope of EU competition law. This distinction is based first, on the
drafting of the Treaty which, in the context of the free movement of goods provisions of the
Treaty, grants to Member States the possibility to justify quantitative restrictions to trade for the
protection of intellectual property rights (Article 36 TFEU), second, on the fact that Article 345
TFEU provides that Member States’ systems of property law should be protected. The distinction
between “existence” and “exercise” may be subject to criticism as it is difficult to distinguish
between the core of the IP right, its scope, and its exercise, unless the distinction reflects a
decision over a list of legitimate activities that can fall within the scope of the IP right, similar to
the approach followed in the US with regard to the scope of the IP rights. For example, would
the sale of the IP right fall within the scope of EU competition law or would it be part of the
existence of the right, assuming that this covers as any property right the use and sale of the
right?
The European Courts have proceeded to a formalistic approach by defining the scope of
the IP rights as linked to the “subject matter” and the “essential function” of the specific IP
rights. The concept of the “specific subject-matter” made it possible to determine what might be
covered by the legal status of any industrial or intellectual property right without damaging the
EU principles of competition or that of free movement. For instance, in the field of patents, the
'specific subject-matter' consists, in the Court of Justice's view, in “the exclusive right to use an
invention with a view to manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circulation for
the first time […] as well as the right to oppose infringements”.188 The Court also found that “the
basic function of the trade mark [is] to guarantee to consumers that the product has the same
origin”,189 a definition later expanded to cover the ability of trademark owners to oppose “any
possibility of confusion to distinguish that product from products which have another origin”.190
The Court referred to the purposive concept of “essential function” in order to expand the
specific subject matter beyond the core rights previously identified. For example, in American
Home products, the Court referred to the “essential function” of trademarks to grant to a
trademark owner the right to prohibit a reseller of its goods from repackaging the products and
then applying the trademark to the new package.191
187 Joined cases C-56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299.
188 Case 15/74 Centrafarm BV and Adriaan de Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc [1974] ECR 1147.
189 Case 119/75 Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v Terranova Industrie CA Kapferer & Co [1976] ERR 1039.
190 Case 102/77 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139.
191 Case C 3/78 Centrafarm v American Home products corporation [1978] ECR 1823.
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In Windsurfing, the Court found incompatible with Article 101(1) TFEU a patent
licensing agreement containing obligations placed on the licensees only to use components
approved by the licensor and to sell the patented product in conjunction with a product outside
the scope of the patent clauses.192 Windsurfing argued that the purpose of the requirement was
solely to ensure that the products sold by the licensees were not of inferior quality and did not
infringe the rights of other licensees, hence, they were covered by the specific subject-matter of
the licensed patent rights. The Court found that such quality controls do not come within the
specific subject-matter of the patent unless they relate to a product covered by the patent since
their sole justification is that they ensure 'that the technical instructions as described in the patent
and used by the licensee may be carried into effect”.193 The Court found the “arbitrarily placed”
obligation on the licensee only to sell the patented product in conjunction with a product “outside
the scope of the patent” as not being “indispensable to the exploitation of the patent”.194
The distinction between “existence” and “exercise” has also affected the enforcement of
Article 102 TFEU to IP rights. In CICCRA/Renault and Volvo/Veng, concerning the refusal by
the automobile manufacturers to deliver to independent repairers the spare parts they were
producing, the Court emphasised that “the right of the proprietor of a protected design to prevent
third parties from manufacturing and selling or importing, without its consent, products
incorporating the design constitutes the very subject-matter of his exclusive right”, finding that
“an obligation imposed upon the proprietor of a protected design to grant to third parties in return
for a reasonable royalty, a licence for the supply of products incorporating the design would lead
to the proprietor thereof being deprived of the substance of his exclusive right, and that a refusal
to grant such a licence cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position”.195 The Court
noted, however, that the “exercise” of an exclusive right could be subject to Article 102 TFEU in
“exceptional circumstances” if there was “certain abusive conduct” and provided three examples
of situations where Article 102 TFEU could be applicable: in this case (i) the excessive pricing
of the patented products, (ii) the refusal to supply independent repair shops and (iii) failure to
continue production of parts for car models still in circulation.196 The concepts of “subject
matter” and “essential function” of IP rights have been used in these cases as a shield to
competition law enforcement. However, by opening the door for “certain abusive conduct” to
fall under Article 102 TFEU the Court sapped the practical relevance of the “existence”
/”exercise” distinction.
In Magill, a case involving the refusal by TV stations grant a copyright license for the
relevant information on their day programmes, thus impeding Magill from launching a weekly
TV guide, the General Court went as far as concluding that the broadcaster conduct was outside
the essential function of the copyright when, “in the light of the details of each individual case, it
is apparent that that right is exercised in such ways and circumstances as in fact to pursue an aim
manifestly contrary to the objectives of Article [102 TFEU]”.197 According to the Court, “(i)n
192 Case 193/83 Windsurfing International v Commission [1986] ECR 611.
193 Ibid para 45.
194 Ibid para 57.
195 Case 53/87 CICCRA v Renault [1988] ECR 6039; Case 238/87 Volvo v Veng [1988] ECR 6211, para 8.
196 Ibid para 9.
197 Case T-69/89 RTE v Commission [1991] ECR II-485; Case T-70/89, British Broadcasting Corporation and BBC
Enterprises Ltd v. Commission [1991] ECR II-535, para 58 (British Broadcasting case); Case T-76/89, ITP v
Commission [1991] ECR II-575.
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that event, the copyright is no longer exercised in a manner which corresponds to its essential
function […] which is to protect the moral rights in the work and ensure a reward for the creative
effort, while respecting the aims of, in particular, Article [102 TFEU]. Indeed, “(i)n that case, the
primacy of [EU] law, particularly as regards principles as fundamental as those of the free
movement of goods and freedom of competition, prevails over any use of a rule of national
intellectual property law in a manner contrary to those principles”.198 Although in its judgment
on appeal the Court of Justice has not discussed this part of the General Court’s judgment and
did not deal with the issue of the “subject matter” of the copyright in question, Advocate General
Gulmann noted in his Opinion that “the right to refuse licences forms part of the specific subject-
matter of copyright” and criticized the General Court’s conclusion for incorporating “the aim of
the competition rules in the determination of the essential function of copyright” and thus for not
accepting the competition law immunity of conduct falling within the scope of the “essential
function” of the copyright.199 The Court of Justice preferred instead to refer to the “exceptional
circumstances” that conduct involving IP rights might fall under article 102 TFEU.200 The
concept of “exceptional circumstances” has been interpreted broadly by the jurisprudence of the
European Courts,201 as well as national courts,202 thus suggesting that the EU courts have
abandoned their previous formalistic approach focusing on the definition of the scope of the IP
right and its core for a more open-ended approach that would involve some form of case by case
(economic) analysis.
It is noteworthy that in other occasions the EU Courts went beyond a purely formalistic
distinction between the “existence”, the core of the IP right, and its “exercise” and considered the
value of the IP right in envisioning the interaction between competition law and IP rights. In
Erawu-Jacquery v La Hesbignonne, the Court held that a prohibition on the sale or export of
basic seeds was not within Article 101 TFEU since considerable investment had been made in
developing the basic seed.203 According to the Court, “a person who has made considerable
efforts to develop varieties of basic seed which may be the subject-matter of plant breeders'
rights must be allowed to protect himself against any improper handling of those varieties of
seed” and “to that end, the breeder must be entitled to restrict propagation to the growers which
he has selected as licensees”.204
198 Ibid British Broadcasting Case, para 58.
199 Opinion of AG Gulman in Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and
Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission [1995] ECR I-743, para 38 & 70.
200 Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications
Ltd (ITP) v. Commission [1995] ECR I-743.
201 See, for instance Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, (n 194), paras 10 & 50; Case C-418/01 IMS Health
GmbH & Co OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] ECR I-5039, para 35, 37 (listing as constituting
exception circumstances the refusal to grant license of an input the supply of which was indispensable for carrying
on the business in question, the fact that such refusal prevented the emergence of a new product for which there was
a potential consumer demand, the fact that it was not justified by objective considerations and was likely to exclude
all competition in the secondary market); Microsoft CFI case (n 120), para 331 and 647 (noting that prejudice may
arise where there is a limitation not only of production or markets, but also of technical development, thus extending
the scope of application of Article 102 TFEU to refusals to license) (IMS Health case).
202 See, for instance in the UK, Intel Corp. v Via Technologies Inc. [2002] EWCA Civ 1905 (Civil Division – Court
of Appeal), para 48 (noting that exceptional circumstances may extend beyond those contemplated in Magill and
IMS).
203 Case 27/87 SPRL Louis Erauw-Jacquery v La Hesbignonne SC [1988] ECR 1919. See also, Case 258/78,
Nungesser v. Commission [1982] ECR 2015.
204 Ibid para 10.
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(ii) Standards focusing on the intent of the IP holder
A possible alternative standard is to focus on the intent of the monopolist.205 Some US
courts have adopted standards based on intent advancing the view that a monopolist should not
“rely upon a pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct”.206 This might
involve some analysis of the subjective intent of the undertaking, by looking to documents,
emails or statements. However, it is unclear at what level of management the decision-maker
should look to find evidence of intent and it is quite common for executives to use language that
suggests intent to exclude a competitor.
An alternative would be to examine objective intent as this is indicated by the behaviour
of the undertaking. In its Preliminary Report of the Sector Inquiry on the Pharmaceutical Sector,
the Commission noted that “intention can […] be taken into account in competition law
assessments”,207 although it is clear that the intent of the applicants does not form part of the
assessment of patent claims.208 The Astra Zeneca decision of the European Commission,
confirmed by the General Court, acknowledged the importance of evidence of anticompetitive
intent in demonstrating that a conduct is liable to have anticompetitive effects.209 The General
Court found that while abuse is an objective concept, “[…] intention can still be taken into
account to support the conclusion that the undertaking concerned abused a dominant position,
even if the abusive conduct actually took place”.210 In any case, evidence of intent plays a limited
role in Article 102 analysis.211
b. Economic balancing tests
Balancing tests weigh the restriction of allocative efficiency or other anticompetitive
effects of the conduct involving IP rights from one side and the possible benefits of these IP
rights in inducing innovation and dynamic efficiency on the other side. Innovation is considered
positively as it enhances competition in the market and provides a variety of choice to
205 Carrier (n 171) 793.
206Image Technical Services, Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), 1219.
207 European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, Final Report (n 43), footnotes 375 and 376.
208 For example, in the context of the DG Comp’s Pharmaceutical sector inquiry, the European Patent Office argued
against a scrutiny of the intent of applicants in applying for patent rights for purposes of competition law. See,
Communication from the Commission, Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, available
at < http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/communication_en.pdf >, last accessed 28
April 2013, p. 7
209 Commission Decision, AstraZeneca (n 20) Annex A, para. 13.
210 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca AB v Commission [2010] ECR II-2805, para 334, although on appeal the Court of
Justice did not explicitly confirmed this position: Case C-457/10P AstraZeneca AB v. Commission (6 December,
2012).
211 See, for instance, Case C-549/10 Tomra Systems ASA v Commission (April 12, 2012), para 19 (noting that “it is
clearly legitimate for the Commission to refer to subjective factors, namely the motives underlying the business
strategy in question”), paras 21 and 22 (observing that “the Commission is under no obligation to establish the
existence of such intent on the part of the dominant undertaking in order to render Article [102 TFEU] applicable”
and that “(t)he existence of an intention to compete on the merits, even if it were established, could not prove the
absence of abuse”).
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consumers. Contrary to the formalistic analysis conducted under the scope or intent tests,
balancing tests involve some consideration of the economic effects of the IP rights in the specific
market configuration.
One of the most sophisticated balancing tests is Kaplow’s ratio test, which examines the
ratio between “the reward the patentee receives when permitted to use a particular restrictive
practice” and “the monopoly loss that results from such exploitation of the patent”.212 According
to Kaplow, ‘patentee reward’ and ‘monopoly loss’ refer, respectively, to the incremental reward
and loss resulting from the practice in question”.213 The ratio depends on how much the reward is
increased or decreased as opposed to how much the monopoly deadweight loss is increased or
decreased by each individual licensing restriction. This ratio will be compared to an “optimal
ratio”, which is the ratio for increasing the patent life by one year, assuming that patent law has
made the right balance of incentives and rewards at the first place.214 If the individual ratio for
the specific practice is lower than the optimal ratio, the practice should be prohibited. If it is
higher, then one should measure whether the licensing practice costs less (in providing the
incremental reward) than the last year of patent life. If the individual ratio is higher, the practice
is permitted. Contrary to other standards, the test provides a balancing on a case-by-case basis of
the possible effects of the exercise of the IP rights on allocative and dynamic efficiency.
However, the test is resource intensive, as it requires ascribing particular numbers for patentee
reward and monopoly loss, a difficult task already for economists not to mention the courts.215 It
also focuses on total welfare and does not grant a specific weigh to the welfare of consumers,
unless we assume that the interest of the consumers long term coincide with that of the inventor,
which might be problematic in jurisdictions in which the protection of the consumers is the
primary objective of competition law. One might also object to the narrow view of the concept of
innovation in this test as it emphasizes the reward for the pioneer inventor (standalone
innovation), without considering the possibility of cumulative innovation.216 The implicit
assumption that the patent system has made the right balance of incentives and rewards, in order
to define the optimal ratio, may also be questioned.
Among the various economic balancing tests that have also been suggested, Ordover
argues that the critical trade-off is “between incentives for investment in knowledge creation and
the overall efficiency with which this investment is achieved”.217 For Ordover, both competition
law and intellectual property law contribute to the two stages of competition that are “pertinent
to the understanding of dynamic evolution of the economy”: “(e)x ante competition occurs at the
R&D stage (production of knowledge); (e)x post competition occurs at the product (or service)
212 Louis Kaplow, ‘The Patent-Antitrust Intersection:  A Reappraisal’ (1984) 97 Harvard Law Review 1813, 1816.
213 Ibid 1831-1832.
214 Ibid 1830.
215 Carrier (n 172) 798. As it has been noted by Janusz A Ordover, ‘Economic Foundations and Considerations in
Protecting Industrial and Intellectual Property’ (1984) 53(3) Antitrust Law Journal 503, 514 (noting that “it is
unlikely that the analyst will have information that is precise enough to determine the movement of the ratio,
especially in those close cases when, as a result of relaxation, both numerator and denominator of the ratio move in
the same direction, as when a new practice increases both the innovator's reward and the monopoly loss”).
216 Bastidas Venegas (n 172) 473.
217 Ordover (n 215) 509.
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stage”.218 The presentation of the tension between these two areas as indicating a tension
between monopoly and competition is thus incorrect:
“First of all, inasmuch as patent, copyright and trademark laws and antitrust law are all
concerned with promoting efficient allocation of social resources, there can be no conflict
on this account. In particular, both patent and antitrust law recognize that without clearly
specified property rights the economic system is bound to collapse. And, second of all,
antitrust law itself recognizes monopoly (market power) as a reward for innovative
effort”.219
Hence, the conflict arises when the dynamic goals of the patent law clash with the static
allocative goals of competition law, hence the conclusion that “the conflict between these two
bodies of law reflects the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency”.220 The comparison of
static allocative efficiency effects and dynamic efficiency raises the issue of the discounting of
the dynamic efficiency effects, “because the benefits from a given R&D investment flow over
time they must be made commensurate with the up-front costs of the investment itself”.221
Ordover conceptualizes the existence of two markets: the upstream market (of ideas, information
and knowledge) and the downstream market (of products and services) arguing that these two
markets are connected temporally but also intertemporally linked “in the sense that economic
events (such as the intensity of competition) that occur in the upstream market have a
prospective impact on competition and on allocative efficiency in the downstream market”.222 He
suggests the analysis of the effects of these practices and institutions in the form of a structured
rule of reason that would look to market shares, market concentration and entry barriers at both
levels of this “temporal vertical chain”. The analysis is more complicated than for other vertical
agreements in the licensing context as the firm that sells the license participates both in the
upstream (R&D) market as well as in the downstream (product or services) market, which
suggests that the anticompetitive effect is more likely in the licensing context if the restriction is
employed by a firm that operates in both markets. A practice is deemed efficient “if it leads to a
lower cost of ‘producing’ the same ‘quantity’ of knowledge, new information or ideas”.223
Should it be necessary to weigh the pro-competitive effects in one market to the anti-competitive
effects in the other, Ordover suggests giving a greater weight to expansions of the R&D output
than to expansions (or contractions) of outputs of goods and services. In essence, his approach
advances the following components in the structured rule of reason analysis: “(i) (t)he finegrain
structure of both the downstream and upstream markets, (ii) (t)he actual legal interpretations of
the patent, copyright and trade- mark laws: for example, are patents interpreted broadly or
narrowly? (iii) (t)he strength of incentives for the creation of intellectual and industrial property
provided by other tools of social policy that have an impact on knowledge and information
creation, (iv) (t)he nature of the R&D activity itself. For example, are R&D expenditures being
devoted to a ‘patent race’ towards a major breakthrough where there can be (temporarily) only
218 Ibid 510.
219 Ibid 511.
220 Ibid
221 Ibid 514.
222 Ibid
223 Ibid 517.
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one winner, or are these expenditures being devoted to minor process or product improvements
that allow a number of winners to coexist as rivals in the marketplace”.224
Other economic balancing tests focus on the IP side of the equation and suggest an
adjustment of the scope and strength of IP rights as a possible solution to the problem.225
Although not explicitly referring to a balancing test, the US DOJ and FTC Intellectual
Property Guidelines in 1995 took a more positive view of IP rights and ended the period of
hostility represented by the “Nine No Nos” approach previously followed by the US agencies,
following a period during the 1980s during which the IP rights have been strengthened. The
Guidelines advance that restraints in intellectual property licensing arrangements are evaluated
under the rule of reason, the Agencies inquiring “whether the restraint is likely to have
anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve
procompetitive benefits that outweigh those anticompetitive effects”,226 by looking to the
characteristics of the restraint (was it imposed by a competitor or a non-competitor, does it
involve an exclusive license?) and a number of market factors (concentration, market shares,
possible foreclosure or collusive effects). According to the Guidelines,
“(i)f the Agencies conclude that the restraint has, or is likely to have, an anticompetitive
effect, they will consider whether the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve
procompetitive efficiencies. If the restraint is reasonably necessary, the Agencies will
balance the procompetitive efficiencies and the anticompetitive effects to determine the
probable net effect on competition in each relevant market”.
The Guidelines also put in place a “safety zone” recognizing that licensing arrangements
often promote innovation and enhance competition and thus some degree of certainty should be
offered to undertakings in order to encourage such activity. The safety zone encapsulates a
balancing test, as it implies that such arrangements have positive effects on welfare. With regard
to the effect on product markets, the licensor and its licensees collectively should account for no
more than twenty percent of each relevant market significantly affected by the restraint. With
regard to the effect on technology and innovation markets, there should be at least four or more
independently controlled technologies in addition to the technologies controlled by the parties to
the licensing arrangement. Alternatively, there should be four or more independently controlled
entities in addition to the parties to the licensing arrangement possessing the required specialized
assets or characteristics and the incentive to engage in research and development that is a close
substitute of the research and development activities of the parties to the licensing agreement.227
There is no presumption that arrangements falling outside the “safety zone” are anticompetitive.
224 Ibid 518.
225 E.g. Kaplow ‘The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal’ (n 212).
226 US DOJ & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (April 6, 1995), Section 3.1,
available at < http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm#t21> accessed 28 April 2013.
227 Ibid Section 4.3.
60
The EU Guidelines on Transfer of Technology Agreements seem to be inspired by the
same principle.228 Their starting standpoint is that there is no inherent conflict between
intellectual property rights and EU competition rules. According to the Commission,
“[…] both bodies of law share the same basic objective of promoting consumer welfare
and an efficient allocation of resources. Innovation constitutes an essential and dynamic
component of an open and competitive market economy. Intellectual property rights
promote dynamic competition by encouraging undertakings to invest in developing new
or improved products and processes. So does competition by putting pressure on
undertakings to innovate. Therefore, both intellectual property rights and competition are
necessary to promote innovation and ensure a competitive exploitation thereof”.229
The Guidelines refer to the concept of “dynamic competition”,230 which we will explore
later in the report, but it is important here to note that although there is no presumption that
intellectual property rights and licence agreements as such give rise to competition concerns, any
eventual anticompetitive concerns will be assessed with an eye on the possible pro-competitive
efficiencies, which must be “balanced against the negative effects on competition”.231 The EU
Guidelines also create a safe harbour for licensing arrangements that do not impose any hardcore
restriction, such as a cartel, a resale price maintenance clause, restrictions on the exploitation and
development of the licencee's own technology.232 In the current version of the EU Regulation,
the market share threshold to be applied for the purpose of the safe harbour depends on whether
the agreement is concluded between competitors or non-competitors. In the case of agreements
between competitors, which do not include a hardcore restriction, the market share threshold is
20 % and in the case of agreements between non-competitors it is 30 %, as in the latter case the
activities of the parties are usually complementary to each other. Outside the safe harbour
created by the market share thresholds individual assessment is required. The fact that market
shares exceed the thresholds does not give rise to any presumption that the agreement is caught
by Article 101 TFEU. In order to promote predictability beyond the application of these
thresholds and to confine detailed analysis to cases that are likely to present real competition
concerns, the Commission adds a second safe harbor, again with the exception of hardcore
restrictions, when there are four or more independently controlled technologies in addition to the
technologies controlled by the parties to the agreement that may be substitutable for the licensed
technology at a comparable cost to the user.233 According to the Guidelines, in assessing whether
the technologies are sufficiently substitutable, the relative commercial strength of the
technologies in question must be taken into account.
In the context of Article 102 TFEU, the European Commission seems to have been
inspired by the balancing approach in its Microsoft decision.234 The specific characteristics of
228 Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements (n 106).
229 Ibid para 7.
230 Ibid para 8.
231 Ibid para 9.
232 Article 4, Transfer of Technology Block Exemption Regulation 772/2004, [2004] OJ L23.
233 Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements (n 106) para. 131.
234 Commission Decision, Microsoft/W2000 (COMP/C-3/37.792), 24 March 2004, available from
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf> accessed 28 April 2013
(Microsoft Commission Decision).
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intellectual property rights were not prima facie taken into account. The Commission observed
that “there is no persuasiveness to an approach that would advocate the existence of an
exhaustive checklist of exceptional circumstances and would have the Commission disregard a
limine other circumstances of exceptional character that may deserve to be taken into account
when assessing a refusal to supply”.235 Microsoft has put forward the same justification as in the
US litigation: the need to protect its own incentives to innovate by preserving its intellectual
property rights.236 The Commission rejected that claim by affirming that intellectual property
rights “cannot as such constitute a self-evident objective justification for Microsoft’s refusal to
supply”.237 It followed in that respect the position of the Federal Circuit in the US Microsoft
case.238
The Commission considered that innovation is an objective for both intellectual property
and competition law239 and adopted a balancing test focused on innovation incentives concluding
that
“[…] a detailed examination of the scope of the disclosure at stake leads to the conclusion
that, on balance, the possible negative impact of an order to supply on Microsoft’s
incentives to innovate is outweighed by its positive impact on the level of innovation of
the whole industry (including Microsoft). As such the need to protect Microsoft’s
incentives to innovate cannot constitute an objective justification that would offset the
exceptional circumstances identified”.240
On examination, the test seems broader than the “new product” rule. First, the
Commission takes into account the incentives of the competitors of the dominant firm to
innovate in the future. This was not an issue considered in Magill and IMS/NDC Health where
the question was about products which, absent the refusal to supply, have been sold or were to be
offered in the market. Second, the Commission included in its analysis the incentives of
Microsoft to innovate. In Magill and NDCHealth the Court only referred to the dominant firm’s
competitors, which had the intention to enter the secondary market in order to offer a new
product and were excluded by the dominant firm. However, in Microsoft, the Commission took
also into account Microsoft’s incentives to innovate in comparing the situation where article 102
applies with the alternative situation where Microsoft’s anti-competitive behaviour remains
unfettered.241 According to the Commission,
“Microsoft’s research and development efforts are […] spurred by the innovative steps its
competitors take in the work group server operating system market. Were such
competitors to disappear, this would diminish Microsoft’s incentives to innovate”.242
235 Ibid para 555.
236 Ibid para 709.
237 Ibid para 710.
238 U.S. v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (Microsoft’s argument that the exercise of an intellectual property right
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Because of the nature of the market, Microsoft’s incentives to innovate were maintained, while
those of its competitors were also preserved.
The analysis of the incentives of a dominant firm or of its rivals in the secondary market
to innovate extends the scope of article 102 TFEU in comparison with the new product rule. This
is based on the assumption that competitive pressure increases the dominant firm’s incentives to
innovate. This is also linked to the belief that a competitive market is the optimal structure for
innovation.
The Commission’s DG Comp Staff Discussion paper on Article 102 TFEU, adopted in
2005, suggested the adoption of two tests: the “new product rule” and the “incentives to
innovate” test.243 First, in order to constitute an infringement, the refusal to grant a licence should
prevent: “the development of the market for which the licence is an indispensable input, to the
detriment of consumers. This may only be the case if the undertaking which requests the licence
does not intend to limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered on
this market by the owner of the IPR, but intends to produce new goods or services not offered by
the owner of the right and for which there is a potential consumer demand”.244 Second, “a refusal
to licence an IPR protected technology which is indispensable as a basis for follow-up innovation
by competitors may be abusive even if the licence is not sought to directly incorporate the
technology in clearly identifiable new goods and services. The refusal of licensing an IPR
protected technology should not impair consumers’ ability to benefit from innovation brought
about by the dominant undertaking’s competitors”.245
The implementation of this test in practice would, however, raise important difficulties.
The courts are not generally well equipped to conduct the type of prospective cost-benefit
analysis that would be necessary in order to balance the incentives of the dominant firm and its
rivals to innovate. In that respect, Microsoft was a relatively easy case. The Commission did not
undertake the difficult task to balance incentives to innovate, as it assumed that the incentives of
Microsoft were not hampered by the prohibition of the refusal to supply interoperability.
However, if the dominant firm’s incentives to innovate were affected by the prohibition of the
refusal to licence, it would have been necessary to conduct a proper cost-benefit analysis, which
may prove a difficult task for the judiciary.
In its Microsoft judgment, the General Court rephrased the condition of the “new product
rule” by considering that prejudice to consumers may arise where there is limitation of technical
development.246 The Court did not however balance Microsoft’s incentives to innovate with
those of its competitors, thus focusing on a version of the balancing test that would compare
static allocative inefficiencies to dynamic efficiency benefits. This version of the test may lead to
an extension of the scope of Article 102 TFEU, as it takes into account only the incentives of the
rivals of the dominant firm to innovate without considering those of the dominant firm.
243 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses
(hereinafter referred as DG Staff Discussion Paper) December 2005, available at
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The Commission followed up with its Guidance on its enforcement priorities with regard
to exclusionary abusive practices by integrating the “new product rule” to the consideration of
consumer harm in the context of Article 102 TFEU in the form of dynamic effects, advancing
that “consumer harm may, for instance, arise where the competitors that the dominant
undertaking forecloses are, as a result of the refusal, prevented from bringing innovative goods
or services to market and/or where follow-on innovation is likely to be stifled”.247 The
Commission seems however to subject dynamic efficiency gains to a more demanding analysis,
than anticompetitive dynamic effects: as for all types of objective justifications, “the dominant
undertaking will generally be expected to demonstrate, with a sufficient degree of probability,
and on the basis of verifiable evidence, that the following cumulative conditions are fulfilled: (i)
the efficiencies have been, or are likely to be, realised as a result of the conduct […] (ii) the
conduct is indispensable to the realisation of those efficiencies: there must be no less anti-
competitive alternatives to the conduct that are capable of producing the same efficiencies […],
(iii) the likely efficiencies brought about by the conduct outweigh any likely negative effects on
competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets […] (iv) the conduct does not
eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most existing sources of actual or potential
competition”.248 The Commission further notes that “rivalry between undertakings is an essential
driver of economic efficiency, including dynamic efficiencies in the form of innovation”, thus
requiring a residual degree of competition to be maintained in all cases.249 The current approach
does not take into account efficiencies with low probability of being realized or passed on to
consumers. A similar approach is followed in the context of article 101(3) TFEU.250
The risk of the economic balancing approach is that in practice courts and competition
authorities may emphasize more restrictions to allocative efficiency than dynamic efficiency
benefits. The possibility that these economic balancing tests might lead in practice to weigh more
static efficiency as opposed to dynamic effects has led to the view that competition law should
turn to dynamic analysis and embrace the goal of innovation.
c. Competition law and the turn to dynamic analysis
(i) “Dynamic competition” as a criterion of competition law analysis
The competition/static allocative efficiency bias of the economic balancing test has led
many authors to suggest a re-orientation of competition law towards a more dynamic approach
247 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 87
(Guidance Paper).
248 Ibid para 30.
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250 European Commission, Notice - Guidelines on the application of article 81(3) [2004] (n 107), para. 51, noting
that “(a)ll efficiency claims must […] be substantiated so that the following can be verified: (i) the nature of the
claimed efficiencies, (ii) the link between the agreement and the efficiencies, (iii) the likelihood and magnitude of
each claimed efficiency and (iv) how and when each claimed efficiency would be achieved”. According to the
Commission, the parties should describe and explain in detail what is the nature of the efficiencies and how and why
they constitute an objective economic benefit and substantiate any projections as to the date from which the
efficiencies will become operational so as to have a significant positive impact in the market. Unsubstantiated
efficiency claims are rejected. These requirements also apply in the context of Article 102 TFEU.
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that would incorporate innovation as an objective of competition law251. The concept of
“dynamic competition” regroups a number of theories that might be distinguished from the
“static competition model”.252 Jerry Ellig and Daniel Lin outlined the principal strands of
dynamic competition law scholarship: (i) Schumpeterian competition does not focus on price and
output but on new products, new technologies, new sources of supply, new forms of
organization. Possession of market power is found consistent with vigorous competition; (ii)
Evolutionary competition acknowledges that firms develop different routines for doing things
and that the bundle of routines that best enables undertakings to grow and prosper is selected by
the competitive process, which should be left to operate freely (without intervention); (iii) from
an Austrian perspective, information about production methods and consumers’ desires is
incomplete. Hence, competition is a process by which firms discover new resources and better
ways to satisfy consumers; (iv) a path dependence approach would focus on increasing returns
and network effects, acknowledging the fact that consumers may be locked in to inferior
technologically options and that competition often takes the form of “winner takes it all”;
Finally, (v) a resource based perspective will emphasize capabilities in transforming resources to
valuable outputs and thus increase profitability.253 A common characteristic of these different
theories of “dynamic competition” is that they focus on innovation as a key component of the
competitive process.
Several authors have explored the implications of such dynamic analysis in competition
law. Richard Gilbert and Steven Sunshine have argued for the explicit integration of dynamic
efficiency concerns in merger control, through the concept of “innovation markets”.254 David
Evans and Richard Schmalensee have noted that “firms engage in dynamic competition for the
market, through sequential winner-take-all races to produce drastic innovations, rather than
through static price/output competition in the market”.255 They argued for a competition law
251 See, Michael A. Carrier, Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing the Power of Intellectual Property and
Antitrust Law (Oxford University Press 2011).
252 See, for this opposition, Tepperman and Sanderson (n 93) 5, “Competition based on the successive introduction
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improving quality for existing goods, and by pursuing innovation in an effort to introduce new goods to market.
Nonetheless, this way of dichotomizing competitive rivalry serves to emphasize an important contrast. Static views
of competition take the existing set of products and market participants as given, describing the outcome of
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that can be applied and varied in the “short term”. Dynamic competition involves the creation of new products and
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analysis in “dynamic industries” that would require explicit consideration of “dynamic
competition”, thus making a distinction between competition law applying to the “new
economy” or “high technology” and the “old economy”. Christopher Pleatsikas and David Teece
have criticized the static analytical frameworks applied in defining markets and measuring
market power without due noting that the basis for competition in many high technology
industries is fundamentally different from that in more mature and stable industries, as there is a
much greater emphasis on performance-based, rather than price-based, competition and hence a
more “dynamic analysis” is required.256 Sidak and Teece have argued for a “neo-Schumpeterian
framework for antitrust analysis that favors dynamic competition over static competition [that]
would put less weight on market share and concentration in the assessment of market power”.257
The concept of “dynamic competition” has been given different definitions. Some have
emphasized the time dimension of the concept arguing that “(d)ynamic competition models
entail the prediction of future competitive outcomes”.258 Others, have observed that “dynamic is
a shorthand for a variety of rigorously competitive activities such as significant product
differentiation and rapid response to change, whether from innovation or simply new market
opportunities ensuing from changes in “taste” or other forces of disequilibrium”,259 taking leave
from the concept of equilibrium, at least in a non-stochastic form. As it was often repeated,
dynamic analysis “views competition through a broader lens and focuses less on outcomes and
more on process”.260 This view might require a complete revamp of the way competition law
addresses innovation.
Michael Katz and Howard Shelanski observedthe multiplier effect that innovation may
have on efficiency gains. They suggested the consideration of dynamic efficiencies, even if these
are not certain, thus breaking with the conventional hostility of competition law to efficiency
gains that are not certain, by advancing an expected value approach that would account both the
magnitudes and probabilities of potential, merger-related efficiencies.261 Competition authorities
and courts should use a decision-theoretic approach under conditions of uncertainty, which
would select the course of action that yields the highest expected payoff, “where the expected
value of taking an action is equal to the payoffs associated with the different possible outcomes
that can follow from that action weighted by the probabilities that those outcomes will occur if
the action is taken”.262 Such an approach would require the decision-makers to base their
judgment on broader evidence about how competition is evolving in the specific industry.
Jonathan Baker has also suggested an industry-specific approach in competition law enforcement
by arguing that competition law authorities should target enforcement to appropriate industries:
“winner-take-all markets” or markets where future product competition remains unaffected by
256 Christopher Pleatsikas and David Teece, ‘The analysis of market definition and market power in the context of
rapid innovation’ (2001) 19 International Journal of Industrial Organization 665.
257 Gregory J Sidak and David J Teece, ‘Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law’ (2009) 5(4) Journal of Competition
Law & Economics 581.
258 Douglas H Ginsburg and Joshua D Wright, ‘Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust Institutions’ (2012)
78(1) Antitrust Law Journal 1.
259 David J Teece, ‘Favoring Dynamic over Static Competition: Implications for Antitrust Analysis and Policy’ in
Geoffrey A Manne and Joshua D Wright, Competition Policy and Patent law under Uncertainty (Cambridge
University Press 2011) 203, 211.
260 Ibid 217.
261 Howard A Shelanski and Michael L Katz, Mergers and Innovation (2007) 74 Antitrust Law Journal 1.
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current product market competition, as a result of pending technological change, growing
demand or regulatory intervention.263
Other authors have challenged the view that competition law analysis is static and does
not accommodate dynamic competition concerns. Cal Shapiro criticized the view that innovation
and dynamic competition concerns should lead competition law to be extremely cautious of
imposing limits on the conduct of dominant firms or prohibiting mergers in dynamic industries,
noting that today’s market leaders may be able to maintain or extend their dominance while
slowing the pace of innovation and arguing that competition doctrine does not actually focus on
static analysis.264 More recently, Gans argued that static analyses are not misleading and can be a
good proxy for dynamic effects, with the exception of cases where the predominant mode of
commercialization by innovative entrants is via cooperation rather than competition with
incumbent firms, in which case both static and dynamic analyses should be combined.265
Joshua Wright has expressed doubts as to the state of current theoretical apparatus and
empirical evidence in competition law to conduct the complex trade-offs required by dynamic
competition law analysis.266 Drawing on previous work by Harold Demsetz,267 Wright highlights
the complexity of the task of weighing effects on the several dimensions of competition that
might be affected by a specific conduct. In some cases one dimension of competition (e.g. price)
is negatively correlated to another (e.g. new products, innovation or quality) and this negative
correlation means that a policy selecting the optimal mix of competitive forms requires
knowledge of the “technical rates of substitution between these forms in order to covert different
forms into common units of consumer welfare”.268 However, as Wright notes, competition law
analysis “does not provide an analytically coherent method to equalize measures of intensity,
efficiency or consumer welfare”.269 Wright argues against presumptions of anticompetitive effect
in this context and an overall guiding principle of deference to the competitive process, in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence of substantial consumer harm.270
It follows from these divergent points of view that there is some disagreement over the
adequate methodologies to be followed for the incorporation of innovation and “dynamic
competition” in competition law analysis. Some would favour an adjustment to the existing
tools, by paying more attention to possible dynamic anticompetitive effects and taking more into
account dynamic efficiency gains, eventually biasing the economic balancing process in favour
of dynamic efficiency considerations. Others would encourage a tailored-made approach to
263 Jonathan Baker, ‘Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation’ (2007) 74(3) Antitrust Law
Journal 575.
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265 Joshua S Gans, ‘When Is Static Analysis a Sufficient Proxy for Dynamic Considerations? Reconsidering
Antitrust and Innovation’ (2011) 11(1) Innovation Policy and the Economy 55.
266 Joshua D Wright, ‘Antitrust, Multidimensional Competition and Innovation – Do we Have an Antitrust-Relevant
Theory of Competition Now?’ in Geoffrey A Manne and Joshua D Wright (eds), Competition Policy and Patent law
under Uncertainty (Cambridge University Press 2011) 228-251.
267 Harold Demsetz, ‘100 Years of Antitrust: Should we Celebrate?’ Brent T. Upson Memorial Lecture, George
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“dynamic competition” by developing new concepts and tools,271 such as innovation markets
and an innovation-centred competition law.272
It is important here to note that whichever approach with regard to the integration of
“dynamic competition” is followed, this will have little implications on the relation between
competition law and IP rights. In other words, this is a different question than the interaction
between “static competition” and “dynamic competition” in competition law analysis. First, there
should be no assumption that intellectual property rights promote “dynamic competition”, as this
depends on the nature of innovative activity in the industry (including the degree of cumulative
innovation) or the strength of IP protection, among other factors. If that is true the fact that
competition law focuses on “static competition” or “dynamic competition” is irrelevant, with
regard to the interaction between these two areas of law. Indeed, a static competition law
analysis might be the least imperfect option, if it is compared to the choice of protecting IP rights
that would not advance “dynamic competition” but would restrict “static competition”.
Protecting “static competition” is better than not protecting any form of competition. Second,
even if one assumes that intellectual property rights promote “dynamic efficiency” or “dynamic
competition”,273 a rather blunt assumption with regard to the available evidence so far, it is also
unclear how that would affect the interaction between competition law and intellectual property
rights. If competition law pursues both “dynamic competition” and “static competition”, it would
be a far superior instrument than intellectual property law, which would sacrifice “static
competition” for “dynamic efficiency”, unless one considers that “dynamic efficiency” weighs
more than “static efficiency” and that the methods for incorporating dynamic efficiency in
intellectual property law are superior than those available in competition law analysis. However,
there is no reason to assume that intellectual property law has developed a superior “technology”
than competition law for incorporating dynamic efficiency concerns in the analysis. It is only if
competition law pursues exclusively “static efficiency” that it would constitute an inferior
alternative to intellectual property law, should it be assumed that intellectual property promotes
“dynamic efficiency”. Hence, by bringing “dynamic competition” and innovation to the centre of
competition law, competition law scholars may finish by transforming competition law to a more
effective regulatory instrument than intellectual property in promoting innovation.
(ii) Technology and innovation markets in US and EU competition law
The US DOJ and FTC Guidelines for the licensing of IP note that an arrangement can
affect price or output in three types of markets: a market for existing goods and services, a
technology market consisting of intellectual property that is licensed and its close substitutes, and
an innovation market consisting of the research and development directed to particular new or
improved goods or processes and the close substitutes for that research and development,
271 Gilbert and Sunshine (n 247); Marcus Glader, Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis: EU Competition
Law and US Antitrust Law (Edward Elgar 2006).
272 Michael A Carrier, ‘Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation’ (2003) 56 Vanderbilt
Law Review 1047.
273 Assuming that innovation is the first order preference of consumers and that dynamic competition is the process
that enables consumers to maximise their utility, the concepts of “dynamic efficiency” and “dynamic competition”
are close to each other and can be used interchangeably.
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“tomorrow’s products”.274 Technology and innovation markets serve as analytical tools to predict
changes in the price or output of goods and services.
According to the US DOJ and FTC Guidelines, technology markets consist of the
intellectual property that is licensed and its close substitutes, technologies or goods that are close
enough substitutes significantly to constrain the exercise of market power with respect to the
intellectual property that is licensed. The concept is used when rights to intellectual property are
marketed separately from the products in which they are used, technology being an input, which
is integrated either into a product or a production process. That would be the case, for example,
of an upstream firm that is not vertically integrated downstream to the production and
commercialisation of the products. The concept is referred to also in the EU Block exemption
regulation on the transfer of technology agreements and Guidelines.275 The delineate the relevant
technology market, both the European Commission and the US Agencies will apply the
hypothetical monopolist test (or SSNIP test),276 which identifies the smallest group of
technologies and goods over which a hypothetical monopolist of those technologies and goods
likely would exercise market power, by imposing a small but significant and non-transitory
increase of the price (e.g. the royalties) of a level of 5-10%.
The concept of innovation markets enables competition authorities to assess the effects of
an anticompetitive practice on research and development efforts and eventually future product
markets. Gilbert and Sunshine have suggested a five steps process for identifying innovation
markets: first, identify the overlapping R&D activities of the merging firms, second, locate any
alternative sources of R&D, third, evaluate actual and potential competition from downstream
products that could make it unprofitable for a hypothetical R&D monopolist to raise price or
reduce output; fourth, assess potential competitive effects on investment and R&D that could
result from the increased concentration brought about by the practice; fifth, assess any
efficiencies arising from the practice that would likely increase output and lower the post-
practice price of R&D in the innovation market under review, in order to determine whether such
efficiencies would be sufficient to outweigh any likely anticompetitive effects.277 An alternative
to the innovation markets approach would be to use potential competition theory and in
particular consider the possibility of limit pricing, the strategy of constraining price in order to
reduce the risk of future entry.278 Applying potential competition analysis would however require
that one of the firms is already an established supplier of the relevant good and service, which is
not always the case and some effects, for example possible delays in introducing a new drug in
the market, cannot be captured by the tool of potential competition.279 The concept of innovation
market thus extends the ability of competition law to assess effects on research tools or processes
competition.
274 US DOJ and FTC Guidelines on the licensing of IP rights, (n 220) Section 3.2. The distinction between these
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25.
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The concept has nevertheless been subject to a number of criticisms: first, R&D is only
an input to the production of goods and services and competition law analysis should focus on
outputs, the actual supply of future goods and services; second, the sources of R&D may be
difficult to identify as discoveries may come from unexpected places; third, economic theory
does not provide a solid empirical basis on the assumption that the decrease in the number of
firms engaged in R&D will affect negatively innovation (the link between market structure and
innovation), as the elimination of redundant expenditure, the reduction of costs and the
possibility for the firm to fully capture the results of the R&D programme might accelerate the
process of innovation (if one takes a Schumpeterian view).280
Recognizing that a licensing arrangement may affect the development of goods that do
not yet exist, the US DOJ & FTC Guidelines acknowledge that they will analyse such an impact
either as a separate competitive effect in relevant goods or technology markets, or as a
competitive effect in a separate innovation market.281 The concept will be used only when the
capabilities to engage in the relevant research and development can be associated with
specialized assets or characteristics of specific firms. The authorities will rely on market data or
evidence from buyers' and market participants' assessments of the competitive significance of
innovation market players. The use of this concept in some high profile merger cases has been
controversial.282
From the other side of the Atlantic, the EU Guidelines do not ascribe the same
importance to this concept than to that of technology markets. The Commission accepts that
licence agreements may affect innovation markets, but in analysing such effects, the Commission
prefers to confine itself to examining the impact of the agreement on competition within existing
product and technology markets. It is only in a limited number of cases that it might be useful
and necessary to also define innovation markets, for example where the agreement affects
innovation aiming at creating new products and where it is possible at an early stage to identify
research and development poles, in which cases it will analyse whether after the agreement there
will be a sufficient number of competing research and development poles left for effective
competition in innovation to be maintained.
(iii) Dynamic analysis in the context of competition law assessment in merger control and
antitrust
In most cases, dynamic analysis is incorporated in competition law assessment with the
consideration of “dynamic efficiencies”. As it has been noted by some commentators, “dynamic
efficiency in competition economics is connected to whether appropriate incentives and ability
exist to increase productivity and engage in innovative activity over time, which may yield
cheaper or better goods or new products that afford consumers more satisfaction than previous
consumption choices”, the concept relating to “the ability of a firm, industry or economy to
280 Ibid.
281 US DOJ and FTC Guidelines on licensing IP rights (n 220), Section 3.2.3.
282 See, for instance, Genzyme Corporation / Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the statement of Chairman T.
Muris (critical to the use of the concept): <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/01/murisgenzymestmt.pdf> accessed 28
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exploit its potential to innovate, develop new technologies and thus expand its production
possibility frontier”.283 Both static and dynamic efficiencies should be taken into account in
competition law enforcement. We have previously noted that the evidential requirements for the
proof of efficiency gains in competition law, in particular in the context of the EU, might render
more difficult the consideration of dynamic efficiencies.284
The main difficulties relate, first, to the verification requirement as well as to the
requirement that efficiency gains and their passing on to consumers (whose position should not
be worse than that prior the anticompetitive conduct) must be probable enough, in view of the
fact that the burden of proof rests on the defendants.285 Firms may have difficulty to meeting the
requisite level of proof with regard to causation and the quantification of the incremental surplus
created by the additional innovative effort, most of which will relate to future products.286
Remote dynamic efficiencies may also be discounted to some extent against short-term
anticompetitive effects. Second, the requirement that restrictions should be indispensable for the
realization of dynamic efficiency gains (in merger control, any dynamic efficiency put forward
should be merger specific) raises the issue of causation and of the existence of less restrictive to
competition alternatives to achieve the same dynamic efficiency gain.287 Third the trade-off
between static allocative inefficiency, because of higher prices, and dynamic efficiency is
particularly difficult to make. Some have opted for a “dynamic pure consumer welfare standard”,
in order to balance any consumer harms flowing from short run price increases with consumer
benefits from price decreases in the longer run resulting from diffusion of the merger-induced
cost reductions to other competitors.288 However, as we have highlighted above, applying an
appropriate discount rate to future time periods, in order to ensure that greater weight will be
given to relatively more certain, short run, effects than uncertain dynamic efficiencies, might
283 Andrej Fatur, EU Competition Law and the Information and Communication Technology Network Industries
(Hart Publishing 2012) 40. See also, Jesús Huerta De Soto, The Theory of Dynamic Efficiency (Routledge 2009).
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defeat the purpose of favoring “dynamic competition”. In conclusion, the static and dynamic
efficiency trade-off will in most cases take the form of a “rough comparison”.289
A possible solution to the risk of over-considering static allocative inefficiency effects
would be to weigh more heavily liked dynamic efficiencies than static effects. Tepperman and
Sanderson provide two reasons for that.290 First, there may be many sources for dynamic
efficiencies, while only one for allocative inefficiency, in view of the important spill-over effects
that innovation in one market or sector might bring to other markets or sectors and thus to a
different set of consumers. This effect is not taken into account by conventional competition law
analysis that focuses on the effects on a relevant market (as a result of the partial equilibrium
analysis performed) and does not incorporate in the analysis cross-market effects. The European
Commission takes into account the positive welfare effects of an agreement as long as “the group
of consumers affected by the restriction and benefiting from the efficiency gains are substantially
the same”.291 The Court’s position on this issue seems more liberal. In a number of cases on the
application of Article 101(3) the Court had regard to advantages arising from the agreement, not
only for the specific relevant market but also for “every other market on which the agreement in
question might have beneficial effects”.292 Second, price effects tend generally to be transitory,
given the dynamically competitive nature of competition, as higher profitability will generally
attract new entry and a new round of innovation in order to displace the leader. This conclusion
relies on the assumption that the market leader would not be able to block or deter entry through
the exercise of exclusive rights (e.g. IP rights) or strategic conduct (e.g. predatory pricing, tying).
What are the different sources of dynamic efficiency gains?293 First, dynamic efficiency
gains may derive from variable and fixed costs savings across time. Second, they may arise from
a combination of R&D programs or different capabilities creating synergies (these may relate to
the integration of R&D activity, productive assets or distribution capacity, that is different
segments of the innovative process). In the case of R&D synergies this might reduce the risk of a
wasteful duplication and the elimination of redundant R&D. Third, they might be economies of
scale or scope in R&D activities, the assumption being that an R&D program of some size is
more productive than two separate programs of half size. The avoidance of patent thickets issues
and a better IP rights enforcement might also be considered as enhancing dynamic efficiency, by
enhancing returns to R&D efforts. Increased financial resources on innovation and improving the
spread of R&D risk constitute further sources of dynamic efficiency gains.
It is worthy of note that neither the EU Guidelines on the Transfer of Technology nor the
US Guidelines on the licensing of IP examine the different sources of dynamic efficiency and
provide guidance on how the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency will be done in
practice. The Guidelines prefer a general presumptions approach that would assume the
289 Tepperman and Sanderson (n 94) 33
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existence of dynamic efficiencies if the licensing arrangement falls within one of the two safe
harbours of the regulation (structural indicators, such as market shares or the number of
technologies available). The more recent US Horizontal Merger Guidelines include a new
section on innovation and product variety, which incorporates dynamic competition in the
analysis of anticompetitive effects. It is recognized that “competition often spurs firms to
innovate” and that the US Agencies will intervene if “a merger is likely to curtail the merger
firm’s innovative effort below the level that would prevail in the absence of the merger”.294 The
possible effects on innovation could take different forms, such as a reduced incentive to continue
with an existing product-development effort or a reduced incentive to initiate the development of
new products. With regard to dynamic efficiencies, the Guidelines note that “in evaluating the
effects of a merger on innovation, the Agencies consider the ability of the merged firm to
conduct research or development more effectively”, in particular if this may spur innovation
without affecting short-term pricing.295 Yet, it is also recognized that “the Agencies should
consider the ability of the merger firm to appropriate a greater fraction of the benefits resulting
from its innovations”, including licensing and intellectual property conditions, which “affect the
ability of a firm to appropriate the benefits of its innovation”. Although the Guidelines
acknowledge that most weight is given to the results of competition analysis over the short term,
it is also noted that “(r)esearch and development cost savings may be substantial and yet not be
cognizable efficiencies because they are difficult to verify or result from anticompetitive
reductions in innovative activities”, thus opening the door to a more flexible consideration of
dynamic efficiencies.
The trade-off between static anticompetitive effects (allocative inefficiency) and dynamic
efficiencies may even be more complicated in a multi-jurisdictional setting. One may envisage a
situation in which a licensing practice affects consumers in jurisdiction A but enables a licensor
established in jurisdiction B to profit from dynamic efficiency gains. In principle, this should not
pose a problem, as the consumers of jurisdiction A would eventually benefit from the outcome of
the innovation in the long run. Yet, it is possible that the product will first be introduced in the
market of jurisdiction B, thus benefiting the consumers of this jurisdiction, without the
consumers of jurisdiction A being able to enjoy within a reasonable time frame, for different
reasons, the benefits of the sacrifice of allocative efficiency for the purposes of innovation. This
issue may become a concern, from a political economy perspective, if the core of the inventive
activity is concentrated in some jurisdictions only.
d. The need to apply an overall “decision theory” framework
It should be clear by now that the case law has developed multiple standards in order to
tackle the anticompetitive exercise of intellectual property rights. Despite the use of the
“property rights” rhetoric, the competition law authorities and the courts do not apply the
essential facilities doctrine and take into account the need to protect innovation. The standards
used are nevertheless complex and fact-specific and ultimately a source of uncertainty for firms.
294 US DOJ & FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), available at
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The need for an overall approach is highlighted by Ahlbors, Evans and Padilla who
suggest an “error-cost framework”, which is structured in two stages. First, economic theory and
evidence will be used “to assess the cost and likelihood of errors resulting from condemning
welfare-increasing business practices or condoning welfare reducing ones”; In a second stage, “a
legal rule that minimizes the expected cost of intervention taking into account the possibility of
legal error” will be “selected from a spectrum of standards ranging from per se legality to per se
illegality, including the rule of reason”.296 The authors start from the assumption that “what
matters is the impact of forcing access on the incentives to innovate, and not the nature of the
property rights at stake”.297 What applies to intellectual property rights should also apply to other
property rights as both are “the result of previous investment or risk taking”.298
This starting position may be criticised as it is not always true that IP rights are the result
of significant previous investment or risk taking. In addition, this approach does not take into
account the different degrees of “previous investment and risk taking”. An insignificant
inventive effort will be considered the same way a significant one would be. The authors’
assumption may be explained by the fact that they try to avoid the difficulties of balancing
incentives to innovate with anticompetitive effects (allocative inefficiencies), which, they
consider, is “an extremely complex” and “daunting task” for courts.299 However, even if one
could agree that this is an important issue which has not yet been resolved, this is not a valid
reason to adopt such a strong assumption.
According to Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla, the existence of compulsory licensing will
inevitably reduce the incentive ex ante for the IP holder to take the risk to invest in new
products.300 However, even if this hypothesis may be a plausible generalisation, it does not
always hold. Increasing competition in the secondary market will exercise pressure on the IP
holder to innovate as this will be the only way to maintain its competitive advantage against its
competitors. The disincentive created by the compulsory license may well exist but it is also
important to consider that the IP holders will still have a first mover advantage as it would
probably not be before a substantial period of time that their rivals would be able to compete in
equal terms. Moreover, it would be possible for the inventor to increase his revenues from
licensing.
Furthermore, Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla apply the “cost-error framework” to antitrust
but not to intellectual property, which, they assume, is the outcome of a meritorious investment
and “risk taking” process.301 However, this double standard is not justifiable. Ironically, this
approach supposes that decision analysis theory may be useful for assessing antitrust, which is
essentially a judge-made law that follows an adversarial process but not for examining IP rights,
which are granted by a regulatory body and therefore it is more likely to be subject to decision
errors or capture. Indeed, the protection of IP has expanded considerably the last twenty years
following the transformation of economic structures and the focus on international
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competitiveness. Even trivial “inventions” may benefit from an IP protection. The ex post case
by case analysis of competition law may be at certain regards superior than the ex ante approach
of intellectual property, as market information is most likely available after the IP rights has been
granted. However, a procedure of post-grant review may mitigate this concern.
Furthermore, the protection of intellectual property is backwards looking. The
examination of the patent application focuses on the “prior art” and there is no assessment of the
existence of possible substitutes or potential competition. The problem is particularly acute in
emerging industries where prior art is difficult to locate as it is disseminated in scientific journals
or in the form of informal know how, with the result that the patent officer’s examination can be
easily flawed, from a welfare perspective.
Type I errors (over-expansion of IP rights) are therefore more likely to happen than type
II errors (under-inclusiveness of IP protection). By limiting the negative effects of type I errors,
caused by a broad intellectual property protection, competition law is a necessary complement to
intellectual property law.
On the above basis, competition law’s intervention is justified if IP law has failed to
guarantee the level of innovation in the market.302 This is what happened in Magill where
intellectual property rights were granted to simple data without any inventive effort having been
made. The European Community’s Directive on the Legal Protection of databases, which
provides high levels of protection for databases may illustrate the side-effects of a careless
intellectual property protection.303 The Directive was adopted following an intense effort of
lobbying by database companies and is a compromise between the lower “sweat of the brow”
copyright protection that was granted to databases in some EU Member States (e.g. UK, Ireland)
and the higher standard of copyright protection granted by other Member States (e.g. France).
The directive established a legal framework giving a high level of copyright protection to
“original” databases, which “by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents
constitute the author’s own intellectual creation”304 and a new form of “sui generis” protection to
non-original databases if the “maker” of the database showed “that there has been qualitatively
and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation
of the contents” of the database.305
The Directive protects a simple compilation of existing basic information, which is the
result of some kind of investment. The objective of this form of IP protection is therefore not to
protect innovation but to protect the investments of the database “makers” against the “parasitic
behaviour” of free riders.306 The sui generis protection granted has the potential to produce
important anticompetitive effects. Contrary to a copyright protection, which distinguishes
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Rochelle C Dreyfuss, Harry First and Diane Zimmerman (eds) Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property
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between the idea, which stays in the public domain, and the expression of the idea, which is
protected, the database directive gives the possibility to exclude the re-utilisation of the data by
others. This is particularly risky for competition, “in cases, where a database is the only possible
source of the data contained therein, such as telephone directories, television program listings or
schedules of sporting events” and may result in “an absolute downstream information monopoly
in derivative information products and services”.307
In response to this risk, article 16 of the Directive required the Commission to submit a
report examining whether the application of the sui generis right “has led to abuse of a dominant
position or other interference with free competition which would justify appropriate measures
being taken, including the establishment of non-voluntary licensing arrangements.” Indeed,
while the first proposal of the Database Directive provided for the possibility of compulsory
licensing in order to limit the risk of anti-competitive effects, these provisions have been
removed from the final version of the Directive, which only limited the right of the database
“maker” in exceptional circumstances.308 This is probably why recital 47 provides that the
Directive is without prejudice to the application of Community or national competition rules,
making it therefore possible to limit the rights of the database “makers” through competition law.
The application of competition law can therefore be seen to be triggered by the failure of the text
of the database Directive to take properly into account the protection of cumulative innovation
and competition.
It is remarkable that the national courts and the European Court of Justice have
interpreted the “quantitative substantial investment” requirement of the Directive restrictively in
order to avoid the emergence of anticompetitive effects.309 Indeed, the ECJ curtailed the scope of
the protection by explicitly refusing to adopt the “spin off” doctrine, developed by some Dutch
courts, which would make it possible to provide sui generis protection for databases generated as
“by-products” of the main activities of the Database “maker” on which the later has a de facto
monopoly (e.g. television program listings, railway schedules etc), which is the situation that
arose in Magill.310 The ECJ distinguished between creating and obtaining data in order to
assemble the contents of a database.311 It also considered that the activity of creating materials
that make up the content of a database did not constitute substantial investment in the sense of
307 P Bernt Hugenhotz ‘Abuse of Database Right: Sole-Source Information Banks under the EU Database Directive’
in Lévêque and Shelanski (eds) (n 129) 203.
308 Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases, COM (92) 24 final, OJ 1992 C 156/4, art.
8(1) and 8(2).
309 Case C-46/02 Fixtures Marketing Ltd. V Oy Veikkaus Ab [2004] ECR I-10365; Case C-203/02 The British
Horseracing Board Ltd and Others v William Hill Organisation Ltd [2004] ECR I-10415; Case C-338/02 Fixtures
Marketing Limited v. AB Svenska Spel [2004] ECR I-10497; Case C-444/02 Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Organismos
Prognostikon Agonon Podosfairou AE – OPAP [2004] ECR I-10549. For an analysis of national courts’ decisions,
see First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC (n 39) p. 11.
310 Estelle Derclaye, ‘Databases Sui Generis Right: Should We Adopt the Spin-off Theory’ (2004) 26(9) European
Intellectual Property Review 402.
311 Case C-46/02 Fixtures Marketing Ltd. V. Oy Veikkaus Ab (s 302) para 34 (“the expression ‘investment in […] the
obtaining […] of the contents’ of a database must […] be understood to refer to the resources used to seek out
existing independent materials and collect them in the database, and not to the resources used for the creation as
such of independent materials”).
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the directive and that therefore a single-source database was not protected under sui generis
rights.312
By adopting a narrow interpretation of the scope of the Directive the Court avoided the
situation where single-source databases would benefit from the sui generis protection and as a
result enable the database “makers” to abuse their dominant position on the information they
create. The recent evaluation report of the Database directive also considers the risk of potential
anticompetitive effects and examines different options, ranging from the simple repeal of the
Directive to the preservation of the status-quo. While the Commission notes the “attachment” of
the EU database industry to the sui generis protection for factual compilations and their
“considerable resistance” to any reform (an indication of the “specific-interest group” character
of this legislation), it also remarks on the weak empirical support for such a system of
protection.313 Less restrictive to competition alternatives for protecting the investments made
exist. Indeed, the United States opted for a system of liability and not of property rights in
protecting the investments of the database “makers”.314 The US approach is based on unfair
competition principles which protect the database “maker” against misappropriation only if, as a
result, there will be market harm.315
The limitation of the scope of intellectual property protection makes it also possible to
consider ex ante (before the grant of the IP right) the effects of intellectual property protection on
competition and constitutes therefore a conceivable option for attaining the right balance
between competition law and intellectual property.316 The European Commission’s proposal to
amend Directive 98/71/EC on the legal protection of designs317 illustrates the dialectic
relationship between the scope of IP rights and competition law.318 By removing Members
States’ option to provide design protection for spare parts of complex products, such as
automobiles, the Commission seeks to avoid the constitution of monopolies in the aftermarket
for spare parts for which “there is no practical alternative”.319 The proposal codifies the case law
of the ECJ in Renault and Volvo, whose effect could have been curtailed by the generalisation of
312 Case C-203/02 The British Horseracing Board Ltd and Others v. William Hill Organisation Ltd, (s 302) para 35;
Mark J Davison and P Bernt Hugenholtz ‘Football Fixtures, Horseraces and Spin Offs: The ECJ Domesticates the
Database Right' (2005) European Intellectual Property Review 113; Estelle Derclaye, ‘The Court of Justice
Interprets the Database Sui Generis Right for the First Time’ (2005) European Law Review 420.
313 First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC (n 39) p. 5.
314 Feist Publications v Rural Telephone Service Company, 499 U.S. 340 (1991) [The Supreme Court refused to
accept that information contained in a telephone directory could be protected under copyright laws. A database may
only be copyrighted if it possesses some “minimal degree of creativity”].
315 Guido Westkamp ‘Protecting Databases under US and European Law: Methodical Approaches to the Protection
of Investments between Unfair Competition and Intellectual Property Concepts’ (2003) 34 International Review of
Industrial Property and Copyright Law 772.
316 The adjustment of the duration of the IP protection is another option. See, Kaplow ‘The Patent-Antitrust
Intersection: A Reappraisal’ (n 206) 1840 (“[…] setting the patent life and determining patent-antitrust doctrine are
interdependent endeavors; in other words, the system of equations that defines the optimization process must be
solved simultaneously”). However, this is unlikely to happen as the duration of the IP protection is usually
determined by international treaties, which is impossible or extremely difficult to amend.
317 Directive 98/71/EC on the legal protection of designs [1998] OJ L 289/28.
318 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 98/71/EC on the
legal protection of designs COM(2004) 582 final.
319 Ibid 9.
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the “new product rule” to all refusals to license IP rights, following the ECJ’s judgment in
IMS/NDC some months earlier.
C. Illustrations of the interaction between competition law and IP rights: a comparative
EU/US perspective
1. The Patenting Process and Unreasonable Patent Exclusions
a. Refusal to license
Both EU and US competition law start from the general rule that a duty to deal with a
competitor should be rarely imposed to dominant undertakings. There is no obligation for the IP
holder to license the use of their IPRs to others. This rule may be explained for three reasons, all
accepted as significant in both US antitrust and EU competition law. First, undertakings should
have the right to choose their trading partners and to dispose freely of their property.320 Second,
existence of an obligation to license, even for a fair remuneration, “may undermine undertakings'
incentives to invest and innovate and, thereby, possibly harm consumers”.321 Third, at least in US
antitrust law, this cautious approach may also be explained by a concern over the
administrability of competition law, as “an antitrust court is unlikely to be an effective day-to-
day enforcer of these detailed sharing obligations”, should a duty to license be imposed more
frequently.322
In US antitrust law, unilateral refusals to license have been dealt under the following
three broad standards.323 In Data General Corp. v Grumman Systems, the First circuit although it
noted that “exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to license a
copyright”, it created a rebuttable presumption that unilateral refusals to license is a
“presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers”.324 In Image
Technical Services v Eastman Kodak, the Ninth circuit modified slightly that presumption to
emphasize more market reality.325 The court recognized that, although intellectual property
owners are not immune from antitrust liability, “patent and copyright holders may refuse to sell
or license protected work”. Yet, it also noted that intellectual property justiﬁcations in this case
320 Guidance Paper (n 247) para. 75; See also in US antitrust law, United States v Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307
(1919) “[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Act] does not restrict the
long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal”.
321 Guidance Paper (n 247) para. 75; See also in US antitrust law, Trinko (n 119) (“Firms may acquire monopoly
power by establishing an infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers. Compelling such
firms to share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it
may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities”).
322 In Trinko, the Court was cautious in finding exceptions to the general rule of no duty to aid a rival, precisely
“because of the uncertain virtue of forced sharing and the difficulty of identifying and remedying anticompetitive
conduct by a single firm”.
323 Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D Janis and Mark A Lemley, ‘Unilateral Refusals to License’ (2006) 2(1) Journal of
Competition Law & Economics 1.
324 Data General Corp. v Grumman Systems, 36 F2d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994) (“an author’s desire to exclude
others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to
consumers”).
325 Image Technical Services v Eastman Kodak, 125 F3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
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were pretextual, hence bringing forward the role of intent in the analysis, noting that “neither the
aims of intellectual property law, or the antitrust laws justify allowing a monopolist to rely upon
a pretextual business justiﬁcation to mask anticompetitive conduct”.326 Finally, in Re
Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation, the Federal Circuit rejected the
presumptive legality approach for one that would extend antitrust immunity to refusals to license,
in the absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office or
sham litigation.327 The Federal Circuit created a rule of per se legality for refusals to license,
even in cases in which the refusal to license would have the effect to influence a market other
than that covered by the relevant IPR.328 Following the Supreme Court’s judgment in Verizon
Communications v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, it looks highly unlikely that a unilateral
refusal to deal (and even more a unilateral refusal to license) would be found to violate Section 2
of the Sherman Act.329
In the context of EU competition law, the application of article 102 TFEU, prohibiting the
abuses by an undertaking of its dominant position, to unilateral refusals to license IP rights has
been an important issue since the decisions of the ECJ in Volvo v Veng and CICRA v Renault.330
In these cases, the ECJ held that the right of the proprietor of a protected design to prevent third
parties from manufacturing and selling or importing without its consent products incorporating
the design does not constitute an abuse of a dominant position. Otherwise, the IP holder would
be deprived of the substance of his exclusive right. However, the Court did not go as far as to
create an irrebutable presumption for the exercise of IP rights. A refusal to license may constitute
an abuse if the exercise of the IP right would involve, in the part of the undertaking, “certain
abusive conduct”, such as an arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to independent repairers, the
fixing of prices at an unfair level or a decision no longer to produce spare parts for a particular
model.331 In subsequent decisions, the Court extended the scope of article 102 TFEU to cover the
acquisition by a dominant firm of an exclusive patent license of an alternative technology332 or a
refusal to license IP rights in order to defend an existing monopoly power.333
The case law has moved subsequently to develop a standard which takes into
consideration the specificity of intellectual property rights. The ECJ adopted the “new product”
rule in Magill where it held that the exercise of an exclusive right by the intellectual property
owner may, in “exceptional circumstances”, involve abusive conduct.334 Exceptional
circumstances consist of the following: (i) access is indispensable, (ii) the refusal to license
prevented the appearance of a new product for which there was potential consumer demand, (iii)
there was no justification for such refusal, (iv) the refusal to license excluded all competition on
326 Ibid, pp. 1219-1220.
327 Re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
328 Ibid, pp. 1327-1328. The Court held that patents could entitle the patent holder to control secondary markets: in
this case Xerox’s part patents enabled Xerox to control the market for service of Xerox copiers as well.
329 Trinko case (n 119), the Supreme Court noting “the few existing exceptions from the proposition that there is no
duty to aid competitors”.
330 Case 53/87 CICCRA v Renault [1988] ECR 6039; Case 238/87 Volvo v Veng [1988] ECR 6211.
331 Case 53/87 Renault, (n 323) para 9
332 Case T-51/89 Tetra Pak [1990] ECR II-309.
333 Case T-504/93 Tiercé Ladbroke SA v. Commission [1997] ECR II-923 (the objective of the French race courses
was not to extent their monopoly in Belgium (leverage theory) but to protect their monopoly in the French market,
which could be threatened if the Belgian companies were able to take bets for French races).
334 ECJ, Joined Cases C-241/91 and C-242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission (Magill), ECR [1995] I-743.
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the secondary market. By insisting on the requirement that the refusal to license prevented the
sale of a new kind of product for which there was unsatisfied demand, the ECJ appeared to
consider the necessity to protect innovation in the market. In Magill, the refusal to license had
impeded the emergence of a new product, a composite TV guide, which the holders of the
intellectual property right did not offer and for which there was a potential demand. The weak
and questionable nature of the IP right that was involved in this case, a copyright protection
granted on simple TV listings under a “sweet of the brow” standard, may explain the position of
the Court, in particular as access to these data was indispensable for the emergence of the new
product. The judgment was not also clear as to the cumulative or alternative character of these
exceptional circumstances and some confusion resulted from a subsequent case of the General
Court, which treated conditions (i) and (ii) of Magill as alternative rather than cumulative.335
In the meantime, the Court of Justice in Oscar Bronner, a case which did not involve a
refusal to license but the refusal by a dominant firm to share its distribution network with a
competitor, interpreted the four conditions of Magill as being cumulative and narrowed down the
duty to deal doctrine in EU competition law, by interpreting the indispensability condition as
requiring evidence from the undertaking requesting access that it should not be economically
viable for an undertaking with a comparable size with the dominant firm to develop its own
facility or input.336
In IMS/NDC Health,337 the ECJ reaffirmed the cumulative character of these conditions
and explained that the “new product or service” rule limits the finding of abuse for a refusal to
licence “only where the undertaking which requested the licence does not intend to limit itself
essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered on the secondary market by the
owner of the copyright, but intends to produce new goods or services not offered by the owner of
the right and for which there is a potential consumer demand”.338 In Renault and Volvo, both of
which involved rights of design on spare parts, the exceptional circumstances were held to exist
even if the refusal to license did not impede the emergence of a new product. The identification
of two different but interconnected stages of production is also important, as it is only if the
upstream products or services are an indispensable input for the supply of the downstream
product that a refusal to licence may fall within the scope of article 102 TFEU. Yet, as the Court
noted, it is sufficient to identify a captive, potential or hypothetical input market, for example by
distinguishing between the different stages of the innovation process, the intellectual property
right being one of them.339
In its recent Enforcement Priorities’ Guidance on exclusionary abuses,340 the
Commission notes that it will consider unilateral or “constructive”341 refusals to deal as an
enforcement priority if all the following circumstances are present: (i) the refusal relates to a
335 Case T-504/93 Tierce Ladbroke SA v Commission [1995] ECR II-923.
336 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG
[1998] ECR I-7791.
337 IMS Health case, paras 34-35.
338 Ibid para 49 (emphasis added).
339 Ibid paras 44-45.
340 Guidance Paper (n 247).
341 For example, unduly delaying or otherwise degrading the supply of the product or imposing unreasonable
conditions in return for the supply.
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product or service that is objectively necessary to be able to compete effectively on a
downstream market, (ii) the refusal is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on
the downstream market, and (iii) the refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm.342 As it becomes
clear, the third condition did not exist as such in the case law of the EU courts. The Commission
emphasizes the interest of consumers and indicates that it will examine the likely negative
consequences of the refusal to supply in the relevant market outweigh over time the negative
consequences of imposing an obligation to supply. Preventing innovation, in particular stifling
follow-on (cumulative) innovation constitutes an example of possible consumer harm. The
Guidance also takes a more liberal view of the condition of indispensability, as the fact that the
licensee does not intend to limit herself essentially to duplicating the goods or services already
offered on the secondary market is not the only instance in which cumulative innovation may be
considered as likely to be stifled. The Commission adopts instead a wider interpretation of the
restrictive effect on innovation. With regard to possible objective justifications, the Guidance
recognizes two instances which may give rise to such claims by IPR holders: the need to allow
the dominant undertaking to realize an adequate return on the investment required for the
development of its input business and the need for the undertaking to generate incentives to
invest in the future, taking the risk of failed projects into account.343 These efficiency gains
should however be examined under the four conditions test for efficiencies, described below.
In contrast to US antitrust law, refusals to provide interoperability are assessed in the EU
under the broader category of refusals to supply.344 The Commission applied Article 102 TFEU
to the refusal by Microsoft to supply Sun Microsystems the necessary information to establish
interoperability  between their work group server operating systems and  Microsoft’s PC
operating system Windows.345 Microsoft was ordered to disclose interoperability information in
a reasonable, non-discriminatory and timeliness way. While the Commission did not contemplate
compulsory disclosure of the source code of Windows and the disclosure measure only covered
interface specifications, it acknowledged that “it cannot be excluded that ordering Microsoft to
disclose such specifications and allow such use of them by third parties restricts the exercise of
Microsoft’s intellectual property rights”.346 Microsoft’s conduct was not necessarily impeding
the emergence of an identifiable new product. Microsoft’s conduct had nevertheless, according
to the Commission, the effect of reducing the incentives of its competitors to innovate (and
produce new products in the future) and therefore to limit consumer choice. The Commission
affirmed that intellectual property rights cannot as such constitute a “self-evident objective
justification” for Microsoft’s refusal to supply and employed a balancing test examining if the
possible negative impact of an order to supply on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate could be
outweighed by its positive impact on the level of innovation of the whole industry (including
Microsoft). Taking the view that “Microsoft’s research and development efforts are […] spurred
by the innovative steps its competitors take in the work group server operating” system market
that “were such competitors to disappear, this would diminish Microsoft’s incentives to
innovate”, the Commission concluded that the costs outweighed the benefits in this case.
342 Ibid para 81.
343 Ibid para 89
344 Ibid., para 78.
345 Commission Decision Microsoft (n 228).
346 para 546 and para 1004
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The General Court (at the time the Court of First Instance) confirmed the Commission’s
Microsoft decision in 2007.347 While it reaffirmed the four criteria of the ECJ in Magill and NDC
Health it also adopted a more open-ended interpretation for some of these conditions. First, the
Court used language that implied that these conditions were not the only exceptional
circumstances in which the exercise of the exclusive right by the owner of the intellectual
property rights may give rise to such an abuse, although it noted that the requirement “that the
refusal prevents the appearance of a new product for which there is consumer demand is found
only in the case-law on the exercise of an intellectual property right”.348 Second, the Court gave
also a broad interpretation to the “new product rule” of IMS/NDC Health, finding that consumer
injury may arise where there is a limitation not only of production or markets, but also of
technical development.349 Contrary to Magill and IMS, Microsoft’s conduct did not impede the
emergence of identifiable new products but affected the competitive process that would have
brought about these new products in the future. Third, the Court interpreted “consumer harm”
broadly noting that consumer choice would be affected if rival products of equal or better quality
would not be able to compete on equal terms at the market.350
SUMMARY. There is a significant divergence between US antitrust law and EU
competition law in the treatment of unilateral refusals to license. US antitrust law is relatively
permissive for this type of conduct, even in the context of an entrenched dominant position. It is
only in rare circumstances that an obligation to license has been imposed. Following the
Supreme Court’s judgment in Trinko, the emphasis is put on dynamic efficiency and the
incentives of the dominant undertaking to invest and not on the allocative efficiency losses of
monopoly pricing. On the contrary, in Europe, refusals to license may fall under Article 102
TFEU in “exceptional circumstances”. The interpretation of the case law and in particular the
decisional practice of the Commission and its soft law rule making activity indicate, however,
that these “exceptional circumstances” have been expanded to cover an array of situations and
that the conditions set by the ECJ in IMS/NDC Health do not effectively limit the scope of
liability under Article 102 TFEU.
b. Anticompetitive abuses of the IP system
The value of an IP right, in particular a patent, lies in the fact that it can be enforced
against infringers. However, dominant firms have been found in both US antitrust law and EU
competition law to abuse the regulatory and litigation system with the aim to raise the costs of
their rivals, exclude competition and ultimately harm consumers. The abuse may take the form of
(i) a fraudulent litigation or some form of misrepresentation in the context of the regulatory
process at the patent offices, (ii) or it might also consist in introducing litigation with the
collateral purpose of imposing to the rival(s) an anticompetitive injury. In the context of patent
litigation, this conduct may take the form of competition law (antitrust) counterclaims to patent
infringement claims, what is generally referred to as “sham litigation” in the US or “vexatious
litigation” in Europe.
347 Microsoft CFI case (n 118).
348 Ibid paras 332-334.
349 Ibid para 647.
350 Ibid para 652.
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It is important here to note that what constitutes a restriction of competition in these cases
is not the use of the regulatory or litigation process itself but the abuse of that process. The
restriction of competition flows directly from a “private” action, as the injury would have
happened no matter what the government official or judge would have decided. What is
important is to establish criteria enabling the decision-maker to distinguish a legitimate use of the
regulatory process or the courts from the abuse of these processes.
With regard to the first type of abusive conduct, the Supreme Court held in Walker
Process Equipment that a defendant in a patent suit might bring an antitrust counterclaim where
the allegedly infringed patent was obtained by fraud on the PTO.351 He must show by clear and
convincing evidence that there is some fraud or “inequitable conduct” from the patent holder.
Not any misrepresentation from the patent holder in the patent application process is sufficient to
make a patent unenforceable. The US courts require high standards for the proof of “inequitable
conduct”: this includes a misrepresentation of a material fact, the falsity of that representation,
the intent to deceive, a justifiable reliance upon the representation by the party deceived and a
showing of “materiality”, that is injury to the party deceived as result of the misrepresentation
(the patent examiner would not have issued the patent if the misrepresentation was not made).352
The important question to ask, once the infringement action is filed is whether the infringement
plaintiff knew or should have known that the action is improper. In addition to “fraud” or
“inequitable conduct” element of the offense, which has been broadly interpreted,353 US courts
require, as in all Section 2 Sherman Act cases, evidence that the conduct is reasonably capable of
maintaining or extending monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of rivals.
In the EU, the Commission and the EU Courts may also apply Article 102 TFEU to
fraudulent misrepresentations by a dominant undertaking to a Patent Office (during opposition
and appeal procedures) or a national court (during patent litigation) in order to procure IP rights.
For example, in 2005 the European Commission found Astra Zeneca guilty of having abused
dominance by using its IPRs and the pharmaceutical regulatory system to prevent or delay the
marketing of generic versions of its ulcer treatment drug, Losec.354 Astra Zeneca had submitted
misleading information to national patent offices in order to acquire supplementary protection
certificates (SPCs) which would extent the patent protection for Losec and then defending those
in court. It had alsomisused national rules by launching a tablet form of the drug and
withdrawing authorizations for the original version of its drug Losec in certain national markets
where patents or SPCs were due to expire. The General Court upheld the decision of the
Commission finding that the misleading nature of representations made to public authorities
must be assessed on the basis of objective factors, proof of the deliberate nature of the conduct
351 Walker Process Equipment v Food Mach. & Chem Corp., 382 US 172 (1965).
352 Nobelpharma AB v Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998). For a critical analysis of this case
law see, Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘The Walker Process Doctrine: Infringement Lawsuits as Antitrust Violations’
University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-36 (1 September 2008) available at
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259877> accessed 28 April 2013.
353 Hovenkamp, ‘The Walker Process Doctrine’ (n 345) 4, noting that “infringement actions can also be qualifying
exclusionary practices […] when they are based on valid patents that are known by the infringement plaintiff to be
unenforceable as a result of improprieties in procurement, or on valid patents but where the infringement plaintiff
knew or should have known that the infringement defendant was not an infringer” or “when the infringement
plaintiff  bases its cause of action on unreasonable and clearly incorrect  interpretations of questions of law”.
354 2006/857/EC: Commission Decision, AstraZeneca [2006] OJ L 332/24.
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and of the bad faith of the undertaking in a dominant position not being required for the purposes
of identifying an abuse of a dominant position.355 However, the ECJ found that intention was a
relevant factor in the assessment of abuse in this case, the Court also emphasizing that dominant
companies do not need to be “infallible” in their dealings with regulatory authorities and each
objectively wrong representation will not necessarily be an abuse.356 As a result of this case
dominant companies would not be considered to have engaged in abusive conduct simply
because a patent application was struck down when challenged. Indeed, “innovative companies
should not refrain from acquiring a comprehensive portfolio of intellectual property rights, nor
should they refrain from enforcing them”.357
Competition authorities in Europe and the US have also found that the commencement of
litigation may be abusive in limited circumstances. The reasons pushing the competition
authorities to intervene against this type of conduct are not hard to imagine. First, litigation of
IPRs is particularly significant in some economic sectors, such as the pharmaceutical industry, as
originator companies use a variety of instruments to extend the commercial life of their
medicine, including litigation.358 Second, litigation costs are important. The European
Commission found in its recent Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry that the average duration of
opposition and appeal proceedings averages 2,8 years (from 6 months to 6 years in some
Member States), litigated infringement proceedings could take about 7 years, the average
duration of interim injunctions granted was 18 months and litigation costs are significant in view
of the fact that patent infringers (in this case generics) face multiple actions in multiple states,
given the absence of a unified EU patent system.359
“Sham” or “vexatious” litigation refers to the predatory use of adjudicative procedures to
achieve anticompetitive goals. It is a typical case of non-price predation:  the predator uses legal
processes to impose expenses and delay, at little cost to itself. In the United States, an exception
to Noerr-Pennington immunity360 exists where one uses the governmental process, rather than its
outcome, as a sham to cover anticompetitive conduct.361 In Europe, vexatious litigation may
constitute an abuse of a dominant position, contrary to article 102 TFEU.362 The key piece of
evidence in identifying sham litigation is the absence of genuine interest in receiving judicial
relief. Establishing the genuine motive of the plaintiff, therefore, has been the central issue to
much of the case law on sham litigation in Europe and in the United States.
355 Case T-321/05, Astra Zeneca v Commission (n 204), para. 356.
356 Case C-457/10P, Astra Zeneca v. Commission (n 204).
357 Ibid para 188.
358 European Commission, Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report (2009) (n 202), noting
that “(t)he number of patent litigation cases between originator and generic companies increased by a factor of four
between 2000 and 2007”.
359 European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry – Final Report (n 43), pp. 202-253 and 394-415.
360 Noerr-Pennington immunity holds that, efforts to influence public officials through lobbying, publicity, and other
contact are protected by the petition clause and are not a violation of antitrust law even when the petitioning activity
is undertaken for a disfavored motive, such as eliminating competition. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v
Pennington 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight 365 U.S. 127
(1961).
361 Walker Process Equipment v Food Machinery and Chemical Corp. (1965) 382 US 172.
362 Case T-111/96 ITT Promedia NV v Commission (1998) ECR II-2937.
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In practice, courts adopt two different approaches to identify sham claims. Some took a
narrow view and defined sham litigation as a pattern of baseless claims made without regard to
their merits, and designed to delay and tie up the judicial process. Others based their assessment
of the real motive of the plaintiff on a cost-benefit analysis of his economic interest to bring suit.
With regards to the first approach, the existence of a predatory intent is clearly
demonstrated in situations of misrepresentations of facts or law to tribunals, perjury, fraud or
bribery. However, the courts also consider as sham litigation actions that are manifestly
unfounded or without probable cause. In assessing the existence of probable cause the courts
examine the situation existing when the action in question was brought. Probable cause to
institute civil proceedings requires no more than a reasonable belief that there is a chance that a
claim may be held valid upon adjudication. This approach makes virtually conclusive the
presumption that a successful suit cannot be a sham. It requires as a first step of the analysis of
the claim of sham litigation by the courts, the proof that the lawsuit is objectively baseless, in the
sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits. However, there
are important reasons to object to this test. Probable cause may be absent if the claim is not
supported by the adequate factual evidence. It is also possible that a claim is considered baseless
because of a misconceived interpretation of the law. However, in this some courts may consider
baseless an action that other courts will consider meritorious. This risk is particularly present in
situations in which the concept of what constitutes a baseless claim may be influenced by the
court's conception of the adequate balance to achieve between allocative and dynamic efficiency.
The establishment of a bright-line rule may lead to an important risk of false negatives.
Furthermore, it might not be objectively reasonable to bring a lawsuit just because there is a
probability of some success on the merits, no matter how insignificant the value of the claim
might be.
The second approach is broader. The fact that the claim is not baseless does not preclude
the finding that the use of litigation constitutes an antitrust violation. Rather, the existence of
sham litigation is evaluated by a purely objective test focusing on the economic interest of the
plaintiff to bring legal action. What counts is whether the suit's expected value to the plaintiff
exceeds its costs. The economic test for sham litigation is essentially a predation test, as it
requires the proof of a profit sacrifice, which cannot be recouped by the plaintiff at a later stage
in the event his legal action is successful. The application of this test raises numerous questions.
For instance, information with respect to relative legal merits of the opposing parties and the
amount of recovery may be privately held. The parties must learn about each other before they
can identify suitable settlement terms. This learning is difficult because of incentives to
misrepresent private information. Further, economies of scale in legal services may prompt large
or dominant firms to follow anticompetitive rent-seeking strategies. As a result, some
anticompetitive rent-seeking cases may be wrongly identified as non-predatory. The forgoing
leads us to the question as to what is a workable standard for establishing the existence of sham
litigation. Unlike the vast literature on predatory pricing, economists have had little to say on the
issue of predatory sham litigation. Economic literature has yet to produce an objective
examination of the incentives for sham acts.
In US antitrust law, the Supreme Court has adopted a two parts test, combining an
objective with a subjective approach: (i) the lawsuit must be objectively baseless, no reasonable
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litigant could realistically expect success on the merits; (ii) only if the challenged litigation is
objectively meritless may a court examine the litigant’s subjective motivation (his bad faith).363
Thus, motive alone cannot make viable a Section 2 Sherman Act case for infringement or
misappropriation of intellectual property simply because the IPR turns out to be invalid.364
Similarly, because of the additional subjective requirement, objective baselessness alone,
although necessary, is not by itself a sufficient element of a competition law claim.365 It is not
sufficient that the underlying claim is objectively baseless; the claimant (in the IP infringement
case) must know or believe that it is. In EU competition law, the General Court found that
bringing legal proceedings may constitute an abuse only in “exceptional circumstances”, namely
(i) where the action cannot reasonably be considered as an attempt to establish the rights of the
undertaking concerned and would therefore serve only to “harass” the opposite party and (ii) the
action is part of a plan whose aim is to eliminate competition.366 This test seems to be more
geared towards the intent of the claimant than the US antitrust two parts test, yet focusing on an
objective definition of that intent by inferring it from the absence of any other plausible
explanation for the claim than a harassment strategy of the other party.
The application of these criteria in practice presents a number of difficulties, in particular
with regard to the complex patent environment in certain industries (e.g. pharma). In the context
of this industry, litigation almost always raises disputes on seemingly genuine or reasonable
issues about infringement, sometimes involving secondary patents filed by the originator some
years after the grant of a primary or base patent raising material issues as to the scope of the
patent and the ability of the generic firms to invent around the claimed patent.367 Patent litigation
in this area is also initiated in an important proportion by generics firms seeking declarations of
non-infringement or declarations of invalidity, thus breaking with the “mould” envisaged by the
test.368 It has also been noted that a dominant undertaking initiating the IP litigation would be
required to show, as a defence to the antitrust counterclaim, that it believed at the time of
initiating this litigation that it had good prospects of success, by disclosing privileged
information the undertaking received from its counsel on the success of the litigation or internal
documents on the perceived value of patent or IPR.369
SUMMARY. This area of interaction between competition law and IPRs still remains
largely unexplored and involves some difficult compromises, as access to justice should be
preserved, while competition in the marketplace preserved. The recent enforcement activity of
the European Commission might offer an occasion to address some of the complex evidential
challenges in this area of competition law.370
363 Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc v Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc, 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
364 Ibid para 66.
365 Ibid para 61-62.
366 Case T-111/96, ITT Promedia NV v Commission (1998) ECR II-2937, paras 55 and 57.
367 Simon Priddis and Simon Constantine, ‘The Pharmaceutical Sector, Intellectual Property Rights, and
Competition Law in Europe’ in S. Anderman & A. Ezrachi (eds.), Intellectual Property and Competition Law (n
167) 241-275, 267.
368 Ibid
369 Ibid 268.
370 See, for instance the recent European Commission’s investigation of the patent infringement claims of
Laboratoires Servier against Apotex. European Commission Press Release, MEMO/09/322, available at
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-322_en.htm> accessed 28 April 2013.
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2. The “Innovation Commons”371
In some key industries, such as semi-conductors, computer software, biotechnology,
nanotechnology, electronics, amongst others, the fuzzy boundaries of individual IPRs, the
development of complex products requiring a variety of inputs and complementary assets, the
importance of litigation following up disputes over appropriability and the need to organize the
sharing of benefits between the actors present at different stages of the innovation process, has
led to the development of “innovation commons”, enabling the sharing of information protected
by IPRs and avoiding the problem of blocking patents. When licenses from too many individual
IP holders are required, firms might under invest in the commercialization of downstream
technologies, thus impeding R&D activity by making it difficult for firms to operate without
extensive licensing of complementary technologies. The fragmentation of IPRs may impede the
development and commercialization of new products or may increase considerably their cost.
Focusing on the biotechnology industry, Heller and Eisenberg have discussed the “tragedy of the
anti-commons” that may arise when there are multiple gatekeepers, each of whom must grant
permission before a resource can be used: when IPRs are fragmented, the resource is likely to be
underused and thus innovation will be stifled.372 There is empirical evidence of this “anti-
commons” problem and the resulting fragmentation of IPRs in various industries. For example,
Hall and Ziedonis have examined patenting in the semi-conductor industry and found that this
was higher in the presence of a low concentration of patent rights among rival firms, that is, a
situation of greater fragmentation of patent rights. These empirical studies indicate that firms
attempt to defend themselves from the anti-commons problem by developing strategies of
defensive patenting in order to strengthen their bargaining position, thus at the same time
increasing the likelihood of a “tragedy of anti-commons”.373
Innovation commons may take different forms: those working within the framework of
IPRs include patent pools and cross-licensing arrangements, blanket licensing, cooperative
standard setting and settlement of IP related disputes. The management of common resources
provides benefits in comparison to the organization of the activity within a firm, as it enables the
public to benefit from communal development, but also competition. In certain circumstances it
can be a superior alternative than individual IPRs, dealing with the problem of “excessive or
misaligned” IPRs and the constitution of “patent thickets”. Patent thickets are particularly
common in technology areas that are densely populated by patents having overlapping claims
relating to similar technology374. This overlapping set of patent rights requires that those seeking
to commercialise new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees. This leads first to
increased transaction costs associated with negotiating with multiple patent owners if a license is
needed to avoid infringement. Second, producers may infringe patents inadvertently, because it
is difficult to identify overlapping patents or because the patent boundaries are hard to determine
371 Christina Bohannan and Herbert Hovenkamp, Creation Without Restraint: Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in
Innovation (Oxford University Press 2012) 325.
372 Michael A Heller and Rebecca S Eisenberg, ‘Can Patents Deter Innovations? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research’ (1989) 280 Science 1.
373 Bronwyn H Hall and Rosemarie H Ziedonis, ‘The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in
the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995’ (2001) 32(1) Rand Journal of Economics 101.
374 Review of Intellectual Property and Growth, Patent Thickets, Licensing and Standards, available at <
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-doc-aa.pdf>, accessed 28 April 2013.
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prior development of the invention. Third, inventors may face potential litigation from upstream
firms that do not practice their patents and hence keep them in relative obscurity, thus increasing
litigation costs. Fourth, when multiple patents cover complementary components of a
technology, patentees may exclude each other from using the technology as produce will have to
navigate a “thicket” of conflicting rights to use their invention. The risk of exclusion may be
intensified if patent holders strategically engage in building thickets of patents in order to force
innovators to share rents under cross licenses or to develop a patent portfolio for defensive
purposes. Small and medium enterprises (SME) may also be at disadvantage than large
incumbents disposing of strong patent portfolios, which may conclude between them cross-
licensing arrangements excluding SMEs from entering markets.
Patent thickets may produce negative welfare effects. It is well known in economics that
when firms with market power sell complementary goods, their combined price will typically be
higher than if both were sold by a single monopolist. This phenomenon called double
marginalization may be particularly acute in high technology fields. In high-tech fields where
innovation is rapid and cumulative, a large number of patents may touch on the same new
technology. Double marginalization can make the technology expensive to commercialize,
harming downstream producers and consumers as well as the innovators the patent system was
designed to reward. This complements problem may even become worse if the downstream firms
using the various inputs truly require the IPRs controlled by the upstream firm to make their
products. First, the downstream producer will have to pay royalties to multiple patent owners,
leading to the increase of the total amount of royalties paid, leading to high royalty overcharges
that act as a tax on new products incorporating the patented technology, thereby impeding rather
than promoting innovation (royalty stacking)375. This issue is examined in more detail in a
different part of the report. Second, it would have been possible for the downstream producer to
invent around the blocking patents if that manufacturer were aware of the patent and disposed of
the time to do so. However, the situation is different if the downstream producer becomes aware
of the patent after the downstream product has been designed and placed into large-scale
production. In this case, the manufacturer would have incurred asset specific investments for the
use of the specific technology and would be in a far weaker negotiating position. The patent
holder could thus seek far greater royalties, backed up with the threat that she may interrupt the
productive activity of the manufacturer. The producer’s only options in this case would be either
to negotiate in a weak bargaining position with the patent holder or go back and redesign the
product, re-launch its production, solve any compatibility problems there might exist between the
different versions of the product, activities that would impose a huge cost. Consequently, the
downstream producer is highly susceptible to hold up by the patent holder (the hold-up problem).
Hold out can also arise if the downstream producer needs multiple complementary IPRs which
are procured in a sequenced fashion, but patent holders strategically delay the start of the
negotiation and thus get the greatest surplus because of the increased bargaining power that
would result from their position as the last bidding seller.376
375 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro ‘Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking’ (2007) 85 Texas Law Review 1991,
1993.
376 Robert P Merges, ‘Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations’ (1996) 84 California Law Review 1293.
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A possible solution to the double marginalization problem is the vertical integration of
the companies controlling complementary assets. Such a solution may however decrease
competition more than what is necessary for the resolution of the problem and might be less
optimal than a solution that enables firms to cooperate while maintaining some degree of
competition between them. Alternatively, the undertakings controlling these assets may
coordinate their activities in a cooperative setting that would enable them to deal with the
complements and the hold-up problems by cross-licensing their IPRs. Any cooperation and
cross-licensing would be superior to a world in which patent holders fail to cooperate. Such
cooperation may however face obstacles with regard to competition law’s sensitivity to the
cooperation of undertakings that might be potential competitors in different circumstances. As a
matter of public policy, coordination will certainly generate benefits to the parties, but one
cannot assume that it will always be compatible with the public interest to promote competition
and protect the consumers. We will examine the application of competition law in Europe and
the US to the various coordination mechanisms put in place in order to deal with the
complements and the hold-up problems.
a. Patent pools and cross licensing
Patent pools and cross-licensing arrangements constitute a natural solution to the
complements problem.377 Under a patent pool, an entire group of patents is licensed in a package,
either by one of the patent holders or by a new entity established for this purpose, offering a “one
stop shop” to all members of the pool to have access to the desired patents. Patent pools also
enable non-members to have access to the patented technology at a royalty rate established by
the members of the pool. Patent pools go back a long time and in some cases their creation was
initiated by the State378. In 1917, during the First World War, US aircraft manufacturers were
asked by the US government to participate to a patent pool because ongoing litigation between
the company established by the Wright brothers had led aircraft production to a stalemate379.
Patent pools are often developed in conjunction with technological standards (e.g., the MPEG-2
video and DVD standards in the late 1990s).
When patents in a pool are complements, the pool can lower their combined price, reduce
transaction costs by limiting the number of individual licensing agreements required to make use
of the technology) and thus increase licensing revenues. Pools may also reduce costs by reducing
the occurrence of infringement litigation. Patent pools may however also be used to eliminate
competition between rival technologies and facilitate cartelization. Participants in a patent pool
might be able to use it as an opportunity to exchange competitively sensitive information on
prices, output, marketing strategies etc. While recognizing the benefits of patent pools,
competition authorities at both sides of the Atlantic have subjected patent pools to competition
377 Cross-licensing arrangements take the form of bilateral agreements under which two firms license large blocks of
their respective patents to one another so as to avoid infringement litigation. That removes the need of patent-by-
patent licensing and reduces transaction costs. Patent pools intervene in situations in which a firm requires licenses
to a small number of patents held by each of many firms.
378 On the first patent pool, see, Adam Mossof, ‘The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing
Machine War of the 1850s’ (2011) 53 Arizona Law Review 165.
379 For an analysis of the emergence of patent pools, see Robert Merges, ‘Institutions for Intellectual Property
Exchange: The Case of Patent Pools’, in (Rochelle Dreyfuss, ed.) Intellectual Products: Novel Claims to Protection
and Their Boundaries (Oxford Univ. Press, 2001) 123.
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law scrutiny, in particular with regard to their formation, the selection of the included
technologies and their operation.
With regard to cross-licensing, the US Guidelines consider that when cross-licensing
allows firms to combine complementary factors of production, such licensing can be
precompetitive.380 The Agencies apply a rule of reason analysis to all cross-licensing
arrangements, inquiring whether the restraint harms competition among entities that would have
been actual or likely competitors in the absence of the license and whether the restraint is
reasonably necessary to achieve precompetitive benefits that outweigh anticompetitive effects.381
However, they take a different perspective when cross-licensing constitutes a method for
collusion on price or output by downstream competitors: arrangements determined to be
mechanisms of naked price fixing or market division are analyzed under the per se prohibition
rule.382 The Agencies consider that anticompetitive exclusion because of a cross-licensing
arrangement is unlikely unless the parties to the arrangement collectively possess market
power.383 The Guidelines’ market share threshold and the number of technologies safe harbors
apply in this context.
With regard to patent pools, both the US Licensing arrangements guidelines and the EU
Transfer of Technology Guidelines distinguish between complement and substitute technologies.
Two technologies are complements when they are both needed for the production of the product
or for carrying out the process to which the technologies relate. Two technologies are substitute
when either technology enables the downstream manufacturer to produce the product or carry
out the process to which the technologies relate. Pools composed of pure substitute technologies
are more likely to harm competition and social welfare than are pools of complementary
technologies. A further distinction is made between essential and non-essential technologies.
Pools which are only composed of essential technologies are always precompetitive. All
essential technologies are by definition considered complementary as well. Pools with
complementary non-essential technologies may raise some competition concerns and there
should be pro-competitive reasons to include non-essential technologies to the pool. The US
Agencies apply a rule of reason analysis to patent pools, with the exception of when the pool is a
naked restraint to competition. Patent pools limiting competition among entities that would have
been actual or likely potential competitors in a relevant market in the absence of the license have
the greatest potential to restrict unreasonably competition. Vertical license restrictions may also
harm competition if they foreclose access or raise the price of an important input or if they
facilitate horizontal coordination. The US Agencies have completed their policy analysis of
patent pools in the Guidelines with a number of favorable business review letters issued by the
Department of Justice regarding an MPEG patent pool, two DVD patent pools and a patent
platform arrangement involving five separate wireless communication 3G technologies. The
FTC has also initiated some enforcement action against patent pool formed by Summit
Technologies, Inc and VisX, INC, two firms present in the manufacture and marketing of lasers
for vision correcting eye surgery. The FTC examined if the two alleged efficiencies of the patent
380 DOJ and FTC Guidelines (n 220) § 2.3.
381 Ibid § 3.1.
382 Ibid § 3.4.
383 Ibid § 5.5.
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pool could have been achieved by significantly less restrictive means and the patent pool was
dissolved following a settlement with the FTC384.
Categorizing technologies as being complements or substitutes is not an easy task as in
some cases technologies may display characteristics of both. There is also some discussion over
the essential or non-essential character of the technology, as different tests to define whether the
patent is essential to a standard or technology have been put forward.385 Recent patent pools have
all been limited to essential patents and provide for independent experts to determine which
patents should be included on this basis as a competitive safeguard to ensure that patent pools
will not produce any anticompetitive effects.
The EU Transfer of Technology Guidelines adopts a similar approach.386 Patent pools
composed of essential technologies do not fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU. The
inclusion of substitute technologies brings the patent pools within the prohibition principle of
Article 101(1) and it is highly unlikely that it will benefit from the legal exception of article
101(3) TFEU, at least not if the substitute technologies constitute a significant part of the pooled
technology, even if parties remain free to grant individual licenses, as this is unlikely to occur. If
complementary patents of a non-essential nature are included, article 101(1) becomes applicable
because of collective bundling, yet article 101(3) may apply if the nature of the pooled
technology is ambivalent (complementary in part, substitute in part) or it changed over time
(from essential to non-essential). Market dominating pools are required to practice fair and non-
discriminatory terms of licensing and they may not grant exclusive licenses.387 The EU
Guidelines on transfer of technology also contain detailed analysis on the institutional framework
governing the pool, noting that “(t)he way in which a technology pool is created, organized and
operated can reduce the risk of it having the object or effect of restricting competition”.388 Open
pools are considered more competition-compatible than pools set up by a limited group of
technology owners. The involvement of independent experts to the creation and operation of the
pool and for the consideration of whether or not a technology is essential also reduce the
likelihood of the pool being found anticompetitive. The likelihood of sensitive information being
exchanged in an oligopolistic setting and the competitive safeguards put in place to avoid this
from happening are also examined by the Commission.
SUMMARY. Both US antitrust and EU competition law have adopted a flexible
approach to patent pools and cross-licensing, thus facilitating the resolution of the complements
and hold up problems that may arise in situation of patent thickets.
384 US DOJ and FTC, ‘Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and
Competition’ (April 2007) available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf > last accessed 28
April 2013, pp.64-86.
385 One could distinguish between an “economic” test and a “technically essential” test.
386 As technology pools include more than two parties, the Block exemption Regulation 772/2004 on transfer of
technology agreements does not apply. However, the Commission provides information on the analytical framework
in its Guidelines on transfer of technology agreements.
387 Ibid para 226.
388 Ibid para 230-235.
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b. Standard setting and other forms of technology sharing
Standard setting may take different forms: technical standards may be the consequence of
regulatory intervention, cooperative standards may be established through voluntary standard
setting organizations or de facto standards set by the market place may emerge following an
intense competition between firms engaged in a winner-take-all standards war. One might think
of Microsoft’s Window operating system or the QWERTY keyboard layout as illustrations of the
emergence of the latest type of standard, the firm’s position as market leader enabling it to select
the standard (protected by IPRs) and force rivals to obtain a license. Standards provide increased
compatibility between different products, increased interoperability, thus enabling the launch of
a network. The role of interface standards is particularly significant in communication
technologies, such as cell phones, personal digital assistants, laptops. A standard implemented
before the development of a patent thicket may alleviate some of the complements and hold up
concerns related to patent thickets. At the same time, standardization may impose costs, as it
locks in consumers to a legacy system, enables hold up in cases essential IPRs have not been
declared prior the standard or may enable dominance by big players. The way the industry
standard emerges is of particular importance in order to assess its effects on competition. A
cooperative standard is likely to enable multiple firms to be active in the industry, while the
development of a de facto standard may lead to a single, proprietary product, controlled by a
dominant firm.
Cooperative standard setting involves collaboration between competitors in the context of
a Standard Setting Organization (SSO). SSOs adopt IP-related rules so as to promote cooperation
and the development of standards: disclosure rules require participants to the SSO to inform the
SSO members of any IP rights they held on technologies; SSOs are also based on transparency
rules enabling members to be kept informed of ongoing and finalized standardization work.
Licensing rules ensure that all members have effective access to the standard on fair, reasonable
and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND). As these rules engage actual or potential competitors,
they may infringe, in certain circumstances, the provisions of Section 1 Sherman Act in US
antitrust law or Article 101 TFEU in EU competition law.
In US law, antitrust liability has been found for participants in a standard setting process
abusing of this process in order to exclude competitors from the market.389 Although, according
to the Supreme Court, “an agreement on a product standard is, after all, implicitly an agreement
not to manufacture, distribute, or purchase certain types of products”, US antitrust law has stayed
clear from cooperative efforts that aim to set standards as long as the scope of the agreement is
limited to standard setting and does not extend to distribution or pricing. Integration and risk
sharing, even among competitors, has traditionally been classified as a joint venture agreement
under US antitrust law, thus escaping per se prohibition.390 In the context of a standard setting
organization, the aim of the agreement is not however to share risks but to mitigate a hold up
389 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. V Indian Head, Inc., 486 US 492 (1988) (noting that “private standard-setting
associations have traditionally been objects of antitrust scrutiny” because of their potential use as a means for
anticompetitive agreements among competitors); American Society of mechanical Engineers v Hydrolevel Corp.,
456 US 556 (1982).
390 See, our analysis below III.C.2.e.
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situation, limiting the likelihood that blocking patents may jeopardize the development of a new
technology.
The ex-ante negotiation of licensing terms by SSO participants may enter the radar of
competition authorities, as competing firms will be acting jointly to negotiate licensing terms
with each of the firms whose technology may be considered for inclusion on the SSO’s standard.
Sham negotiations “intended to cloak the true nature of a particular licensing agreement”, are
subject to the per se prohibition rule.391 For example, any effort by the SSO members to
negotiate a price fixing agreement will be per se illegal. Conduct such as multilateral ex ante
licensing negotiations or SSO requirements for intellectual property holders to disclose their
intended licensing terms for technologies being considered for adoption in a standard, taking
place before any decision is reached on which technology to include in a standard, will however
be examined under the rule of reason standard.392
A series of cases has brought to the attention of competition authorities in the US
deceptive conduct by a participant in the context of a SSO. In re Dell, the FTC examined
deceptive conduct by Dell, which had omitted to disclose the IPRs held by Dell, prior to the
adoption of a standard by the Video Electronics Standards Association. Once this standard has
been adopted, Dell informed all the other participants that their implementation of the standard
violated its exclusive right. The FTC entered into a consent agreement impeding Dell from using
the patent against those implementing the standard.393 In Unocal, the Union Oil Company of
California had also deceptively declared in the context of the SSO’s rulemaking proceedings
prior to the adoption of the standard that it had no proprietary rights on technologies included in
the standard, before claiming once the technology has been implemented and other oil refiners
had modified their refineries to comply with the standard the infringement of its patents and the
collection of royalties. The FTC successfully challenged this practice and Unocal agreed to settle
in not enforcing the patents relating to the standards.394 As some of these cases are related to
FRAND terms related litigation, we will examine this further in the following section.
Turning to Europe, the recently adopted Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101
TFEU on horizontal cooperation agreements contain detailed guidance on standardization
agreements.395 The Commission examines the effect of the standard-setting process on different
markets: (i) the product or the service market to which the standard relates, (ii) if the standard
setting involves the selection of technology and the rights to IP are marketed separately from the
products to which they relate, the impact on the relevant technology market, (iii) on the market
for standard-setting, if different standard-setting arrangements exist, (iv) on a distinct market for
391 DOJ and FTC Guidelines on licensing arrangements (n 220) §3.4., example 7.
392 See, US DOJ and FTC, ‘Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and
Competition’ (April 2007) available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf > last accessed 28
April 2013, pp. 33-56
393 Re Dell, 121 FTC 616 (1996).
394 Re Union Oil Co. of California, 2004 FTC LEXIS 115 (July 7, 2004); See also, re Rambus, Inc., Dkt. No. 9302,
2006 FTC LEXIS 101 (Aug. 20, 2006), which will be discussed further below.
395 Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal co-
operation agreements, [2011] C 11/1, Part 7.
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testing and certification that may be affected by the standard-setting.396 The Commission
recognizes that standardization may produce significant positive effects as it encourages the
development of new and improved products or markets, but in certain circumstances they might
restrict price competition and limit to control production and the level of innovation and
technical development, in particular by facilitating collusion or by excluding innovative
technologies and foreclosing the market. The analysis is even more complicated in the context of
standard-setting involving IPRs as there are multiple actors involved: (i) Companies that are only
operating upstream and do not engage in manufacturing. These “non-practising entities” may
hold patents essential to a standard, their only source of income being licensing. (ii)
Downstream-only companies are solely present at the manufacturing level and do not hold IPRs,
their production being based on technologies developed by others. (iii) Finally, vertically
integrated companies that both develop technologies and sell products. In negotiations between
non-practising entities and vertically integrated companies, the former ones have the upper hand,
as the vertically integrated companies may not offer to cross-license their own IPRs. This can
lead to situations of patent abuse and excessive royalties, as we will examine further in the
report.
The possible anticompetitive effects notwithstanding, the Commission recognizes that
there is no presumption that holding or exercising IPRs essential to a standard equates to the
possession or exercise of market power. Effects on competition are assessed on a case-by-case
basis. As it is also the case with US antitrust authorities, the Commission considers that using the
disclosure rules of the SSO prior to the adoption of the standard to cover jointly fixed prices of
either downstream products or of substitute technologies constitutes a restriction of competition
by object under Article 101(1). All other arrangements may not be subject to Article 101(1),
unless there are demonstrable anticompetitive effects. According to the Commission, “(w)here
participation in standard-setting is unrestricted and the procedure for adopting the standard in
question is transparent, standardization agreements which contain no obligation to comply with
the standard and provide access to the standard on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms
will normally not restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1)”.397 The Commission
acknowledges the need for the SSO to have transparent participation rules and procedures,398
good faith disclosure rules399 and notes that the SSO’s IPR policy “would need to require
participants to have their IPR included in the standard to provide an irrevocable commitment in
writing to offer to license their essential IPR to all third parties on fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms (“FRAND commitment”)” that “should be given prior to the adoption of
the standard”.400 Furthermore, any exclusion by the participants of specified technology from the
commitment to offer to license should be done at an early stage of the development of the
standard. If participation to the standard-setting process is open equal access is ensured, allowing
all competitors and/or stakeholders in the market affected by the standard to take part in
choosing and elaborating a standard, the risks of a likely restrictive effect on competition will be
low.401 Similarly, competition between many SSOs or standard-setting processes in the industry
396 Ibid para 261.
397 Ibid para 280.
398 Ibid para 280 & 282.
399 Ibid para 286.
400 Ibid para 285.
401 Ibid para 295.
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will exclude the likelihood of the finding of anticompetitive effects. As it is clearly indicated by
the Commission, the analysis should focus on the effects on the market and for this reason the
market shares of the goods or services based on the standard will be taken into account.402
Usually market shares of more than 20% may lead to a more intense scrutiny of the SSO’s
arrangements. In the worst-case scenario, if anticompetitive effects are identified, article 101(3)
may come into play. The Commission recognizes that standardization frequently gives rise to
significant efficiency gains. With regard to the pass-on to consumers requirement of Article
101(3), the analysis will focus on “which procedures are used to guarantee that the interests of
the users of standards and end consumers are protected”, the Commission noting that “(w)here
standards facilitate technical interoperability and compatibility of competition between new and
already existing products, services and processes, it can be presumed that the standard will
benefit consumers”.403 Presumptions may thus avoid a quite difficult and complex examination
of the trade-off between allocative and dynamic efficiency in this context. When, however,
standard-setting leads to a de facto industry standard, Article 101(3) may not enter into play if
affords the parties the possibility to substantially eliminating competition.404
SUMMARY. Both US antitrust law and EU competition law offer a high degree of
flexibility to voluntary standard-setting processes as long as basic rules of transparency, good
faith disclosure, or a requirement to commit to license on FRAND terms are implemented.
c. (F)RAND licensing obligations
As we have previously explained, once a standard is adopted, it is impossible to
manufacture products compliant with the standard without infringing the IPRs covering that
standard. Hence, once a patented technology is incorporated as an essential part of a standard, the
industry gets locked in this standard as switching to an alternative technology may be
particularly costly. The holder of a standard essential patent is able to seek a court injunction to
block companies from producing any products compliant with the standard and to ask for higher
royalties than what he would have asked prior to the adoption of the standard. The infringers
would have in this case to remove their infringing products from the market and no other choice
than to accept licensing terms that they would not have accepted otherwise (a hold up situation).
The issue may arise even if the standard essential patent holders have made a commitment to
license in (F)RAND terms.405 An often related issue is what constitutes (F)RAND. This is an
issue we will examine in more detail when analyzing the application of competition law to
pricing conduct. However, even in presence of (F)RAND licensing the level of royalties required
may be higher than otherwise would be the case, in particular if the standard essential patents
(SEP) are owned by upstream companies that are not active in both R&D and the supply of
products or services (the so called “non-practising entities”). These may sometimes contribute to
the R&D effort upstream (e.g. universities and companies actively investing in R&D but
choosing a licensing IPRs business model) but also “patent trolls”, companies that do not
402 Ibid para 296.
403 Ibid para 321(emphasis added).
404 Ibid para 324.
405 In Europe, the term Fair and Reasonable Non-Discriminatory Prices is used. In the US, the term RAND
(Reasonable and Non Discriminatory terms) is preferred, as US antitrust law does not deal with exploitative
practices and hence “fair” prices. See our analysis below.
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contribute to R&D and product development but instead purchasing companies with large patent
portfolios, then waiting until an industry is locked into a SEP they own and then taxing the
industry participants with substantial royalty demands. The risk of hold up is particularly
important in complex technically markets in which detailed standards have been developed
cooperatively by many companies. As it was explained below, non-practising entities are not
constrained by the need to guarantee cross-licensing arrangements, as most vertically integrated
companies active in the supply of goods and services do: they can ask for injunctive relief
against other companies knowing that they are not exposed to the risk of being subject to similar
actions. For similar reasons they do not fear that SSOs may be reluctant to accept in the future
their technologies, as they are not active inventors in the specific industry. Hence, in a case
opposing NTP, a non-practising entity holding SEP in wireless email technology and Research In
Motion (RIM), the manufacturer of blackberry, NTP’s threat of an injunction ceasing the
operation of all Blackberry services by RIM led the later to agree to settle for a sum of $612,5
million.
Since the eBay judgment of the US Supreme Court, it is much more difficult for non-
practising entities to obtain injunctions in patent infringement cases. However, in Europe, such
constraints in the use of permanent injunctions do not exist yet and although damages are less
significant, the availability of injunctive relief may enhance the bargaining power of non-
practising entities and ensure high rents from settlements.
Both US antitrust and EU competition law have touched upon conduct relating to
(F)RAND licensing and standard essential patents. We have already examined below the
enforcement of Section 1 Sherman Act and Article 101 TFEU. It is clear from the EU Guidelines
on horizontal cooperation agreements that patents declared essential to a standard must be made
available on all interested parties in FRAND terms.406 Unilateral conduct may also fall within the
scope of competition law, most usually Article 102 TFEU in Europe and Section 5 of the FTC
Act in the US. As it has been recognized by the European Commission, “abuse of the market
power gained by virtue of IPRs included in the standard constitutes an infringement of Article
102 TFEU”.407
Some of the examined conduct relates to the transferability of the (F)RAND commitment
from the companies engaged in the standard-setting process to the non-practising entities that
acquired these patents, following a merger and acquisition process or other transaction. In N-
Data, Negotiated Data Solutions, a non-practising entity obtained certain patents essential to an
Ethernet standard developed by the IEEE. N-Data’s predecessor had committed to license its
technology for a one off fee of $1000 per license, as a result of which the technology was
included in the standard and the industry committed to the standard. Although N-Data had made
the acquisition in full knowledge of this commitment of the previous owner, it demanded
royalties far in excess of $1000 per license. The FTC alleged that N-Data’s conduct was an
unfair practice under Section 5 of the FTC Act harming consumers and N-Data agreed to a
consent order, which required it to change its licensing terms so as to bring them in conformity
406 Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal co-
operation agreements (n 382) paras 282-283.
407 Ibid para 284.
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with the commitment of the original patent holder.408 It is noteworthy that the broad
interpretation of Section 5 of the FTC Act in this case may be considered as limited by the
requirements that (i) the conduct is coercive or oppressive (here it was assumed that the patent
hold-up was inherently “coercive” and “oppressive” with respect to firms that are, as a practical
matter, locked into a standard) (ii) there is an adverse effect on competition (here the alleged
effect was on prices and the integrity of the standard setting-process); and (iii) the injured parties
are unable to defend themselves.409
The European Commission has also taken position as to the transferability of the FRAND
commitment in its Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines providing that “to ensure the effectiveness
of the FRAND commitment there would also need to be requirement of all participating IPR
holders who provide such a commitment to ensure that any company to which the IPR owner
transfers its IPR (including the right to license that IPR) is bound by that commitment, for
example through a contractual clause between buyer and seller”.410
The litigation strategies employed in the context of SEP have also been examined in the
two recent investigations in the US and in Europe. In the US, the FTC has recently concluded a
settlement with Google with regard to the conduct of Google’s subsidiary Motorola to renege on
its licensing commitment before its acquisition by Google made to several standard-setting
bodies to license its SEP relating to smartphones, tablet computers and video game systems on
RAND terms by seeking injunctions against willing licensees of those SEPs. Google had
acquired Motorola Mobility (MMI) in 2012 including MMI’s patent portfolio of over 24000
patents and patent applications with a number of patents essential to industry standards used to
provide wireless connectivity and for internet-related technologies (e.g. smartphones, gaming
systems, operating systems, devices offering wireless connectivity or high definition video). The
FTC found that the conduct tended to affect competition in these electronic devices markets and
was in violation to Section 5 of the FTC Act. FTC’s settlement requires Google to withdraw its
claims for injunctive relief on RAND-encumbered SEP’s around the world in the future.
According to the FTC, the proposed settlement “may set a template for the resolution of SEP
licensing disputes across many industries and reduce the costly and inefficient need for
companies to amass patents for purely defensive purpose in industries where standard-compliant
products are the norm”.411
In Europe, the Commission approved the merger between Google and Motorola in 2012.
In response to Google’s argument that the new entity would not have the ability to significantly
408 In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC File No. 051-0094, Decision and Order (Jan. 23, 2008), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122do.pdf> (note the dissenting statements of Deborah Platt Majoras
and Bill Kovacic; see also, In re Robert Bosch GmbH, FTC File N. 121-0081, Decision and Order (Nov. 26, 2012),
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081/121126boschdo.pdf> accessed 29 April 2013.
409 See, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment at 4-6, In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC,
File No. 0510094 (Jan. 23, 2008), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122analysis.pdf>
accessed 29 April 2013.
410 Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal co-
operation agreements (n 382) para. 285.
411 In re Google Inc., FTC File No. 121-0120 (January 3, 3013), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemotorolastmtofcomm.pdf> Statement of the Federal Trade
Commission.
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impede effective competition post-merger, as it will be constrained by the FRAND commitment
which has been given by Motorola Mobility, the Commission noted that FRAND commitments
“cannot be considered as a guarantee that a SEP holder will not abuse its market power”.412
According to the Commission, a SEP holder can certainly threaten to seek or seek injunctions at
any time and nothing ensures that a national court in question may grant an injunction without a
detailed examination of whether FRAND and Article 102 TFEU have been respected, leaving the
SEP holder free to enforce the injunction.413 The Commission noted that “the threat of
injunction, the seeking of an injunction or indeed the actual enforcement of an injunction granted
against a good faith potential licensee, may significantly impede effective competition by, for
example, forcing the potential licensee into agreeing to potentially onerous licensing terms which
it would otherwise not have agreed to”.414 Commenting on this decision, Damien Geradin argues
that “the Commission takes a prudent position” as “while it does not suggest that patent holders
who have made a FRAND commitment should always be prohibited from seeking injunctions
(which would be an excessive position), it recognizes that there may be circumstances where the
seeking of an injunction may be abusive, especially when such injunctions are used to coerce
“good faith” licensees to accept licensing terms that it would not accept but for the
injunction”.415 The approach followed by the Commission raises the issue of identifying what
makes someone a “willing” (good faith) licensee, an issue that was also raised in the US cases.
The Commission has recently opened investigations against two SEP holders active in the
mobile device industry (Samsung Electronics and Google MMI) alleging that by seeking and
enforcing injunctions in various Member States’ courts against competing manufacturers based
on alleged infringement of certain SEPs, the companies have failed to honor their irrevocable
commitments to license any SEP on FRAND terms, that behavior being an abuse of a dominant
position.416 These cases may offer the European Commission the opportunity to elucidate its
position with regard to the availability of injunctive relief for SEP holders in the case of willing
licensees and provide a more detailed definition of the latter category.
SUMMARY. Competition law authorities in Europe and the US have recently intervened
to control behavior adopted in the context of SSOs and in negotiations between standard
essential patent holders and potential licensees outside the standard-setting environment. The
trend at both sides of the Atlantic is to limit the right of SEP holders to use injunctive relief and
reverse commitments to license in (F)RAND terms taken previously by the original SEP holders.
The availability of injunctive relief in this context has already been curtailed in the US, with the
recent judgment of the Supreme Court in eBay and the recent actions of the FTC in the
412 European Commission, Case No COMP/M.6381, Google/Motorola Mobility (February 13, 2012), available at
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf> accessed 29
April 2013.
413 Ibid para 113.
414 Ibid para 107.
415 Damien Geradin, ‘Ten Years of DG Competition Effort to Provide Guidance on the Application of Competition
Rules to the Licensing of Standard-Essential Patents: Where Do We Stand?’ ( 21 January 2013), available at SSRN:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2204359> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2204359> accessed 29 April 2013.
416 European Commission, Commission opens proceedings against Samsung, IP/12/89 (January 31, 2012), available
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-89_en.htm; European Commission, Commission opens proceedings
against Motorola, IP/12/345 (April 3, 2012), available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-345_en.htm>
accessed 29 April 2013/
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enforcement of Section 5 of the FTC Act. In Europe, the recent investigations of the European
Commission in the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU signal that a similar move will take place.
d. Price fixing and horizontal market restraints
Horizontal price fixing or naked agreements seeking to divide the market or to impose
output restrictions between competing intellectual property owners are prohibited by both
Section 1 Sherman Act and Article 101 TFEU. Agreements between competitors that restrict
licensing or that give to one competitor the right to veto another’s strategic licensing decisions as
to pricing, output, innovation will likewise be treated as a per se violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.417 In Europe, such restrictions are explicitly excluded from the benefit of the block
exemption regulation and it is highly unlikely that they might be justified under Article 101(3)
TFEU.418
e. Joint ventures
A distinction should be made between horizontal cooperation agreements that constitute
joint ventures, which are analyzed under the rule of reason and horizontal price fixing or naked
output restrictions that are subject to the principle of per se prohibition.419 To determine whether
a particular restraint in a licensing arrangement is given per se or rule of reason treatment, the
US Agencies examine whether the restraint in question can be expected to contribute to an
efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity. Any restraint in a licensing arrangement
that may further the combination of the licensor's intellectual property with complementary
factors of production owned by the licensee by, for example, aligning the incentives of the
licensor and the licensees to promote the development and marketing of the licensed technology,
or by substantially reducing transactions costs should be analyzed under a rule of reason
standard. For example, price restraints that limit the independent pricing of the members of the
joint venture may be subject to a quick look rule of reason approach when they are reasonably
necessary in order to achieve the efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity.420
In some cases, restrictions may be necessary in order to achieve important transactional
efficiency benefits. A classic example is collecting societies. In BMI the US Supreme Court held
that the blanket licenses issued and priced by the music performing rights organizations ASCAP
and BMI were not subject to per se prohibition under Section 1 of the Sherman Act because: (i)
they allowed for new, integrated products “entirely different from the product that any one
composer was able to sell by himself”, (ii) they generated substantial transaction-cost savings
and (iii) they were a practical necessity if songwriters were to be paid for the use of their
compositions.421 The BMI approach enables horizontal cooperation arrangements that bring
substantial efficiency gains to escape prohibition. EU Competition law is also relatively lenient
417 US DOJ and FTC, Guidelines on Licensing arrangements (n 220) § 3.4.
418 EU Guidelines on Transfer of Technology Agreements, (n 106) Article 4.
419 US DOJ and FTC, Guidelines on Licensing arrangements (n 220) § 3.4.
420 Texaco, Inc. v Dagher, 547 US 1 (2006).
421 Broadcast Music, Inc. v Columbia Broadcast. System, Inc., 441 US 1 (1979).
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to cooperative joint ventures for production or sales with efficiency gains.422 The EU Courts
have also recognized the important transactional benefits of collecting societies,423 although there
is recently some skepticism over the indispensability of the restrictions of competition inherent
in a collecting society, as individual exploitation using digital rights management systems
(DRMs) may technically replace collective administration through collecting societies.424
SUMMARY. Joint ventures may escape prohibition in both US and EU competition law
when they allow for efficiency-enhancing integration of assets, in the absence of a naked or
hardcore restriction to competition (e.g. cartels).
3. Tying and Interoperability
Bundling may take different forms: pure bundling, tying arrangements where some of the
goods contained in the package are offered on their own (tied product) whereas others are not
available individually (tying products), or mixed bundling, which refers to the practice of selling
each product as part of a package, as well as individually but to be interesting for consumers the
bundle price must be lower than the sum of individual prices. In EU competition law tying
arrangements may fall under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In US antitrust law they may be
analyzed under Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 3 of the Clayton Act or Section 5 of
the FTC Act. In addition, tying may establish a basis for a copyright or patent misuse claim.
Intellectual property tying claims may take different forms: (i) the tying of a patented device
with an unpatented component or when the licensing of one technology is conditional upon the
licensee purchasing a product, (ii) technological tying resulting from product design changes
with the aim to combine functionalities between a patented product with an unpatented one, (iii)
bundled or package licensing which bundles an unwanted IPR to another IPR that the licensee
desires, the classic example being block booking of motion pictures, (iv) the bundling of
licensing a specific IPR with franchising. We will focus on patent ties, technological tying and
package licensing.
a. Patent ties
Tying is a relatively frequent claim related to IP licensing and has been particularly
important for the development of the interaction between competition law and IP rights, the first
antitrust cases dealing with IP rights involving tying claims of patented with unpatented goods
and raising the question of the extent of the right of the IP owner to exploit its IPR. Following
the Supreme Court’s judgment in Jefferson Parish Hospital, tying was subject to a peculiar
quasi-per se illegality analysis, as the plaintiffs were required to meet four elements to prove a
violation of Section 1, among which (i) the existence of two separate products, (ii) evidence of
422 See, European Commission, Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements (n 382), paras 150-194
(production  joint ventures), paras  225-256 (in particular para. 255 for joint ventures on sales).
423 Case 395/87, Ministère public v Jean-Louis Tournier [1989] ECR 2521.
424 Case COMP/C2/38.698 — CISAC (July 16, 2008), available at
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38698/38698_4567_1.pdf> (The Commission took the
view that a series of measures, including membership and territorial restrictions incorporated in the reciprocal
representation agreements concluded between the collecting societies infringed Article 101 TFEU). The
Commission’s decision was recently partially annulled by the General Court: see Case T-442/08 International
Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC) (12 April 2013).
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coercion and (iii) proof that the seller has sufficient economic power in the market for the tying
product to enable it to restrain trade in the market for the tied product (a market share of less than
30% in the tying product market was considered insufficient to establish market power).425 In
Illinois Tool Works, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the “this Court’s strong disapproval
of tying arrangement by the case law has substantially diminished” and stressed the need to
prove market power, for tying to be considered anticompetitive.426 The Court also noted that a
patent does not necessarily confer market power on the patentee, thus breaking with a long
tradition of precedents that had made that presumption. The 1995 DOJ and FTC Guidelines on
Licensing arrangements move to a rule of reason analysis of intellectual property tying
arrangements noting that “(a)lthough tying arrangements may result in anticompetitive effects
such arrangements can also result in significant efficiencies and procompetitive benefits”.427
According to the Guidelines, agencies are likely to challenge a tying arrangement if (i) the seller
has market power in the tying product, (ii) the arrangement has an adverse effect on competition
and (iii) efficiency justifications for the arrangement do not outweigh the anticompetitive
effects.428 The Guidelines seem to focus less on evidence of the existence of two separate
products.
In EU competition law, for a tying claim to exist “it is a condition that the products and
technologies involved are distinct in the sense that there is distinct demand for each of the
products and technologies forming part of the tie or the bundle”.429 As it is noted in the
Commission’s Transfer of Technology Guidelines, “(t)his is normally not the case where the
technologies or products are by necessity linked in such a way that the licensed technology
cannot be exploited without the tied product or both parts of the bundle cannot be exploited
without the other”.430 Tying arrangements escape Article 101 TFEU if the market share of the
parties is below the threshold of 20% for agreements between competitors and 30% for
agreements between non-competitors, which apply “to any relevant technology or product
market affected by the licence agreement, including the market for the tied product”.431 Above
these market share thresholds the Commission will balance the anti-competitive and pro-
competitive effects of tying. Among the efficiency gains considered, the Commission notes
instances in which tying is necessary for a technically satisfactory exploitation of the licensed
technology, for ensuring conformity to quality standards, for allowing the licensee to exploit the
licensed technology significantly more efficiently, or when the licensor has a legitimate interest
in ensuring that the quality of the products are such that it does not undermine the value of his
technology or his reputation as an economic operator.432
Contractual tying may fall under the scope of Article 102 TFEU. Article 102(d) cites
tying as an example of abuse: “making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
425 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984). The fourth element is that a non
insubstantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied product is affected.
426 Illinois Tool Works v Independent Ink, 126 S.Ct 1281 (2006).
427 US DOJ and FTC, Guidelines on Licensing arrangements (n 220) § 5.3.
428 Ibid.
429 European Commission, Guidelines on Transfer of Technology (n 106) para. 191.
430 Ibid
431 Ibid para 192.
432 Ibid paras 194-195.
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usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts”. The implementation of this article
requires the difficult task of identifying anticompetitive (affecting consumers) forced package
sales, while tolerating those that are not anticompetitive.
In Tetra Pak II the Court of Justice found that even where tied sales of two products are
in accordance with commercial usage or there is a natural link between the two products in
question, such sales may still constitute abuse within the meaning of Article 102 unless they are
objectively justified, thus adopting a quasi-per se illegality standard to the contractual bundling
by a dominant firm of two distinct products. The Court adopted a supply-oriented test for
defining the condition of two distinct products by noting that for a considerable time there have
been independent manufacturers for the tied product and inferring from that that the two products
are distinct. The Court also announced the principle that “(a)ny independent producer is quite
free, as far as [EU] competition law is concerned, to manufacture consumables intended for use
in equipment manufactured by others, unless in doing so infringes a competitor’s intellectual
property right”.433 In CBET, the Court of Justice held that an abuse is committed where, without
any objective necessity, an undertaking holding a dominant position on a particular market
reserves to itself or to an undertaking belonging to the same group an ancillary activity which
might be carried out by another undertaking as part of its activities on a neighbouring but
separate market, with the possibility of eliminating all competition from such undertaking.434
This restrictive approach of the EU Courts for contractual tying may have been
transformed to a form of structured rule of reason analysis in the recent judgment of the General
Court in Microsoft, although this case concerns technological tying.435 The Commission’s
Priorities Guidance do not refer to the condition of coercion found in the case law and note that
Article 102 may apply where an undertaking is dominant in the tying market and where, in
addition, (i) the tying and tied products are distinct products and (ii) the tying practice is likely to
lead to anticompetitive foreclosure.436 The condition of the distinct products is also interpreted
more broadly, the Commission considering that “the presence on the market of undertakings
specialised in the manufacture or sale of the tied product without the tying product or each of the
products bundled by the dominant firm” constitutes indirect evidence (not direct as it was
suggested in the previous case law of the Court) of the distinct character of the products.437
b. Technological tying
Technological integration or tying has been an area of continuous debate, in view of the
trend to integrate multiple functionalities in products in high technology markets. Product design
changes and technological integration may give rise to antitrust liability in US antitrust law. In
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, the Federal Circuit found improper the modification by Bard of
the product design of its biopsy gun in order to prevent its competitor’s copycat replacement
needles from being used in the guns.438 In Microsoft II, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
433 Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak v Commission (Tetra Pak II) [1996] ECR I-5991.
434 Case 311/84, CBET v. Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Télédiffusion SA [1985] ECR 3261
435 Microsoft CFI case.
436 European Commission, Priorities Guidance ( n 241) para 50.
437 Ibid para 51.
438 C.R. Bard, Inc. v M3 Systems, 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
102
Circuit held that the tying by Microsoft of its web browser software with the operating system
software was permissible: any “genuine technological integration” combining functionalities in a
way that offers advantages unavailable if the functionalities were bought separately and
composed by the purchaser would be beneficial to consumers, regardless of whether elements of
the integrated package are marketed separately.439 In Microsoft III, the District of Columbia
Circuit, distinguished technological tying, a situation where the tied good is physically and
technologically integrated with the tying good, from contractual tying, and applied to the former
a rule of reason approach that would neither include a distinct product test (which is according to
the Court “backward-looking and therefore systematically poor proxies for overall efficiency in
the presence of new and innovative integration”), nor will it infer a restriction of competition
from the simple existence of market power, but would require evidence by the plaintiff of
anticompetitive effects in the tied product market.440
Technological tying is also recognized as a separate form of tying in EU competition law.
Since the seminal judgment of the General Court in EU Microsoft I, in order to succeed a
technological tying case in EU competition law under Article 102 TFEU, the plaintiff needs to
prove that (i) the tying and the tied products are two separate products, (ii) the undertaking
concerned is dominant in the market for the tying product, (iii) the practice (an agreement or
technological integration) does not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product without
the tied product (coercion), and (iv) the practice in question forecloses competition.441 The Court
expressed its reticence to accept technological tying, when this leads to the acquisition of an
entrenched dominant position on the market, noting that “although, generally, standardization
may effectively present certain advantages, it cannot be allowed to be imposed unilaterally by an
undertaking in a dominant position by means of tying”.442 The emergence of a de facto standard
should be the result of competition between the “intrinsic merits” of the products and in fine
depends on the consumers’ choice rather than on the arbitrary decision of a dominant firm to
impose its own standard. The Commission’s Guidance seems inspired by these principles and
applies to technological tying the same conditions as for contractual tying to be found illegal
under Article 102 TFEU, noting however that “the risk of anti-competitive foreclosure is
expected to be greater where the dominant undertaking makes its tying or bundling strategy a
lasting one, for example through technical tying which is costly to reverse” and that “technical
tying also reduces the opportunities for resale of individual components”.443 In a subsequent case
(EU Microsoft II), the Commission accepted the Redmond firm’s commitments to offer a choice
screen remedy for the allegedly anticompetitive practice of bundling the Internet browser
software with the operating system software.444 The Commission has recently launched an
439 United States v Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C.Cir. 1998).
440 United States v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
441 Case T 201/04 Microsoft Corp. v. Commission [2007] ECR II-3601. The European Commission in its Guidance
on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 102 TFEU to abusive exclusionary conduct to dominant
undertakings, [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 50 does not refer to the condition of coercion. Indeed, some authors have
previously argued that it is redundant: Nicholas Economides and Ioannis Lianos, ‘The Elusive Antitrust standard on
bundling in Europe and in the United States in the Aftermath of the Microsoft cases’ (2009) 76(2) Antitrust Law
Journal 483.
442 Case T 201/04 (n 428) para. 1152.
443 European Commission, Priorities Guidance (n 247) para 53.
444 European Commission, Case COMP/C-3/39.530 – Microsoft (tying) (December 16, 2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39530/39530_2671_3.pdf : See also, Nicholas Economides
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investigation against Microsoft for not complying with the conditions of the commitment
decision.445
SUMMARY. Both EU and US antitrust law may apply to bundling and tying practices.
US antitrust law has evolved towards a more lenient approach to technological tying, requiring
evidence of anticompetitive effects and the consideration of the efficiency gains brought by the
practices. This approach is consistent across the different provisions of US antitrust law applying
to tying practices. The situation is slightly different in Europe, which views tying by dominant
firms with suspicion, in particular if that leads to de facto standardization of the industry, and
takes a more aggressive stance against technological tying.
c. Package licensing
With regard to bundled licensing, the US courts have accepted that bundling two related
patents together without any restrictions or any requirements regarding use will likely not be
examined under a per se illegality rule.446 In US Philips Corp. v. ITC, the Federal Circuit
recognized the procompetitive benefits of package licensing, such as the reduction of transaction
costs, hinting to the need for the courts to examine closely the business reasons for the package
license and its likely anticompetitive effects.447
The Commission’s Transfer of Technology Guidelines also apply the equivalent of a rule
of reason approach to bundled licensing: the Guidelines recognize the potential precompetitive
benefits of package licensing and state that a package license is likely to violate Article 101
TFEU only if the market share is above the level required by the market share thresholds. Above
the market share thresholds it is necessary to balance the anti-competitive and pro-competitive
effects of tying.448
4. Pricing IP rights and competition law
An area with significant differences between US antitrust law and EU competition law
relates to the discretion of IP holders to impose price restrictions, either by demanding high
royalties or by imposing post-sale price restraints to the distributors of their products.
a. Royalty stacking, excessive royalties and price discrimination
The persistence of the patent thicket problem with the development of complex products
involving numerous inputs with corresponding third-party proprietary rights attached may lead to
and Ioannis Lianos, ‘A Critical Appraisal of Remedies in the EU Antitrust Microsoft Cases’ 2010 2 Columbia
Business Law Review 346.
445 European Commission, IP/12/1149, Commission sends Statement of Objections to Microsoft on non-compliance
with browser choice commitments (October 24, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-
1149_en.htm .
446 US Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005) [(Philips’ package license of patents for
recordable and rewritable compact discs was not per se unlawful and could involve significant efficiencies]. Princo
Corp v. ITC , 563 F.3d 1301 (Fed Cir. 2009).
447 Ibid., pp. 1192-1193.
448 European Commission, Guidelines on Transfer of Technology (n 106) paras 191-195.
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what is frequently referred to as “royalty stacking”. Royalty stacking results from multiple
royalty obligations, as various licenses related to different inputs of a product combine to impose
aggregate royalty obligations of an extent of 6%–20% (or greater).449 A similar problem emerges
in situations of “royalty packing”, where multiple technologies are bundled together (sometimes
imposed by the licensor or by best practices within an industry) also increasing the aggregate-
royalty problem. Hold up problems may emerge, more so if non-practising entities holding SEP
are involved, and may increase considerably the royalties paid. It is possible that the cost burden
of royalties will not be based on the actual contribution of the invention to the final product.
There are various techniques to deal with royalty stacking and packing: royalty ceilings, royalty
floors, variable royalties, and alternatives to royalties, such as lump-sum payments and patent
pools with no fee cross-licensing among the members of the pool.
Can however royalty stacking become a competition law problem? One might distinguish
between the sanction by competition law of exclusionary practices leading to situations of
royalty stacking from that of royalty stacking as such, that is the exploitative practice of
demanding excessive royalties. There are different perceptions in the EU and the US on the
liability of dominant firms for excessive pricing without exclusionary acts.
With regard to exclusionary practices, competition authorities in Europe and the US have
focused on deceptive conduct in the context of a SSO. Patent holders disclosing information on
their patents and patent applications prior to the adoption of a given standard can at most demand
a royalty that corresponds to the marginal value of their patented technology. However, there are
instances in which a patent holder may adopt the strategy to conceal during the standard-setting
process this information, let the other stakeholders agree on a standard incorporating a patented
technology and reveal the information that the technology is covered by a patent after the
standard has gained widespread acceptance, when the negotiating position of the other
stakeholders will be weakened as they would have made standard specific investments and will
be kept hostage. The patent holder will then be able to demand a royalty that will far exceed the
marginal value of the patented technology (the so called “patent ambush” strategy).
In Rambus an FTC order found Rambus’s deceit, for concealing its patents and patents
and patent applications and for making outright misrepresentations and giving misleading
responses to questions about its conduct in the context of the Joint Electron Device Engineering
Council (JEDEC) SSO a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 5 of the FTC
Act, noting even that deceptive conduct might be found in the absence of an express obligation
to disclose.450 The FTC relied on the fuzzy disclosure obligations imposed to JEDEC members
concluding that these incorporated an underlying duty of good faith and inferred from this that
JEDEC members had reason to believe that the standard setting process will be cooperative and
449 On this practice, see, Einer Elhauge, ‘Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive
Royalties?’ (2008) 4 Journal of Competition law & Economics 535; Thomas F Cotter, ‘Patent Holdup, Patent
Remedies, and Antitrust Responses’ (2009) 34(4) The Journal of Corporate Law 1151, 1160; Joseph Farrell et al,
‘Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up: A Troublesome Mix’ (2007) 74(3) Antitrust Law Journal 603; Mark A
Lemley and Carl Shapiro, ‘Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking’ (2007) 85 Texas Law Review 1991; Gregory J
Sidak, ‘Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to
Lemley and Shapiro’ (2008) 92 Minnesota Law Review 714.
450 In the matter of Rambus, Inc. (August 2, 2006), Docket No. 9302, pp. 34-35 available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/060802commissionopinion.pdf
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free from deception. The FTC also argued that Rambus’ conduct prevented JEDEC from
extracting a commitment from Rambus to license in Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory terms
(RAND). Rambus deceit had the effect of distorting JEDEC’s choice of technologies and
provided Rambus monopoly power. The DC Circuit vacated the order as the FTC failed to prove
that for Rambus’ deceptive conduct the SSO would have adopted a competing technology (thus
there was no exclusionary element).451 The Court found that had Rambus disclosed the
information prior the adoption of the standard, JEDEC would have either excluded Rambus
technologies, or require from Rambus a RAND commitment. As to the first issue, the FTC had
found evidence in its investigation that, had Rambus disclosed the information, JEDEC would
have incorporated anyway Rambus’ technologies. As to the second issue relating to the RAND
commitment, the Court advanced that exploitative abuses are not considered as producing an
antitrust harm in US antitrust law.452 The Court also expressed reservations as to the standalone
use of Section 5 FTC Act in this context and developed limiting principles for its use.
Another case involved an action against US chipset manufacturer Qualcomm, holder of
IP rights in mobile telephone standards. Qualcomm made a promise before the adoption of the
standard to license essential proprietary technology on RAND terms. The Third Circuit in
Broadcom Corp. v Qualcomm, found that intentionally deceiving the SSO with respect to a
royalty commitment could constitute a monopolization cause of action under the following
conditions: (1) in a consensus-oriented private standard setting environment, (2) a patent holder’s
intentionally false promise to license essential proprietary technology on RAND terms, (3)
coupled with an [Standard Determining Organization’s] reliance on that promise when including
the technology in a standard, and (4) the patent holder’s subsequent breach of that promise, is
actionable anticompetitive conduct.453 Broadcom relies heavily on the FTC’s analysis in
Rambus, emphasizing that deception becomes an antitrust concern only where rival technologies
are excluded from the market and consequently consumer welfare is harmed.
One could finally add the recent standalone enforcement of Section 5 of the FTC Act in
Negotiated Data Solutions (N-Data), Robert Bosch GmbH and Google. In these cases the FTC
attempted to articulate circumstances in which conduct related to SEP royalties could fall within
the scope of Section 5 FTC Act, either as an unfair method of competition or as an unfair act or
practice. Hence, in N-Data, the FTC found that Section 5 could reach conduct that would not
violate the antitrust laws, as long as the conduct has some element of coercion or oppressiveness,
it causes substantial harm to consumers, which is not easily avoidable by consumers themselves
and which is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition. In Bosch,
the FTC made explicit that “(p)atent holders that seek injunctive relief against willing licensees
of their FRAND-encumbered SEP’s should understand that in appropriate cases the Commission
can and will challenge this conduct as an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the
FTC Act”.454 In Google, the FTC found that Google’s threat of injunctions against possible
infringers of its SEP “would likely increase costs to consumers because manufacturers using
451 Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F3d 456 (DC Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1318 (2009).
452 Ibid., pp. 464-467.
453 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, 501 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2007).
454 In re Robert Bosch GmbH, File Bo 121-0081 (November 26, 2012), p. 2.
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Google’s SEP’s would be forced, by the threat of an injunction, to pay higher royalty rates,
which would be passed on to consumers”.455
Despite this recent extension of the scope of Section 3 FTC Act, US antitrust law does
not apply to purely exploitative practices. Although this had always been the case,456 it has been
made clearer recently in Verizon v Trinko, the Supreme Court noting that “(t)he mere possession
of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful;
it is an important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices
– at least for a short period – is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk
taking that produces innovation and economic growth”.457 “Fair” royalties is not an objective that
may be pursued through US antitrust law.
In Europe, however, excessive prices (royalties) may be found to infringe Article 102(a)
TFEU which may apply to purely exploitative conduct (exploiting consumers directly without
any requirement to prove any exclusionary conduct), in particular conduct that is “directly or
indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions”. In
United Brands, the Court of Justice held that a price may be found excessive if it has no
reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied.458 According to the Court, this
excess could, inter alia, be determined objectively if it were possible for it to be calculated by
making a comparison between the selling price of the product in question and its cost of
production, which would disclose the amount of the profit margin.459 A two-steps analysis is
effectuated: it has to be determined “whether the difference between the costs actually incurred
and the price actually charged is excessive, and, if the answer to this question is in the
affirmative, whether a price has been imposed which is either unfair in itself or when compared
to competing products”.460 These two conditions (steps) are cumulative. Evidence of an
excessive profit margin is not sufficient in itself to prove an abuse. The EU competition
authorities employ a cost/price approach in order to determine the excessive character of a profit
margin.
A possible option is to determine an adequate cost measure to measure profit (adopt a
cost-plus approach), compare that to the price and then to assess the excessiveness of the profit
margin, the last operation involving the definition of some benchmarks. However, the definition
of the relevant costs becomes a daunting task in the context of IP rights related conduct, as
developing new technology involves R&D expenses, thus high fixed costs, which it would be
difficult to assess, as firms engage in multiple projects and intense cross-subsidization between
455 Some commissioners issued dissenting or concurring opinions opposing the extension of Section 5 FTC Act to
catch conduct that is only remotely exclusionary and mostly exploitative. For example, in Google, Commissioners
Ramirez and Ohlausen believed that this conduct should not fall within the authority of the FTC and that courts are
better suited than the FTC to decide complex licensing disputes. Commissioner Rosch would have preferred to
constrain the discretion of the FTC with more explicit limiting principles, such as that the conduct occurs in
situations of monopoly or near-monopoly power, it causes particularly pernicious anticompetitive harm and is the
result of deceptive conduct.
456 See, for instance, Berkey Photo, Inc v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F2d 263, 294 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
US 1093 (1980).
457 Trinko case (n 119).
458 Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207.
459 Ibid para. 251.
460 Ibid para. 252.
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successful and unsuccessful projects. Common costs used for the development and production of
different technologies (particularly in situations of cumulative innovation), makes the operation
even harder. In Scandlines, the Commission rejected a cost-plus approach (add to marginal cost a
reasonable profit calculated as a percentage of a production cost) for an approach that would
look to whether the price had a reasonable relation to the economic value of the service supplied
and would integrate additional costs (e.g. sunk costs, opportunity costs) and factors not reflected
in the audited profits and costs (e.g. intangible value of the assets).461 How much profit margin
will be deemed excessive is another important issue. In United Brands, the Court held that a
profit margin of 7% is not sufficient.462 Some profit margin would also be entirely justified in
dynamic industries or industries with network effects.
As to the adequate benchmark prices that would define the “unfair” character of the
prices charged, a comparison with the prices charged by competitors might be a possible option
(although one should be cautious, as price differences may indicate quality differences). In
United Brands the Court noted that “other ways may be devised— and economic theorists have
not failed to think up several— of selecting the rules for determining whether the price of a
product is unfair”.463 Other options include the comparison with the price of the product over
different geographic markets.464 In Kanal 5, the remuneration model applied by the Swedish
Copyright Management Organisation (STIM), relating to the broadcast of musical works
protected by copyright, which calculated the amount of royalties on the basis of the revenue of
companies broadcasting those works and the amount of music broadcast, was found to be an
abuse for the simple reason that another method would enabled the use of those musical works
and the audience to be identified and quantified more precisely.465 As it is also observed in the
Commission’s Guidance on the Transfer of Technology agreements, on the question of whether
fees charged for access to IPR in the standard-setting context are unfair or unreasonable in the
presence of a FRAND commitment, “cost-based methods are not well adapted to this context
because of the difficulty in assessing the costs attributable to the development of a particular
patent or groups of patents”; It may be better, instead, “to compare the licensing fees charged by
the company in question for the relevant patents in a competitive environment before the
industry has been locked into the standard (ex ante) with those charged after the industry has
been locked in (ex post)”.466 However, the determination of the excessive nature of pricing in an
IP context is notoriously difficult.
461 European Commission Decision, Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg, COMP/A 36.568/D3, (July 23,
2004) available at (paras 209, 224, 226-227, 234-235). See also in an IP context, Attheraces Limited v. The British
Horseracing Board Limited [2007] EWCA Civ 38, the Court of appeal holding that the High Court had been wrong
to regard the "economic value" of the pre-race data as limited to the product of the cost + formula.
462 Case 27/76, United Brands (n 458), para. 266.
463 Ibid para. 253.
464 Case 27/76, United Brands (n 458) para. 239; Case 395/87, Ministère Public v. Tournier [1989] ECR 2521; Case
110/88, Lucazeau v. SACEM, [1989] ECR 2811, the last two cases on the level of royalties charged by the French
collecting society SACEM for playing recorded music in discotheques  (acknowledging that important price
differentials between Member States could indicate an abuse, unless the undertaking justifies the difference by
reference to objective dissimilarities between the situation in the Member State concerned and the situation
prevailing in all the other Member States).
465 Case C-52/07, Kanal 5 Ltd v Föreningen Svedska Tonsättares Internationella Musikbyrå (STIM) UPA [2009]
ECR I-9275.
466 EU Horizontal Cooperation Agreements Guidelines (n 409) para. 289.
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There has been some recent enforcement of that provision to excessive pricing in the
context of a royalty stacking claim. In Rambus, the Commission found that Rambus had engaged
in a “patent ambush” based on the same behavior examined by the FTC in this case, but reaching
a different conclusion than the US competition authority.467 The Commission turned the patent
ambush claim into one that Rambus had charged excessive royalties for its patents and applied
Article 102(a). An Article 9 commitment decision capped the licensing fees Rambus could
charge for its SEPs.468
Unfairly low prices may also be a concern for the application of Article 102(a). This does
not concern predatory prices, but situations in which a dominant buyer purchases inputs at
unfairly low prices. These are determined according to a comparison between the price paid and
the economic value of the service provided. In CICCE, the Court examined an action for
annulment against a decision of the Commission relating to conduct by some French television
stations holding exclusive broadcasting rights to pay low license fees for the rights of films and
accepted that article 102(a) could apply in these circumstances, although in this case the
Commission had not found an abuse, as it was impossible, in view of the variety of the films and
the different criteria for assessing their value, to determine an administrable yardstick valid for
all firms, since each film is different.469
Price discrimination forms also a standalone Article 102 TFEU violation. The European
competition authorities have applied articles 102 (b) and 102(c) to different practices, but article
102(c) particularly focuses on secondary line injury, that is situations in which a non-vertically
integrated dominant undertaking price discriminates between customers with the effect of
placing several of them or one of them at a competitive disadvantage with regard to the others.
Hence, it constitutes a purely exploitative practice and another illustration of the divergence
between the EU and the US models on the way unilateral practices of dominant firms are dealt in
competition law. In contrast, first line injury involves a dominant firm applying different prices
to its competitors and thus constitutes an example of exclusionary practice. Article 102(c) has
nevertheless applied to all types of discriminatory prices, this area of EU competition law being
particularly fuzzy.
There has been a lot of discussion recently on targeting purely exploitative behaviour,
such as excessive royalties, through the means of Article 102(a) and the issue of royalty stacking
occurring in the context of standard-setting and eventual hold up situations.470 One should bear
467 European Commission Decision, Rambus, COMP/38.636 (December 9, 2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38636/38636_1203_1.pdf
468 See also the statement of objections sent to Qualcomm by the European Commission for the fact that its
licensing terms and conditions for its patents essential to the standard did not comply with its  own FRAND
commitment and had led to excessive royalties. The Commission abandoned the case.
469 Case 298/83, Comité des industries cinématographiques des Communautés européennes v. Commission [1985]
ECR 1105.
470 See, Massimo Motta and Alexandre de Streel, ‘Exploitative and Exclusionary Excessive Prices in EU Law’ in
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), What is an Abuse of a Dominant Position? (Hart Publishing
2006) 91; Emil Paulis, ‘Article 82 EC and Exploitative Conduct’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds),
European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC (Hart Publishing 2008) 515; Lars
Hendrik Röller, ‘Exploitative Abuses’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds) European Competition
Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC (Hart Publishing 2008) 525; David S Evans and Jorge A
Padilla, ‘Excessive Prices: Using Economics to Define Administrable Legal Rules’ (2005) 1 Journal of Competition
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in mind that the Enforcement Priority Guidance of the Commission on Article 102 does not
cover exploitative abuses. Commentators have expressed a number of reservations on this issue:
(i) Assessing excessive pricing may be hard. What should be the right benchmark: a
competitive price? But what does this mean? Duopoly? Perfect or imperfect competition? How
can it be calculated? If one allows some margin above competitive price, what is the magnitude
of this margin? How to establish reasonable return on investment?
(ii) Setting clear rules for compliance in dynamic markets is even harder; How should
these rules apply in dynamic markets, where there is upfront investment for the future? Should
one require high ex post margins to incentivise ex ante risky investments (e.g. in R&D)? It is
important to acknowledge that high margins on some activities may be required to cover fixed
costs that are common across activities;
(iii) Remedies for excessive pricing can equate to price regulation (either implicitly or
explicitly);
(iv) Price regulation can be distortive to competition, investment and R&D; Price
regulation can inhibit entry/expansion by competitors, can distort investment incentives, can
distort incentives for marketing and R&D – i.e. “portfolio pricing” approach (in view of the fact
that the majority of R&D projects fail), may distort pricing incentives; Proponents of this view
suggest that there may need to be explicit regulation for certain areas of natural monopoly – such
as utilities – but this should be done carefully by sector-specific regulators. The rest of the
economy should be left alone – since the risks of careless and ill-informed intervention outweigh
any potential benefits;
(v) The problem will typically solve itself, since high profits encourage entry.
(vi) Defining what constitutes an excessive price is too complicated for competition
authorities or the courts, which are not the adequate institutions for this task.
Commentators have also suggested a number of limiting principles to the application of
article 102(a) to purely exploitative practices. This should apply only in narrow circumstances.
There is wide agreement as to possibility to apply Article 102(a) when (i) There are very high
and long lasting barriers to entry (and expansion); and (ii) the firms (near) monopoly position has
not been the result of past innovation or investment. Yet some authors propose additional
conditions. For example, Evans and Padilla suggest that as well as meeting the first two
conditions it is necessary that (iii) the prices charged by the firm widely exceed its average total
costs; and (iv) there is a risk that those prices may prevent the emergence of new goods and
services in adjacent markets471. Geradin, Layne-Farrar and Petit would add that there needs to be
some form of an exclusionary element or deceptive practice.472 Röller would have applied it only
to situations of “enforcement gap”.473 Motta and De Streel argue that “there should be no sector-
specific regulator”.474 Paulis disagrees with the sector regulator point, noting that the
Commission should maintain the option to intervene when a national regulator is not acting or is
Law & Economics 97; Mark Furse, ‘Excessive Prices, Unfair Prices and Economic Value: The Law of Excessive
Pricing under Article 82 and the Chapter II Prohibition’ (2008) European Competition Journal 59; Ariel Ezrachi and
David Gilo, ‘Are Excessive Prices Really Self-Correcting?’ (2009) 5(2) Journal of Competition Law & Economics
249.
471 Evans and Padilla, (n 470).
472 Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar and Nicolas Petit, EU Competition Law and Economics (Oxford University
Press 2012) 289.
473 Röller, (n 470).
474 Motta and de Streel (n 470).
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taking decisions that are not in conformity with Community law.475 One could however
challenge the requirement that the exploitative practice results from some form of deceptive
practice or exclusionary conduct to be contra legem, as the text of Article 102(a) envisages
unfair prices as a separate violation than the abuse of “other unfair trading conditions”. If we
apply Article 102(a) to only practices that involve some exclusionary or deceptive conduct
element that would jeopardize the full effect of Article 102(a) and the type of practices it aims.
The strength of the case for intervention will of course vary and will be stronger if all these
conditions are present. Others have criticized the assumption often made that markets are self-
correcting and that high prices encourage entry.476
One could also oppose the argument over the incapacity of courts and competition
authorities to define what constitutes an excessive price by referring to the role of the courts in
evaluating damages in the context of competition disputes or IP infringement cases. The
Commission has published detailed non-binding guidance on the different methodologies
available for evaluating competition law damages.477 Similar guidance may be published for
exploitative practices. US courts proceed quite often to the examination of complex econometric
evidence in antitrust disputes. Finally, US courts have developed the so called Georgia-Pacific
list of factors that are supposedly relevant to determining the amount of a reasonable royalty.478
Competition authorities and courts are also involved in the policing of compulsory licensing
remedies and assess the reasonableness of royalties required. Following the decision of the
European Commission finding that Microsoft’s refusal to provide interoperability infringed
Article 102 TFEU, Microsoft was required to grant access to and authorize the use of the
interoperability information on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. The European
Commission suggested that the assessment of the reasonableness of Microsoft’s prices depended
on “whether there is innovation in the protocols, and if there is, what is charged for comparable
technologies in the market”.479 According to the Commission, “such a remuneration should not
reflect the strategic value, stemming from Microsoft’s market power”. In this case, the
benchmark for the calculation of royalties was the incremental value of Microsoft’s protocols
over the prior art and the royalties agreed among third parties for comparable technologies.
Following the remedy imposed by the Commission, Microsoft submitted its remuneration
schemes, containing principles for pricing the interoperability information, as these were
negotiated by the parties. The Commission found that some of the remunerations charged by
Microsoft for non-patented information were unreasonable and imposed periodic penalties.480
475 Paulis (n 470).
476 Ezrachi and Gilo (n 470).
477 Draft Guidance Paper, Quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the
TFEU (June 2011), available at
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_actions_damages/draft_guidance_paper_en.pdf> last accessed
28 April 2013
478 Georgia-Pacific Co. v United States Plywood Co., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
mod’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). It is noteworthy that the Georgia Pacific factors, as developed and applied by
the courts for determining reasonable royalties in patent damage cases, have been recently applied by U.S. courts
also in the FRAND context (see ESS Tech., Inc. v. PC-Tel, Inc., No. C-99-20292 RMW, 2001 WL 1891713, at 3-6
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2001), Rambus, Broadcom etc).
479 Commission Microsoft Decision (n 228), paras 1005-1009.
480 Commission Decision, Microsoft (COMP/C-3/37.792) [2009] OJ C 166/20.
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The General Court confirmed the control effectuated by the Commission of the reasonableness
of the royalties’ rate charged.481
SUMMARY. The application of competition law to pricing practices involving IP rights,
even in the absence of any exclusionary conduct, constitutes a burning issue in EU competition
law. US antitrust law has recently expanded the scope of Section 5 of the FTC Act to cover the
exploitative effects of deceptive practices, while developing some limiting principles. The
application of competition law to this type of practices might bring more problems than those it
may solve, depending of course on the circumstances of the case and the capabilities of the
specific competition authority or courts. Applying competition law to exploitative practices may
however be justified when there are very high and long lasting barriers to entry (and expansion)
and the (near) monopoly position has not been the result of past innovation or investment.
b. Post-sale restraints on IP distribution
(i) Resale price maintenance of IP protected goods
While naked horizontal price fixing agreements or more generally agreements to restrict
output or supply are subject to the per se prohibition rule, since the seminal judgment of the
Supreme Court in Leegin, vertical price fixing is subject to the rule of reason.482 The case law of
the Supreme Court supersedes of course section 5.2. of the Guidelines on Licensing
arrangements,483 which still quote the position of the Supreme Court under the older precedent of
Dr. Miles.484
While EU competition law does not provide for the possibility of per se prohibitions, as
article 101(3) may provide an exception for any restriction of competition, if the four conditions
of this article are fulfilled, resale price maintenance constitutes a hardcore restriction that falls
within the scope of the prohibition principle of article 101(1). It is also explicitly excluded from
the benefit of the block exemption regulation on the transfer of technology agreements485 and it
is highly unlikely that it might benefit from an individual exception under Article 101(3),
because often such restrictions are not the only way to achieve efficiency gains, other less
restrictive to competition alternatives offering an additional option to attain them.486
(ii) Vertical territorial limitations
481 Case T-167/08, Microsoft Corp. v. European Commission [June 27, 2012], (noting that the distinction between
the strategic value and the intrinsic value of the technologies covered is a basic premise of the assessment of the
reasonableness of any remuneration charged).
482 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
483 US DOJ and FTC Guidelines on Licensing Arrangements (n 220) § 5.2.
484 Dr. Miles Med. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). See, however, the position of the Supreme Court in
in United States v. General Electric, 272 U.S. 476 (1926), where the Supreme Court held that a restraint on the
licensee’s sale price was not unlawful as long as the restriction applied only to the first sale of the patented article.
485 Under article 4.2(a) of Regulation 772/2004 (n 226). See also, article 4 of Regulation 330/2010 (for vertical
agreements) if the main purpose of the agreement is distribution. Maximum sale prices or recommended sale prices
do not, however, constitute hardcore restrictions, provided that they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price
as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties.
486 EU Guidelines on the Transfer of Technology Agreements (n 108) para. 97.
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Territorial restrictions limiting the geographic area in which one or more parties may
conduct activity or sell products are also treated differently in US antitrust law and EU
competition law. Although horizontal territorial restrictions are typically subject to a per se
illegality rule, vertical territorial restrictions are assessed under the rule of reason and are
considered as serving precompetitive ends.487 In Europe, territorial restrictions that lead to
absolute territorial protection constitute hardcore restrictions, excluded from the benefit of the
block exemption regulations.488
(iii) Vertical customer restrictions and field of use restrictions
Customer restrictions included in an agreement between non-competitors are examined in
US antitrust law under the rule of reason.489 In contrast, in Europe, customer restrictions are
considered as hardcore restrictions, excluded from the benefit of the block exemption regulation,
some exceptions notwithstanding (e.g. field of use restrictions).490 Field of use restrictions
(restrictions under which the licence is either limited to one or more technical fields of
application or one or more product markets) are also considered as pro-competitive and subject
to the rule of reason.491 In EU Competition law, these restrictions may benefit from the block
exemption, but up to the market share threshold.492 The divergence between US antitrust law and
EU competition law may be explained by the focus of the latter on market integration and the
generally more negative stance it takes against exclusivity clauses.
5. IP settlements and competition law
A recent area of competition law enforcement to IP rights related conduct involves
settlements of IP infringement disputes. These practices have been particularly preeminent in the
pharmaceutical industry, where pioneer drug companies use a tool-box of patent-related
practices that contribute to delays in generic entry. Most practices generate from the intersection
of competition law with two regulatory regimes: patent law and market authorization regulation.
The regulation for market authorizations delays competition by generics for years beyond the
patent period for brand name drugs. A pioneer pharmaceutical company (originator) must invent
the drug (active ingredient, formulation, delivery system), develop it, conduct safety and efficacy
studies, then satisfy the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the US that the drug is both safe
and effective. In Europe, the originator has the choice of either a national authorization
procedure, a decentralized procedure, a mutual recognition procedure, or a centralized procedure.
487 US DOJ and FTC Guidelines on Licensing Arrangements (n 226) § 2.3.
488 Article  4(2)b of Regulation 772/2004, op. cit. if the agreement is a technology transfer agreement (practices that
have as their direct or indirect object the restriction of passive sales by licensees of products incorporating the
licensed technology), or Article 4 of Regulation 330/2010 if it is a distribution agreement.
489 US DOJ and FTC Guidelines on Licensing Arrangements (n 226) § 2.3.
490 Article 4(2)b Regulation 772/2004, op. cit.
491 US DOJ and FTC Guidelines on Licensing Arrangements (n 226) § 2.3.
492 Articles 4(2)b(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), Regulation 772/2004, op. cit. EU Guidelines on the Transfer of Technology
Agreements (n 108) paras 100-105. Although the technical field of use restriction may correspond to certain groups
of customers within a product market, the Commission explains the difference between customer restrictions (which
are hardcore restrictions) and field of use restrictions (that are exempted) by the fact that the latter must be defined
objectively by reference to identified and meaningful technical characteristics of the licensed product. A field of use
restriction certainly limits the exploitation of the licensed technology by the licensee to one or more particular fields
of use without however limiting the licensor's ability to exploit the licensed technology.
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Each country within the EU has its own procedures for authorizing a marketing application for a
new drug but the originator can also seek approval from several EU countries simultaneously
using the decentralized or mutual recognition procedure for   products that fall outside the scope
of the European Medicines Agency. Under the mutual recognition procedure, destination
countries recognize a product that has been first authorized by one country in the EU in
accordance with the national procedures of that country. European drug approvals are overseen
by the European Medicines Agency, which is responsible for the scientific evaluation of
applications for authorization to market medicinal products in Europe (via the centralized
procedure). This procedure takes at least 210 days (although it is possible to conduct an
accelerated assessment in 150 days).
Because of the time consuming and complex pre-marketing requirements, regulators in
both Europe and the US have made efforts to extend the exclusivity period for pharmaceuticals,
while promoting competition on price by generics. In Europe, a specific regulation has put in
place a supplementary protection certificate (SPC) for medicinal products, extending the patent
right for a maximum of five years and enabling the holders of both a patent and an SPC for a
medicinal product to enjoy a maximum period of up to 15 years' effective protection in every
Member State from the time the medicinal product in question first receives marketing
authorisation in the EEA. In the US, the Hatch-Waxman Act493 extended the drug patent term for
as much as five years to take into account the lengthy FDA approval process. However, it
balanced this extension of the exclusivity by granting generic producers the possibility to rely on
branded manufacturers’ prior FDA testing and the demonstration of therapeutic equivalence to
an originator company’s approved drug (abbreviated application process or ANDA), hence
permitting generic producers to enter the market before patent expiration if the branded
manufacturer’s patent was either invalid or not infringed by the generic It also injected an
incentive for generic producers to  challenge drug patents and seek early entry by granting the
first filer a 180-day period of  exclusivity in the generics market. However, the Act also provided
the originators with the right to bring infringement suit under listed patents within 45 days of
notice from the generic. Furthermore, the FDA is barred from approving the ANDA for thirty
months in the ordinary case. We will examine how this specific regime may generate litigation
and may have incentivized originators and generics to conclude agreements that may restrict
competition.
Any delay for the entry of generic drugs in the market produces negative welfare effects
for consumers and the national health systems. According to the European Commission’s
Pharmaceutical sector inquiry in 2009, the price at which generic companies enter the market is
on average, 25% lower than the price of the originator medicines prior to the loss of
exclusivity.494 Furthermore, in markets where generic medicines become available, average
savings to the health system are almost 20% one year after the first generic entry, and about 25%
after two years (EU average). The inquiry showed that because of the strategies of originators
marketing authorisations were granted on average four months later in cases in which an
intervention took place and produced evidence that such practices generated significant
additional revenues on a number of originator products.
493 21 U.S.C. § 355.
494 European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, Final Report (n 43).
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Originators may abuse the different regulatory regimes in order to limit competition by
generics and block their market entry. First, they have developed patent strategies to extend the
breadth and duration of their patent protection, by filing numerous patent applications for the
same medicine (forming the so called "patent clusters" or "patent thickets"). Patent clusters make
it more difficult for generic competitors to determine if they could develop a generic version of
the original medicine without infringing one of the many patents of the originator company and
can lead to uncertainty thus affecting the ability of generic competitors to enter the market.
Second, originator companies may fill voluntary "divisional patent" applications, most
prominently before the EPO. These split an (initial) parent application and can extend the
examination period of the patent office, which adds to the legal uncertainty for generic
companies. Third, they may market generic versions of their own drugs, which are typically
marketed before the genuine generic enters the market so as to capture a significant part of the
market share and reduce the incentive of generics to enter the market, a form of “evergreening”
(making minor changes to the formulation of the drug in order to prevent the launch of less
expensive generics). Fourth, originators may argue data exclusivity for their products in order to
oppose marketing authorisations for a generic product. Fifth, they may introduce patent litigation
against generics.495 Taking into account that the average duration of court proceedings in EU
Member States is 2.8 years, in some jurisdictions this going up to 6 years, and the higher
percentage of opposition procedures in the pharmaceutical sector for EPO’s patents, the duration
of the procedures severely limits the generic companies’ ability to enter timely the market. In
some cases, all these practices may be combined in an exclusionary strategy.
Facing these increasing hurdles, generic companies find rational to conclude settlement
agreements with the originators. Originators have also an incentive to conclude settlements as
they have prevailed in less than the half of cases (75% in the US496), despite the strong
presumption that requires accused infringers to prove patent invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence. Settlements typically limit the ability of the generic company to enter the market (the
generic agrees not to market for part or all of the patent term or not to challenge the validity of
the patent) but a significant proportion of these settlements contains, in addition to this
restriction, a value transfer from the originator company to the generic, most often a direct
payment (“pay for delay” or “reverse settlements”) or a form of license or a future supply
relationship, as side-deals. Indeed, as it was noted in the Commission’s Pharmaceutical sector
inquiry, between 2000 and 2007, originator companies and generic companies entered into a
large number of agreements concerning the sale/distribution of generic medicines, one third of
which were concluded with generic companies before the originator company's product lost
exclusivity ("early entry agreements"). These “early entry” agreements contain clauses that
provide for a certain type of exclusive relationship between the contracting parties, their duration
typically exceeding the date of loss of exclusivity on average by more than two years.497 For
most of those agreements, the generic products were the first generic products on the market and,
thus, were likely to benefit from certain first mover advantages.
495 See, our analysis, op. cit. The Commission noted in the Pharmaceutical sector inquiry that the number of patent
litigation cases between originator and generic companies increased by a factor of four between 2000 and 2007.
496 Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, (July
2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf , pp. 19-20.
497 European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry – Final Report (n 43), p. 10.
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The incentive structure for generics and originators established by the Hatch-Waxman
Act may encourage the use of litigation, reverse settlements and other early entry agreements.
Indeed, while the originator risks the end of exclusivity and lost profits on sales of the drug, the
first generic to get ANDA benefits from the exclusivity period of 180 days, the prices, during
this period, being on average quite high and dropping even more after the end of the generic
exclusivity period.498 The pay-for-delay provisions costing the branded companies far less than
the profits they would lose from price competition, while generic makers gaining far more than
they would from competing on the market, both sides benefit from the settlement to the
detriment of the consumers who lose access to lower-priced generics.499 The amount of these
side payments may be significant: in Cipro, the originator agreed to make payments which
totaled $398 million. The Commission found in its Pharmaceutical sector inquiry that patent
settlements in Europe totaled transfers to generics of about 200 million Euros from 2000 to 2007.
In other words, with these settlements, originators and generics divide monopoly profits.
Different approaches have been proposed in order to reconcile intellectual property and
competition law in this context.500 One approach would be to examine the scope of the IP right
and determine if the exercise of market power was inside the scope of the patent or outside. If the
alleged infringer would have been able to stay on the market and compete but for the settlement,
then the settlement might enable the patent holder to exercise market power outside the scope of
the patent right, and the reverse settlement will be found unlawful. If it would not have been
possible for the alleged infringer to continue to compete, then it is unlikely that the settlement
would violate competition law. Another approach would be to focus on the welfare effects of the
practice and examine if the proposed settlement generates “at least as much surplus for
consumers as they would have enjoyed had the settlement not been reached and the dispute
instead (were) resolved through litigation”.501 This approach would require decision-makers to
“finely calibrate the likelihood of entry”, based on the probabilistic strength of the patent
litigation.502 Finally, another approach would not find an infringement of competition law so
long as the parties were settling a legitimate IP dispute and the settlement was within the
potential scope of the IP right. Challenges to patent settlements can go forward only if the
infringement suit is “objectively baseless”, thus applying the first prong of the sham litigation
test. Some would go even as far as requiring evidence of both prongs of the sham litigation test
and/or the Walker Process test for fraudulent litigation.
The treatment of reverse settlements in US antitrust law has been a subject of great
controversy, the FTC being actively engaged in this area.503 US appellate courts had also the
occasion to examine a number of these cases, taking different perspectives.504 In Cardizem, the
498 For an analysis, see Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study
(July 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf
499 FTC Staff Study, How Drug Company Pays-Offs Cost Consumers Billions (January 2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf
500 For further analysis, see, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property and Antitrust Handbook (2007),
pp. 252-270.
501 Carl Shapiro, ‘Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements’ (2003) 34 Rand Journal of Economics 391, 395-396.
502 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, op. cit., p. 256.
503 See, <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/reporter/competition/payfordelay.shtml> accessed 29 April 2013.
504 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (Cardizem), cert. denied, Andrx Pharm., Inc. v
Kroger Co., 543 U.S. 939 (2003); Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, reh’g en banc
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6th Circuit held that reverse money payment was a significant factor (“bolster[ing] the patent’s
effectiveness”) in finding settlement agreement pending appeal per se illegal.505 The case was
distinguished by the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits, which considered that there was no
violation for the Sherman Act so long as settlements are limited to the scope of the patent, absent
fraud or sham litigation. Different reasons were advanced for this more lenient policy: the
redistribution of risks by the Hatch-Waxman Act in favor of generics (allowing generic
manufacturers to challenge the validity of the patent without incurring the costs of market entry
or the risks of damages from infringement), the statutory presumption of patent validity, the
favorable view over final settlements of litigation, as this reduces litigation costs. While refusing
to grant certiorari in six cases, the Supreme Court has recently taken Federal Trade Commission,
Petitioner v Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al, wherein two generic drug manufacturers agreed
to delay their entry into the market in exchange for a share of profits from the sale of brand-name
drug AndroGel and the judgment is awaited in the following months.506
With regard to EU competition law, no-challenge clauses often included in patent
settlements agreements have generally been considered as not falling within the scope of Article
101(1) TFEU, unless the agreements are not directly connected to the settlement.507 As the
Commission has recently noted in its Pharmaceutical industry sector inquiry and its recent
proposal for revised guidelines on the Transfer of Technology agreements, no-challenge clauses
may nevertheless infringe Article 101(1) “where the licensor knows or could reasonably be
expected to know that the licensed technology does not meet the respective legal criteria to
receive intellectual property protection, for example where a patent was granted following the
provision of incorrect, misleading or incomplete information”, thus adopting for this type of
practice an intent test. With regard to reverse settlements, the Commission has sent statement of
objections to Lundbeck and Les Laboratoires Servier for having entered into agreements that
foresaw substantial value transfers from the originator to the generics in order to delay their entry
in the market.508 The recent proposal for revised Guidelines of the European Commission on
Transfer of Technology agreements, currently in public consultation, mention for the first time,
reverse settlements, noting that “agreements between competitors which include a licence for the
technology and market concerned by the litigation but which lead to a delayed or otherwise
limited ability for the licensee to launch the product on this market may under certain
denied, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) ; Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402
F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
505 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., p. 908.
506 See, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/preview_home/12-416.html
507 EU Guidelines on Transfer of Technology Agreements (n 106) para. 209; Case 193/83 Windsurfing International
v Commission [1986] ECR 611. In contrast, trademark delimitation agreements are dealt as classic market sharing
agreements: see, Case 35/83 BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken GmbH v Commission [1985] ECR 363.
508 In the Citolopram case, Lundbeck and several generic competitors were accused to have entered into agreements
which may have hindered the entry of generic citalopram into markets in the EU: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-12-834_en.htm. In the Perindopril case, the Les Laboratoires Servier and several generic competitors
were accused to have entered into agreements which may have hindered the entry of generic perindopril into the EU.
See also, the recent (April 19, 2013) statement of objections sent by the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), following its investigation into patent litigation settlement agreements (PLSAs) in the
pharmaceutical sector. The underlying factual complaint related to GlaxoSmithKline’s alleged conduct in defence
of one of its blockbuster drugs, Seroxat, which is a prominent anti-depressant (paroxetine), in particular the PLSAs
it concluded with three generics companies (pay for delay): http://oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2013/36-13
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circumstance be caught by Article 101(1)”. They add that “(s)crutiny is necessary in particular if
the licensor provides an inducement, financially or otherwise, for the licensee to accept more
restrictive settlement terms than would otherwise have been accepted based on the merits of the
licensor's technology”.509
SUMMARY. The explosion of IP litigation, in particular in the peculiar regulatory
context of the pharmaceutical industry, has led patent holders to employ a number of strategies
so as to delay the entry of generics in the market to the detriment of consumers. Some of these
practices take the form of reverse settlements or pay for delay settlements and early entry
agreements. Both US and EU competition law have examined these practices and in some cases
have concluded that they may infringe competition. However, the competition authorities at both
sides of the Atlantic have not managed yet to define clear standards that would enable them to
distinguish between legitimate settlements of an IP dispute and those that would infringe
competition law.
IV. EXHAUSTION (FIRST SALE)
While patents produce dynamic benefits by encouraging innovation, they also produce
allocative inefficiencies510. An exclusive right holder seeking to maximize returns will tend to
raise prices over the competitive price and decrease output. This produces a deadweight loss, in
that there are potential consumers who forego purchase at the “monopoly” price even though
they could put the invention to good use (and thus raise social welfare). The patentee does not
make the sale, and thus earns less than the full potential return. The exhaustion (first sale)
doctrine mitigates the first problem. Once a patentee sells an embodiment of the invention (or
authorizes such a sale), his interest in that embodiment is deemed to be exhausted. The buyer can
resell, creating a secondary market where goods are available at lower cost. Those who would
not pay the original price can purchase in the secondary market and enjoy the benefit of the
invention.  The first sale doctrine is also said to fulfill purchasers’ expectations in that it limits
restraints on alienation.
There are, however, numerous problems with the first sale doctrine. First, exhaustion
does not fully mitigate the first problem. Instead, it can increase the patentee’s loss in that the
secondary market can compete with the primary market for the patentee’s products. This exerts a
downward pressure on price and reduces incentives to innovate. Patentees thus prefer to deal
with deadweight loss by segmenting markets and charging differential prices, depending on what
that market can pay. The first sale doctrine interferes with this strategy because buyers can
purchase in the low-cost segment of the market and resell to the high-cost segment. In particular,
patentees use international boundaries for this purpose. As a result, prices in some countries will
be significantly lower than prices in other countries. Patentees do not believe that their interest in
selling where the price is high is “exhausted” by sale where the price is low.
509 Draft Proposal for Revised Guidelines of the European Commission on Transfer of Technology Agreements,
available at <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_technology_transfer/guidelines_en.pdf> para. 223,
last accessed 28 April 2013.
510 On the complex economics of parallel trade, see Keith E Maskus, Private Rights and Public Problems – The
Global Economics of Intellectual property in the 21st Century (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2012),
pp. 172-188.
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Patentees also have other interests in the fate of the embodiments they sell. Some
products are dangerous if not refurbished correctly. In these cases, the patent holder needs to
control resale in order to assure quality (and protect itself from tort liability). Some products,
particularly in the agriculture and software sectors, are self-replicating; if their reuse cannot be
controlled, the primary market can be entirely destroyed. Thus, in Bowman v. Monsanto,511 the
Supreme Court held that the sale of one generation of seed does not exhaust rights on later
generations: a farmer who purchased seed to grow could not sow a new crop using the seeds
produced by the fist crop—that, the Court held, would constitute making the patented product
and not reusing or selling the seed that had been purchased. Finally, in parts of the IT sector,
products are brought to market through value chains, starting with manufacturers of components
and moving to fabricators, distributors and retailers. Because there are differing arrangements
among the members of the chain, participants need to control sales as their products move along
the chain.
Because the arguments both for and against exhaustion are so strong, the TRIPS
Agreement did not take a position on this issue, except to say that WTO members are bound by
the national treatment and most favoured nation provisions (arts. 6, 3, & 4). Thus members are
free to define the limits of exhaustion as they see fit and to allow patent holders to mitigate the
cost of the doctrine contractually. They cannot, however, regard sales as exhausting foreign
right holders’ interests in circumstances where they would not regard national right holders’
interests as exhausted.
1. Defining first sale.
In defining the scope of first sale, the first question is what constitutes a sale. While it is
not entirely clear from TRIPS, exhaustion is generally thought to apply only to voluntary sales
by the patent holder. However, it is arguably also applicable to sales made under a compulsory
license (and subject to royalty payments to the patentee). Some countries also view any lawful
sale—such as sales in countries where the invention is not patented—as subject to the doctrine.
It remains unclear whether definitions that do not involve voluntary sales are consistent with
TRIPS. Significantly, when the WTO decided to expand the use of compulsory licenses during
the Doha Round, it took steps to ensure that the medicines produced under the license do not find
their way into the right holder’s principal markets (in other words, such sales are not considered
subject to exhaustion).
Harder is the question of where the sale must take place. Virtually every country regards
sales within its territory as within the exhaustion doctrine (subject to the exceptions discussed
below). However, countries take radically different positions on sales outside their territory.  The
United States’ position on international exhaustion (parallel importation) has been in flux for
some time. In a very recent case, Kirtsaeng v Wiley, the Supreme Court held that sales of
copyrighted works outside the United States are subject to exhaustion.512 Thus, a student was
permitted to buy copies of textbooks in Thailand at a low price, resell them in the United States
511 _ S.Ct. _ (May 13, 2013).
512 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., --- S.Ct. ---- (March 19, 2013).
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at a higher price, and pocket the difference. In contrast, the Federal Circuit has held that there is
no international exhaustion of patented products and processes, but that was before the Supreme
Court decided Kirtsaeng.513
The EU has taken an intermediate position: sales within the EU (Community exhaustion)
are subject to exhaustion, but sales outside the EU (international exhaustion) are not. In
Silhouette, the Court of Justice found that an Austrian rule providing for exhaustion of trade-
mark rights in respect of products put on the market outside the European Economic Area ("the
EEA") under that mark by the right holder or with his consent was contrary to Community
legislation relating to trade marks.514 Exhaustion occurs only where the products have been put
on the market in the EEA and, in presence of complete harmonisation of the rules relating to the
rights conferred by a trade mark, Member States cannot provide in their domestic law for
international exhaustion of the rights conferred by a trade mark in respect of goods put on the
market in non-member countries.515 With regard to sales inside the EU, the Court of Justice has
established two conditions for the exhaustion of the distribution right of the third party purchaser
to resell the IP protected work in another Member State without the risk of infringement: (i) the
goods should be placed on the market and sold, so as for the holder of the IP right to realize the
economic value of the right, (ii) the holder of the IP right must have consented to the goods
being put on the market within the EEA.516 Consent is presumed if the intellectual property rights
holder and the first sale distributor are under common control or linked economically or when
there is a voluntary grant of a license. However, this is not the case if the goods have been put on
the market in breach of a license condition designed to protect the reputation of the right holder
or when the goods are produced under a compulsory license.517 With regard to imports coming
from outside the EEA, in Davidoff the Court held that “consent must be so expressed that an
intention to renounce those rights is unequivocally demonstrated” or “it may, in some cases, be
inferred from facts and circumstances prior to, simultaneous with or subsequent to the placing of
the goods on the market outside the EEA which, in the view of the national court, unequivocally
demonstrate that the proprietor has renounced his rights”.518 The trader should thus demonstrate
that the right holder consented to the marketing of the product, the silence of the right holder
being not a sufficient element to infer the existence of consent.519 Furthermore, EU law
recognizes the right holder’s right to protect its reputation from any modification of its work, or
513 Jazz Photo Corp. v U.S., 439 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
514 Case C-355/96 Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH [1988]
ECR I-4799 interpreting Article 7 of Directive 2008/95 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to
trademarks [2008] OJ L299/25.
515 The Court, however, noted that the EU authorities could always extend the exhaustion provided for by Article 7
to products put on the market in non-member countries by entering into international agreements in that sphere, as
was done in the context of the EEA Agreement.
516 See, for instance, for trademarks Article 7 Directive 2008/95 to approximate the laws of the Member States
relating to trademarks OJ [2008] L 299/25.
517 For analysis, see Oke Odudu, ‘Intellectual Property Rights’ in Bellamy and Child: European Union Law of
Competition (Oxford University Press 2013), Ch 9, pp. 682-687.
518 Joined cases C-414 & 416/99 Zino Davidoff and Levi Straus [2001] ECR I-8691, paras 45-46.
519 See, also Case C-244/00 Van Doren + Q [2003] ECR I-3051 (on the question of the concrete allocation of the
burden of proof for the exhaustion objection in a trade mark infringement proceeding).
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from a risk of confusion of the consumers on the genuine origin of the product or passing-off,
even after a first sale.520
As suggested by the position taken by the TRIPS Agreement, there is substantial
disagreement on which view of international exhaustion is better from a public welfare
perspective.521 A strong exhaustion doctrine advances the interests of each country’s own
consumers because they potentially have access to cheaper goods from abroad. However, the
advantage to consumers comes at the expense of the patent holder’s interest in maximizing its
return. Thus, it reduces incentives to innovate. In the long run, a strong exhaustion doctrine can
also harm the citizens of poorer countries where the product is protected. The right holder may
refuse to sell in those markets to avoid the backflow of goods. Or the right holder may set the
price based on global demand. Thus, prices will rise in poor countries and fall in rich countries.
For example, now that it is clear that books sold in Thailand can be imported into the United
States, the publisher may well raise the Thai price. The deadweight loss in Thailand will rise as
fewer Thai consumers can afford to buy the texts at the international price. In short, the impact
of the exhaustion doctrine on welfare depends on whether one is interested in consumer welfare,
producer welfare, overall national welfare, or overall global welfare.
2. The role of contracts (licensing to avoid first sale).
Right holders often attempt to mitigate the effects of the exhaustion doctrine
contractually. For example, in Kirtsaeng, the books were marked as for sale outside the United
States. Patentees also try to advance other interests through restrictive licenses. Thus, in
Mallinckrodt v Medipart, a medical device used to deliver radioactive material was marked
“single use only” with the goal of preventing refurbishment and resale.522 In Quanta Computer v
LG Electronics, a value-chain licensing case, LGE licensed Intel to manufacture and sell
microprocessors and chipsets that used LGE’s patents, but the deal made clear that no license “is
granted by either party hereto ... to any third party for the combination by a third party of
Licensed Products of either party with items, components, or the like acquired ... from sources
other than a party hereto, or for the use, import, offer for sale or sale of such combination.”523
Similarly, those holding utility patent rights in seed sell subject to a contractual provision that
bars the farmer from saving seed and using it to grow another generation of crops.524 When these
provisions are violated, the exhaustion doctrine may bar infringement actions. However, acts in
violation of these licenses may be regarded as breaches of contract.
Courts in the United States have, however, had a difficult time deciding whether these
license provisions should be enforced. If the first sale doctrine is an important limit on the patent
holder’s rights, or if the doctrine is considered crucial to the public interest, then the patent
holder should not be permitted to override the limitations contractually.  The Supreme Court has
520 See, for instance, Case 119/75, Terrapin v Teranova [1976] ECR 1039. Some case law of the Court of Justice has
also examined if re-packaging of medicinal products affects the reputation of the trade mark holder: see, for
instance, case C-143/00 Boehringer Ingelheim (No. 1) [2002] ECR I-3759.
521 For an empirical study of parallel import restrictions in the copyright context, see Australian Government,
Productivity Commission Report, Restrictions on the Parallel Importation of Goods (2009).
522 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
523 Quanta Computer, Inc. v LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
524 Monsanto Co. v Bowman, _S. Ct. _ (May 13, 2013).
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hinted that it subscribes to this view. Thus the legend in Kirtsaeng limiting sales to regions
outside the United States did not figure into the Court’s decision—it allowed the books to be
resold in the United States. In Quanta, the Supreme Court held that the license could not be used
to limit the rights of fabricators to utilize purchased components as they wished.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court appeared to have granted certiorari in Bowman v
Monsanto, the case about patented seeds, to reconsider whether restrictive licenses are
enforceable. However it did not reach the issue once it decided that growing a second crop
constitutes “making” rather than “using” or “selling”.525 It is thus possible that the Court will
permit contractual overrides to the first sale doctrine when the restriction is clear to the party
against whom the contract is being enforced and/or when the restriction has an important public
purpose.  Thus, in Quanta, the Court may not have understood the need for the restriction.
Furthermore, the license was confusing: after limiting the right to use the components sold, it
stated that “[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, the parties
agree that nothing herein shall in any way limit or alter the effect of patent exhaustion that would
otherwise apply when a party hereto sells any of its Licensed Products”. As a result, buyers may
have lacked adequate notice of the restriction. Furthermore, the Court may have thought that in
that particular case, the provision was anticompetitive—that the exhaustion doctrine enhanced
competition among fabricators and distributors. In contrast, in the medical device case, the
Federal Circuit found the “single use only” restriction was clear to purchasers and crucial for
quality control purposes (that case did not go to the Supreme Court). As noted above, courts in
the EU have taken an intermediate position on the significance of the right holder’s consent.
SUMMARY. The social welfare effects of the exhaustion doctrine are indeterminate.
The doctrine benefits consumers and downstream manufacturers. However, these benefits may
be offset by diminished incentives to innovate. In international cases, the benefits may also be
offset by subsequent price adjustments by the patentee. In cases where there is a clear social
benefit to limiting resale—such as to protect quality, safeguard health, or prevent self-
replication—courts have proved somewhat willing to enforce contractual restrictions. But
because the doctrine protects the expectation interests of purchasers, buyers must have adequate
notice of restrictions prior to purchase.
V. GOVERNANCE ISSUES
A. Improving the Governance of the Intellectual Property System
For the most part, copyright and trademark governance is considered rather
straightforward. Copyrights arise automatically. Registration, if it is required at all, is essentially
a ministerial act. In the United States, it is carried out in the United States by the Copyright
Office, an agency within the Library of Congress. Enforcement is in the courts of general
jurisdiction.
In the United States, federal trademark cases are more complicated because registration is
necessary to acquire full federal trademark protection and the application requires examination
(state marks can be acquired through use and enjoy certain federal rights as well). Federal
525 See Bowman, footnote 3.
122
registration is handled by the Patent and Trademark Office (the USPTO). The Manual of
Trademark Examining Procedure guides its work. The USPTO has a special appeal tribunal, the
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board, to hear appeals from denials of registration. Appeals from
the USPTO are usually heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. As
with copyrights, enforcement actions are heard in courts of general jurisdiction.
Patent rights are more complicated still. The USPTO handles examination, using the
Manual for Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP). As with trademarks, there is an adjudicatory
tribunal within the agency—the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)—and appeals from there
are usually heard in the Federal Circuit. Enforcement of patents is in trial courts of general
jurisdiction, but appeals are channeled to the Federal Circuit.
In all these cases, the losing party has a right to petition for review in the United States
Supreme Court.  However, the Supreme Court enjoys the right to decide which petitions to grant.
Historically, it has granted review in very few intellectual property cases.
For trademarks and patents, the EU system is quite different. Copyrights are national
rights. However, the EU has issued a series of directives on copyright term, rental rights,
database rights, rights over the internet, and other matters which all EU counties must
implement. All of the countries of the EU maintain their own patent and trademark offices and
the national rights that emanate from these offices are dealt with in national courts. In addition,
the EU recognizes a Community Trademark, which is examined in the Trade Marks and Designs
Registration Office of the European Union and litigated in national courts. Finally, the countries
of the EU are members of the European Patent Convention (EPC), which also includes many
countries that are not in the EU. An EPC patent is examined in the European Patent Office
(EPO). After a period when it can be centrally challenged in the EPO, the patent matures into
patent rights in each of the EPC countries designated by the right holder. At that point,
enforcement is in national courts. The EU is currently contemplating the development of a
Unitary Patent, which would be examined in the EPO and enforced in a set of specialized courts.
For all regimes, questions on interpreting EU law are ultimately for the Court of Justice of the
European Union (the ECJ).
Governance issues arise mainly in connection with patents, which involve a complicated
legal regime applied to technologically complex material. As new technological prospects
emerge, the law must be adapted to meet the needs of industry and the public. Incorrect decisions
are also extraordinarily costly. The failure to grant patents can inhibit innovation. But
overgranting puts a tax on innovation, raises transaction costs prohibitively, attracts non-
practicing entities, and induce holdups. Because the situation in the EU is complicated by the
separate authorities of the EPC and the EU, governance issues will be discussed through the lens
of the US system.
1. The role of the USPTO.
As noted above, initial decisions on patentability are made by a specialized agency. The
USPTO is composed of a corps of examiners trained in the art they examine. The administrators
of the USPTO guide their practice, in part through supervision of decisions and review in the
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PTAB, in part through the MPEP, and in part by writing guidelines on areas of particular
importance. For example, the USPTO is currently working on guidelines for claiming software,
with the goal of requiring claims and disclosure that are more focused and less indeterminate.
When developing these rules, the USPTO generally announces its proposal and then holds a
series of hearings around the country to give interested parties an opportunity to comment.
Written comments can also be sent directly to the USPTO. The “notice and comment” procedure
is reiterative, until the USPTO issues its final guidelines.
In the United States, most regulatory agency rulemaking is entitled to substantial
deference, on the theory that the agency is composed of experts in the field they are regulating.
For historical reasons, however, the USPTO has never received rulemaking authority, except for
matters related to practice before the PTO (such as attorney qualifications).526 While it can make
rules to guide examination, most of the rules the USPTO develops are not entitled to formal
deference in court. Similarly, while the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
performs a cost-benefit analysis on all agency actions that are legislative in nature, most USPTO
rules are not legislative and are therefore have not traditionally been subject to review. That said,
as patent issues have become more salient in the economy, OIRA has begun to take notice. It has
statutory authority to conduct cost-benefit analysis of "significant" rules, even if not legislative
and has begun to do so with regard to certain intellectual property issues, such as government
approaches to standard-setting involving patented standards. More controversially, since 1999,
OIRA has also asserted the authority to review any rule with an impact of over $100 million or
that creates a serious inconsistency or otherwise interferes with an action taken or planned by
another agency.527 Thus, it could begin to review more USPTO actions. OIRA is, however, a
small agency; the extent to which it will have the capacity to scrutinize the USPTO’s actions
remains unclear.
To some extent, the degree of deference given the USPTO by courts may also change.
The latest patent statute, the America Invents Act (AIA),528 vests new adjudicatory authority in
the USPTO. While the agency’s Board has always heard appeals from patent rejections, and has
had limited capacity to reexamine patents when new prior art has been found, it will now
entertain post grant review, allowing interested members of the public to oppose patent grants for
the first nine months after issuance (this procedure will be similar to the opposition procedure in
the EPC).529 In addition, the Board will entertain inter partes actions in certain types of cases.530
These procedures will give the USPTO a broader perspective on patents and on their impact on
competition and innovation. In addition, the USPTO now has a Chief Economist who is charged
with conducting research on patent issues as they arise.531 Most important, the UPTO will
acquire the authority to set its own fees. As a result, it will no longer be in a position where it is
526 The scope of this authority remains somewhat ill-defined, see, e.g., Tafas v. Doll, 559 F. 3d 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
527 See, e.g., Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Q & As,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/OIRA_QsandAs (discussing Executive Order 12866 and amendments); OMB
Circular A-119, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a119 last accessed 28 April 2013.
528 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. (US) 284 (2011).
529 35 U.S.C. §§ 321-329.
530 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319.
531 For the research agenda and reports of the Chief Economist, see <http://www.uspto.gov/ip/officechiefecon/> last
accessed 28 April 2013.
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forced to issue patents to support its operations.532 Finally, the USPTO is establishing satellite
offices near technology centers (for example, Detroit, home of the automobile industry; Silicon
Valley, home of the IT industry; and Dallas, home of the petroleum industry). Examiners in
these locations are likely to become highly expert in the technologies of the local industries and
especially aware of these industries’ needs.
As a result of these new capacities, institutions, and procedures, there is an expectation
that the rules developed by the USPTO will be accorded more respect, if not official deference.
Furthermore, because the new inter partes procedure is cheaper and faster than adjudication, the
USPTO may become the preferred venue for litigation (indeed, trial judges may suspend
adjudication of cases pending USPTO determination of the validity of relevant patents). Because
the USPTO’s decisions are entitled to res judicata effect, the USPTO’s views may, as a practical
matter, become the final disposition in many future cases.
2. The Role of the Courts.
Until 1982, courts of general jurisdiction ultimately developed patent law through
litigation: a special court, the Court of Claims and Patent Appeals (CCPA) heard appeals from
the USPTO; regional trial courts heard enforcement actions at the first instance; and the US
regional circuits heard appeals from the trial courts. This led to three problems. First, because the
courts of appeals are not bound by each other’s decisions, notorious differences developed
between the law applied in examination—which was developed by the CCPA—and the law
applied by regional trial and appeals courts in litigation. Second, the regional courts of appeals
had each adopted different views on patents, leading to intense levels of forum shopping among
them. Third, generalist judges did not always interpret the law in a manner consistent with
optimal levels of innovation. Supreme Court intervention was regarded as too infrequent to solve
these problems.
In 1982, the Federal Circuit was created to hear a range of cases, including all appeals
from the USPTO and all federal trial court cases in which the plaintiff’s claims arise under the
patent act.533 As a result of channeling almost all federal patent cases to a single court, it was
assumed that the notorious differences would disappear, as would forum shopping. In addition,
the Federal Circuit was expected to build considerable expertise in patent law—that is, to
provide the expert perspective that the USPTO could not, as a historical matter, furnish.
532 For evidence that the previous fee structured distorted granting behavior, see Michael D Frakes and Melissa F
Wasserman, ‘Does Agency Funding Affect Decision making? An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting
Patterns (2013) 66 Vanderbilt Law Review 67; Robert P Merges, ‘As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform’ (1999) 14 Berkeley Technology Law
Journal 577, 589‐91.
533 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (providing for jurisdiction over appeals of regional adjudication of all patent disputes and
certain tort cases brought against the United States; of decisions of the Court of Federal Claims and the Court of
International Trade; of certain decisions of the International Trade Commission; of decisions of the Merit Systems
Protection Board; of certain tax decisions from the courts of the Canal Zone, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and Northern
Mariana Islands; of dispute resolution under the Contract Disputes Act and various economic measures, including
the Harmonization Tariff Schedule, the Economic Stabilization Act, the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, the
National Gas Policy Act, and the Energy Policy Conservation Act; and of certain agency action under the Federal
Labor Relations Authority, the Patent Act, and the Lanham (Trademark) Act). See generally, Rochelle C Dreyfuss,
‘The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts’ (1989) 64 New York University Law Review 1 (1989).
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Views on the Federal Circuit’s performance are somewhat mixed. The patent bar is very
pleased with the court. Practitioners believe the law is more predictable and uniform across the
nation. Adjudication is also more efficient and open issues are resolves relatively speedily.
Empirically, patent filings have increased as the Federal Circuit has made patents more secure.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s popularity among practicing patent lawyers bar has led many other
nations to create specialized patent (or specialized intellectual property) courts as well.
At the same time, there is reason for concern. First, much of the complexity in patent
cases arises in the factual part of the case (figuring out the facts or applying the law to the facts).
But fact-finding is the province of the trial court; courts of appeals review fact finding very
deferentially; it is only legal conclusions that are reviewed de novo. In order to better supervise
the lower courts, the Federal Circuit has deemed many factual questions to be questions of law
and it has tended to impose rigid, bright line rules to make it easier for the generalist judges to
apply the law to the facts. But both moves have been severely criticized. For example, claim
construction is considered a legal issue. As a result, a trial court will construe the claim, hear the
rest of the case, and reach final decision—only to find that the Federal Circuit has reversed the
claim construction. At that point, the entire case may have to be retried. Further, many of the
Federal Circuit’s bright line rules have been reversed by the Supreme Court as overly rigid.534
Better might be to create expert trial courts. Channeling all cases to a single set of trial
courts would produce judges with greater facility to read technical materials. With better
acquaintance with the somewhat arcane rules of patent law, these judges would become more
likely to make accurate factual decisions. In fact, some countries are experimenting with
expertise at the trial level. To some extent, the United States is as well. A new pilot program
allows each trial court to designate judges to hear patent cases.535 Cases will be distributed
randomly among the judges of the court, but any judge assigned a patent case can have it
reassigned to the designated judge. So far, judges in fourteen district courts have volunteered to
become designated judges. It remains to be seen how many cases they hear, how expert they
grow, and whether the Federal Circuit becomes less prone to reverse their decisions.
A second critique of the Federal Circuit is that it is overly enamored of patents as a
means of promoting innovation. As noted above, the court has jurisdiction over issues other than
patent law. However, it hears almost no competition law case or cases arising under other
intellectual property laws. Because it tends to see patents as the sole means of promoting
invention, its decisions have largely expanded the prerogatives of patentees at the expense of the
public, including competitors. It is difficult to know whether this concern is valid, but the
Supreme Court appears to think so. In recent years, it has stepped up its review of Federal Circuit
cases and for the most part, it has reversed or otherwise modified the Federal Circuit’s decisions.
As described in Part II, it has repeatedly reversed the Federal Circuit on what constitutes
534 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, ‘What the Federal Circuit Can Learn From the Supreme Court—and Vice Versa’ (2010)
59 American University Law Review 787.
535 United States Courts, The Third Branch News, District Courts Selected for Patent Pilot Program (7 June 2011)
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-06-
07/District_Courts_Selected_for_Patent_Pilot_Program.aspx accessed 28 April 2013.
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patentable subject matter,536 it has raised the inventive step,537 emphasized the equitable nature
of injunctive relief,538 and expanded the exhaustion doctrine.539 It has also stretched the Bolar
research exemption to cover some preclinical work540 and expanded standing to challenge patent
validity.541 Of course, it is possible that the Supreme Court, which is composed of generalists,
has it wrong and the specialists on the Federal Circuit have it right. For that reason, some
countries have considered specialization at both the trial and appellate level. However, any
system that sees competition as a strong motivator of innovation should consider the Federal
Circuit experience and be wary of overspecialization.
SUMMARY. At the end of the day, the better option may be to repose legal expertise
(power to interpret patent law) in the patent office, rely on specialized trial courts with technical
expertise to implement the law in specific cases, and permit review by generalist appellate
courts. The appeals court would be highly deferential to patent office rules, but would be
available to consider how patent law interfaces with competition policy, the public interest, and
innovation policies that derive from other legal regimes.
B. Improving the interaction between competition law and IP law
There are various ways to improve the interaction between competition law and IP law.
First, one may conceive some cross-fertilization between the two fields from a
substantive law perspective. Competition law may internalize IP values, such as the promotion of
incentives to innovate in competition law enforcement. The call for competition law to move
towards a more dynamic analysis that focuses on innovation, instead of static allocative
efficiency, encapsulates the view that both disciplines should find some common ground,
although for competition authorities the starting point remains the assumption that competition
promotes growth and innovation.542 IP law may also internalise competition law values by
focusing on access and dissemination. We have previously explained the various doctrines of IP
law enabling access and dissemination concerns to be taken into account (e.g. the experimental
use exception, decompilation of parts of a software product, compulsory licensing, patent misuse
doctrine). A recent report by the US FTC has also suggested the possibility for the Patent Office
(PTO) to “consider possible harm to competition along with other possible benefits and costs,
before extending the scope of patentable subject matter”.543 The Report also noted the necessity
of expanding the consideration of economic learning and competition policy concerns in patent
536 Mayo Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski v Kappos, 130
S.Ct. 3218 (2010).
537 KSR Int'’l Co. v Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
538 eBay, Inc. v MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
539 Quanta Computer, Inc. v LG Electronics, 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
540 Merck KGaA v Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
541 MedImmune, Inc. v Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
542 See, OFT 1390, Competition and Growth (November 2011) (noting the “wide range” of empirical studies
examining the links between competition, innovation and productivity, which set, on the whole, a positive
relationship between the three and at the micro level, examples of the positive impact of specific competition
interventions on price, choice and innovation, which are “abundant”).
543 US FTC, ‘To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy (October
2003)) available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf> last accessed 28 April 2013,
Recommendations 6 and 10.
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law decision-making. These recommendations insist on the importance of trans-disciplinary links
between IP and competition law and confirm the thesis that intellectual property and competition
law have become or are in the process of becoming a “unified field”.544
The integration of social science/economics learning in IP decision-making and
adjudication remains however relatively marginal, in comparison to competition law. In the US,
the PTO does not dispose of a rule-making function over questions of patentability, its authority
being merely confined to the adjudication of disputes of patent validity. Certainly, the 2011
America Invents Act has conferred to the US PTO also the ability to conduct post grant review
proceedings, available for a limited period of nine months after a patent was granted or re-issued,
a process overseen by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, but did not confer upon it any
rulemaking authority. Courts, in particular the Federal Circuit, have generally been regarded as
the dominant institution in the shaping of patent policy in the US.545 Yet, both the US PTO and
the Federal Circuit lack economic expertise and are unable, under the current circumstances, to
perform a sophisticated economic analysis of the effect of their activity on innovation,
productivity and welfare. Responding to this concern over the lack of economic expertise, the US
PTO established in March 2010 the Office of the Chief Economist (OCE), whose function is to
initiate and oversee economic analysis in the field of intellectual property protection and
enforcement and to feed into the advisory role of the USPTO to the President (via the Secretary
of Commerce) and the administration with advice on the economics of intellectual property
rights.546 The research programme set for the first chief economist related to macro-economic
type of research on the relationship between economic growth, performance and employment, IP
issues in a standard setting context, the economics of trademarks, the economics of the USPTO
process and the role of IP in the markets of technology and knowledge. A report on Intellectual
property and the US Economy, focusing on specific “IP intensive” industries was published in
March 2012.547 It is not however clear if the position of the chief economist at the US PTO will
evolve to a more permanent position with a more expansive role and intervention in the
adjudicative process. This paucity of economic analysis contrasts with the very active role
economists have been playing in the academic debates over economic analysis of IP rights.
In Europe, the integration of economic expertise seems more advanced, at least at the
institutional level. The European Patent Office (EPO) established the position of a chief
economist already in 2004. The chief economist is the executive secretary of the EPO's
Economic and Scientific Advisory Board (ESAB), an institution created in 2011 and composed
of 11 patent experts (a mix of economists, social scientists and practitioners), appointed for a
period of three years.548 The Board advises the EPO on the scope and set-up of relevant
economic and social studies, provides guidance on related research projects and evaluates their
544 W. K. Tom & J A. Newberg, ‘Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field’ (1997)
66 Antitrust Law Journal 167.
545 A. Rai, ‘Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for Policy Development’ (2012) 61
Duke Law Journal 101 (noting also the increasingly important involvement of the Supreme Court in the area);
Rochelle C Dreyfuss, ‘What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court – And Vice Versa’ (n 534).
546 See, <http://www.uspto.gov/ip/officechiefecon/> last accessed 28 April 2013.
547 See, <http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf> (the report use standard statistical
methods to identify which US industries are the most patent-, trademark-, and copyright-intensive, and defines this
subset of industries as “IP-intensive).
548 See, http://www.epo.org/about-us/office/esab.html last accessed 28 April 2013.
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impact. One of the first studies published by ESAB, for example, was on patent thickets, an issue
of great concern also for competition law, as we have previously explained. ESAB is also
expected to provide “early warning signals” on sensitive developments and issues and to operate
as a platform for discussing the role of patents (applications) in the early stage of the innovation
process and during application procedures at the EPO, the governance of the patent system and
economic and social issues relating to the impact of patents after grant, such as “competition
matters”. The two first chief economists of the EPO have also published one of the few books in
Europe on the economic analysis of the European patent system, integrating a competition
perspective.549
The Hargreaves report in the UK identified the lack of economic analysis as one of the
major sources of the failure of public policy in this area and the lack of evidence-based policy-
making, a point also frequently made in the past by other reviews of the IP system in the UK.550
Following proposals in 2006 by the Gowers Review, the UK government put in place in 2008 the
Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property (SABIP) with the aim to oversee a number of
research projects on IP policy topics. However, the SABIP was not part of the IPO and did not
contribute to the mainstream IP policy process in any area, resulting to its disbandment in
2010.551 The Gowers report also led to the appointment of the first chief economist of the IPO in
2008 and the development of an IP economists unit [Economics, Research and Evidence (ERE)],
to which somepolicy staff who have previously worked for the SABIP were integrated, thus
shifting attention upon the economic aspects of IP.
The Hargreaves report also included a number of recommendations with the aim to
“broaden the IPO’s vision” and to base IPO’s decision-making in evidence and the obligation to
“take due account of the impact of the IP system on innovation and growth”.552 The Hargreaves
report recommended legislative changes that would add new functions to the IPO including (i) “a
duty to keep under review the impact of IP and IPRs, and market positions founded on IPRs, on
innovation and growth, including adverse impacts on competition and the competitive spur to
growth, and to report annually”; (ii) “powers to prepare one off reports on specific areas or cases
where there appears to be detriment to competition and consumer welfare”; (iii) “powers to
require information to support the exercise of these reporting functions”; (iv) “powers to make
recommendations to the competition authorities, and to fund investigations that competition
authorities may make as a result, thereby recycling income from fees paid by rights holders in
the interests of maintaining healthy and efficient markets, as well as servicing the needs of rights
holders and applicants”.553
549 Dominique Guellec and Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, The Economics of the European Patent System:
IP policy for innovation and competition (Oxford University Press 2007).
550 Hargreaves (n 20) 91, “(e)ven where IP law is clear it is too infrequently grounded in evidence or directed to take
account of economic priorities. This represents a failure of public policy” and p. 92, noting that the Banks Review in
the 1970s “deplored the lack of evidence to support policy judgments” and that “(t)hirty years later, the Gowers
Review in 2006 made the same point”, concluding that “our institutional framework appears to have failed to equip
itself to conduct evidence-based policy effectively”.
551 Ibid 92.
552 Ibid 95.
553 Ibid.
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Following the Hargreaves Report, the IPO was also asked to issue an annual report on the
extent to which its activities have promoted innovation and growth, and, second, to improve its
evidence base for policy making, in view of its rule-making functions and in particular to prepare
impact assessments quantifying, if possible, the costs of policy changes and integrating in the
published impact assessments a summary statement of the impact of the proposed policies on
innovation and growth.554 It remains to be seen how these additional requirements will affect the
activity of the IPO and the integration of economic learning.
A similar trend for more economic analysis in the IP offices can be observed in other
jurisdictions. There are also economists in INPI Brazil, IP Australia, the Canadian office, OHIM,
an observatory including economists at INPI France, the Swiss IP office and even in CIPO
China. Furthermore, offices in Japan and Germany have close links to academic institutions
which are almost as effective in terms of influence. WIPO has also recently strengthened its
capability on both economics and statistics.
In comparison, the integration of social science research and economic expertise is
particularly developed in the area of competition law. In the US, a significant part of the staff of
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the FTC dispose of economic expertise
and economists are particularly present in both the adjudicative and the rule-making functions of
the authorities. At the FTC, the Bureau of Economics provides economic analysis and support to
antitrust and consumer protection investigations and rulemakings. In the EU, a Chief
Competition Economist’ (CCE) office, was established in 2003, comprising a team of specialized
economists, headed by a Chief economist who is appointed by the European Commission. The
CCE’s office fulfills a “support function”, being involved in competition investigations and
providing economic guidance and “methodological assistance”, but also exercises a “checks-and
balances” function, giving the Commissioner an “independent opinion” before any proposal for a
final decision to the College of Commissioners.555 The Chief economist also coordinates the
work of the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy (EAGCP), which regroups a
number of academic economists who have recognized reputation in the field of industrial
organization, proposed by the chief economist and nominated by the Commissioner. The
EAGCP prepares opinions on the projected reviews of EU competition law policies and
regulations. The Commission’s appointment of a Chief Economist reflects its responsiveness to
changes in intellectual climate and economic theory. Many national competition authorities have
followed the same path by appointing chief economists and by either establishing specific
bureaus of economics or by integrating economists in the different case teams dealing with
investigations.
A common emphasis on the economic effects of each policy on welfare and innovation
may reduce the tensions between these two areas of law. Yet, there are limits as to what
554 IPO, The Role of the Intellectual Property Office (July 2012) available at <http://www.ipo.gov.uk/hargreaves-
roleofipo.pdf> ; IPO, Response to the Informal Consultation on the Role of the Intellectual Property Office (March
2013) available at <http://www.ipo.gov.uk/response-2013-roleipo.pdf> last accessed 28 April 2013.
555 Lars-Hendrik Röller and Pierre A Buigues, ‘The Office of the Chief Competition Economist at the European
Commission’ (May 2005) available at <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/officechiefecon_ec.pdf> last
accessed 28 April 2013.
130
economic analysis may offer for the development of a congruent approach to innovation across
both fields. The IP system relies on a single set of rules that apply to all industries with relatively
minor deviations, which is the result of the choice to limit administrative costs and ensure
economies by making rules more general.556 Defining the optimal scope of the property rights on
a case by case basis, taking into account its probable effect on innovation and welfare, might
largely exceed the capacities of government authorities in charge of the development of IP law
and might be extremely costly, in view of the number of patent applications (to give that as an
example) and the limited amount of information at their disposal at the time of the grant of the
patent. Empirical studies on the effect of different IP rights on the level of innovation per
industry are scarce and not always conclusive. The best that can be done under the current
institutional circumstances is to make efforts to integrate economic analysis in the design of
optimal IP law regimes and rules, rather than in enforcing the standards of patentability, as it was
suggested by the FTC. At the same time, the focus of the economic analysis might be different in
the context of an IP office than in that of a competition authority. Although competition
authorities increasingly recognize the important of dynamic analysis and the objective of
innovation, they cannot completely abandon static analysis of the effects of a practice on
consumers, the latter being considered particularly important if the aim of competition law is to
protect consumers from wealth transfers, in the absence of compensating qualitative
efficiencies557. Competition law and IP agencies dispose of different types of expertise and
functions, which are nevertheless complementary, as they enable achievement of dynamic
efficiency at the lowest cost for allocative efficiency. There are thus reasons to avoid any
significant duplication of tasks between the competition law and the IP authorities. There has
nevertheless been some discussion over the integration of the different functions to the same
agency or the development of an overarching innovation policy bureau that would coordinate
innovation policy across different government bureaus and regulatory agencies (e.g. an Office of
Innovation Policy).558 There are some examples of the integration of the IP and competition law
enforcement in one authority (e.g. INDECOPI in Peru, yet this does not concern the award of IP
rights).
Second, one might favour an institutional approach that would focus on the development
of “trans-disciplinary links” between competition authorities and IP law offices,559 but also
between executive agencies and the judiciary. In the US, it is clear that both the DOJ and the
FTC have been particularly active in the area of IP rights. Yet, in recent years there has been
increased cooperation between the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, the FTC and the USPTO. First,
a joint workshop on promoting innovation was organized in 2010 by these institutions. Second,
the DOJ Antitrust Division and the USPTO have coordinated their action with regard to standard
556 Christina Bohannan and Herbert Hovenkamp, Creation Without Restraint: Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in
Innovation (Oxford University Press 2012) 341.
557 For a similar view, taking the perspective that the objective to protect consumers is a distributive justice aim
(fairness) that may enter in conflict with intellectual property in some circumstances, see Daniel A Farber and Brett
McDonnell, ‘Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the IP/Antitrust Interface’ (2003) 87 Minnesota Law Review 1817.
558 Stuart M Benjamin and Arti K Rai, ‘Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective’ (2008) 77(1) The
George Washington Law Review 1.
559 See also William E Kovacic ‘Competition Policy and Intellectual Property: Redefining the Role of Competition
Agencies’ in Lévêque and Shelanski (eds) (n 129) 1, 9 (advocating “the development of new cooperative networks
in which competition agencies work with collateral government institutions, such as rights-granting authorities, to
study the interaction of these regulatory regimes”).
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essential patents by adopting in January 2013 a joint policy statement on remedies for standard-
essential patents subject to voluntary F/RAND commitments. The joint policy statement
addresses whether injunctive relief or exclusion orders in International Trade Commission
investigations are properly issued when the patent holder asserts standards-essential patents that
are encumbered by a F/RAND licensing commitment and notes that monetary damages, rather
than injunctive or exclusionary relief, should be the appropriate remedy for infringement.560
There have also been proposals for restructuring the relations between the various innovation
policy institutions and organizing frequent consultations ex ante between the USPTO and the
DOJ/FTC.561
An illustration of this cooperation is that the European Patent Office submitted comments
at the European Commission’s Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry,562 in which the European
Commission commented extensively on the EPO’s process and suggested changes. An
interesting institutional experiment came out of the Hargreaves report in the UK stressing the
importance of competition as a necessary condition for innovation, enterprise and growth. Given
the important role of competition, the Hargreaves report suggested the conferral of new functions
to the IPO in this area, a proposal the government rejected as it would have jeopardized the
independence of the competition authority. However, the competition authority in the UK (the
Office of Fair Trading, OFT) agreed in 2012 to sign a non-binding Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) with the IPO putting in place a framework for a strengthened
cooperation.563 Notable features of this MoU are the provisions on the sharing of information on
specific complaints, policy proposals or developments of policy and regulation having an impact
on IP and competition, common advocacy efforts, regular meetings (at least quarterly to discuss
matters of common interest) and procedures for the IPO to refer to the OFT cases where it
considers that there may be competition concerns. The appointment of liaison officers or staff in
charge of the interaction between competition law and intellectual property in the different
authorities may also enhance cooperation and mutual understanding.564
It is important to expand and deepen this cooperation by the constitution of networks of
competition authorities and intellectual property offices at a regional or global scale. More
importantly, the judiciary should not be left out, in view of the dominant role it has in the
interpretation of the standards for benefitting from IP protection and the development of
adequate remedies in case of IP infringement. For the time being, there are only some
mechanisms to establish cooperation between the DG competition at the European Commission
and national courts of the different Member States of the EU (presumably including those in
560 US DOJ & USPTO, ‘Policy Statement on Remedies for Standard-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary
F/RAND Commitments’ (8 January 2013) available at <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf>
last accessed 28 April 2013.
561 Arti K Rai, (n 545) 154.
562 See, European Commission Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary Report –Comments from the EPO (28
November 2008) available at
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_pharma/european_patent_office.pdf> last accessed 28 April
2013.
563 Memorandum of Understanding between the Intellectual Property Office and the Office of Fair Trading (July
2012) available at <http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/MoUs/IPO.pdf> last accessed 28 April 2013.
564 See, for example, the establishment of an IP and Competition Policy unit at the Innovation Directorate of the
Intellectual Property Office in the UK, or the creation of IP and innovation-focused units in competition authorities.
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charge of IP law disputes).565 Training programmes for judges may also enhance their economic
expertise, as well as their knowledge of competition law and IP law principles.
SUMMARY: The incorporation of social science input (in particular economics) in IP law is a
crucial but also challenging endeavor that could eventually lead to less tensions between IP and
competition law. Evidence-based and influenced policy making in both IP law and competition
law may also set the basis for a more intense collaboration between the competition authorities
and the IP offices.
VI. Conclusion
The intersection between competition law and IP gives rise to complex trade-offs between
incentives to innovate and dissemination of innovation, static and dynamic efficiency, total
welfare and the welfare of consumers and difficult choices between rules and standards, general
rules versus specific IP law regimes, ex ante versus ex post approaches. The interaction of IP
rights with the economically inspired competition law has also led to an effort of re-
conceptualization of this area of law from an economic perspective, for a long term absent from
the day to day activity of the IP offices and courts in interpreting and delimiting IP boundaries in
various economic sectors. Patent law has of course been the area of predilection of this more
economic approach with an increasing number of economic and empirical studies examining the
real effect of the IP rights granted to innovation and welfare.566 From this perspective, the
dialectical relation between these two disciplines has been an opportunity for re-conceptualizing
IP rights and the property rights analogy that has for a long time provided the unifying narrative
of this area of law.
This transformation of IP law is visible in the way the classic opposition in law and economic
literature of property rules and liability rules took hold in order to explain the frequent
limitations incurred by IP holders on their rights to exclude others from using their invention and
enjoining the fruits of their investment by receiving an important compensation in the form of
royalties.567 The property rights analogy challenged, it appeared that the relation between
property rules and liability rules for the protection of information forms a continuum: “when an
innovator is forced to license its innovative technology, the protection afforded to him degrades
565 For example, Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003 on the enforcement of EU competition rules provides that the
European Commission (the Directorate General on Competition) can transmit information to the national courts,
give its opinion on questions regarding the application of the EU competition rules, submit observations to national
courts as amicus curiae, the national courts being obliged to submit to the Commission a copy of their judgments
touching upon issues of competition.
566 See, for instance, Michele Boldrin and David K Levine, ‘The Case Against Patents’ (September 2012) Federal
Reserve Bank of St Louis Working Paper 2012-035A available at
<http://www.research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf> accessed 28 April 2013; James Bessen and Michael J
Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk (Princeton University Press
2009); Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, (n 549); Jaffe and Lerner (n 138); Suzanne Scrothcmer,
Innovation and Incentives (MIT Press 2004).
567 Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalielability: One View of the
Cathedral’ (1972) 85(6) Harvard Law Review 1089; Mark A Lemley and Phil Weiser, ‘Should Property or Liability
Rules Govern Information?’ (2007) 85 Texas Law Review 783.
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from a property rule to a liability rule”.568 The emphasis on the cumulative nature of innovation
contributes to this re-conceptualization of IP rights across these two poles. More importantly, the
opposition between property rules and liability rules may provide a unifying theoretical
framework for the analysis of the effects of different forms of protection of innovation to the IP
rights holders. At one side of the continuum, patents provide the possibility to the IP holders to
exclude imitators and duplicators by the award of an exclusive right to enjoin others from the use
and commercialization of the invention, even if the infringer has duplicated the invention by her
own effort; At the other side of the spectrum, trade secrets do not protect the inventors against
independent discovery and duplication through reverse engineering; Copyright protects the
expression of an idea, hence does not exclude the parallel development of an invention, although
“ it tends to put restrictions on reverse engineering (“circumvention of digital locks”)”.569
These different efforts of conceptualization of different forms of IP rights denote the
challenge of constructing a theoretical framework that takes into account that the process of
innovation does not only include the standalone invention step but also those of cumulative
innovation, dissemination and commercialization to the benefit of consumers and society at
large. The traditional conception of IP rights as property rights may not provide an accurate
description of the innovation process and might lead to favor some actors in this process to the
detriment of others.
One might be tempted to address IP law as a form of regulation: IP rights impose
obligations on third parties, not as a consequence of a contract, tort or voluntary exchange, but
because of the direct intervention of the government which aims to stimulate particular activities
to foster the general welfare.570 By conferring property rights on ideas, the government does not
only seek to facilitate market transactions, as is the case for physical property rights, but also to
correct a market failure, which is in this case “free riding that occurs when innovations are too
easily copied, and the corresponding decrease in the incentive to innovate”.571 Hovenkamp
observes,
“IP laws create property rights. But so do state created exclusive franchises and filed
tariffs. In fact, the detailed regulatory regimes that we call the IP laws are filed with very
rough guesses about the optimal scope of protection – ranging from the duration of
patents and copyrights to the scope of patent claims and fair use of copyrighted material.
The range of government estimation that goes on in the IP system is certainly as great as
in regulation of, say, retail electricity or telephone service. Further, the IP regime is
hardly immune from the legislative imperfections that public choice theory uncovers”.572
568 Vincenzo Denicolò and Luigi Alberto Franzoni, ‘Rewarding Innovation Efficiently – The case for Exclusive
Rights’ in Manne and Wright (eds) Competition Policy and Patent Law Under Uncertainty: Regulating Innovation
(n 252) (Cambridge University Press 2011), 287, 289.
569 Ibid 290.
570 See, for instance, Ioannis Lianos, ‘Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: Is the Property Rights'
Approach Right?’ in John Bell and Claire Kilpatrick (eds) 8 The Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies
(Hart Publishing 2006) 153.
571 Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise—Principle and Execution (n 141) 228.
572 Ibid 337.
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Other authors have criticized the reward theory of patents, which “emphasises only one
dimension of the patent instrument – compensation for innovation – and ignores the role of
patents as means of regulating markets”.573 The same point is also made by Bently and Sherman
for whom patents are “regulatory tools” which are used by governments in order to achieve
economic as well as non-economic ends.574 For example, the patent offices should also take into
account “the external effects of the impact of technology on the environment or health”.575
Furthermore, Burk and Lemley argue that patent law is an industry and technology-
specific regulation.576 Different patent theories, such as prospect patents, incentives, cumulative
innovation and anti-commons operate differently according to the particular industry’s
settings.577 Exploring the enforcement of patents in the US, Burk and Lemley identify several
“policy levers,” which help the patent offices and the courts to frame IP doctrines which
correspond to the needs of cumulative innovators and the consumers.578 The existence of sector-
specific IP protection on semi-conductors, software, medicinal products and biotechnology in
Europe may better illustrate the point.579
Taking a regulatory perspective on IP enables us to conceptualize the interaction between
competition law and IP as a dimension of the relation between government activity and
competition. If one takes a public choice perspective, it is possible to argue that any form of state
intervention in the marketplace carries the risk of capture and inefficiency: there is a wealth of
empirical literature on the inefficiency of sector specific regulations, but similar claims have also
been made with regard to competition law.580 The burden of proof is on the State to establish the
need of its intervention through competition law or through the grant of an exclusive right, here
an IP right for innovation purposes, and the standard of proof is set high, on the assumption that
the self-correcting mechanism of the market will take care of any eventual failure, in the absence
of state interference. Such an approach leads essentially to subject state intervention to a stricter
competition assessment than private action, as by essence the monolithic (and monopolistic)
nature of government intervention departs more from the optimum of competitive markets (and
the standard of perfect competition) than even concentrated private market structures. Yet, it is
also clear that from this perspective the field left to competition law versus other forms of state
573 Shubba Ghosh, ‘Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred’ (2004)
19 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1315, 1351.
574 Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (2nd ed., Oxford University Press 2004, now in its 3rd
edition, 2008) 329.
575 Ibid
576 Dan L Burk and Mark A Lemley, ‘Policy Levers in Patent Law’ (2003) 89 Vanderbilt Law Review 1575.
577 Ibid 1615-1630.
578 Ibid 1687-1689 (e.g. while it is necessary to assure a broad patent protection for biotechnological and chemical
inventions, “because of their high cost and uncertain development process”, this is not the case for software
industry).
579 Council Directive 87/54/EEC of 16 December 1986 on the legal protection of topographies of semiconductor
products [1987] OJ L24/36; Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer
programs [1991] OJ L122/42 (now replaced); Council Regulation 1768/92/EEC of 18 June 1992 concerning the
creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products [1992] OJL 182/1; Directive 98/44/EC (n
31).
580 Fred S McChesney and William F Shughart II (eds), The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: the Public
Choice Perspective (University of Chicago Press 1995).
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intervention, such as IP law, remains open for negotiation, a negotiation conducted through and
according to the rules of the communicating tool of welfare economics.
As a result, of a greater recourse to economics in public policy, the IP offices/authorities’
bureaucracy see also its role change, as it is gradually transformed from a structure performing
merely tasks of execution, involving a formalistic check of the conditions of patentability by
looking to a close evidential environment (defined by the prior art) to a more pro-active
technocracy, assuming more often tasks of forecast, knowledge gathering/sharing with regard to
the effects of the IP system on economic efficiency, welfare and innovation. The establishment
of economic units within the IP authorities and economic and scientific advisory boards
illustrates the gradual transformation of IP bureaucracy towards a more regulatory setting.
Should they integrate more systematically dynamic economic analysis in their day to day work
(through sector studies and empirical work), IP authorities (e.g. patent offices) may develop
superior expertise than competition authorities or court, not only on the innovative nature of the
patented technologies but also on the characteristics and conditions of the industry as a whole.
This evolution towards a more regulatory IP law framework would, no doubt, alter the balance
between the patent and IP offices and the courts, which enjoyed a dominant role in the
interpretation and framing of IP law doctrine. If this hypothesis is confirmed, IP offices might be
better placed to assess the welfare effects of their interventions on dynamic efficiency than
competition authorities and courts. If there would be any claim for an antitrust authority to
intervene in this configuration that would only happen, under this approach, because of the
superior economic expertise of the antitrust authority on the specific matter or the fact that it
responds ex post to an abuse of the IP process.
A regulatory approach to IP will also enable crucial reforms in the way patent offices
operate: first, as this has been illustrated by the recent reforms introduced at the USPTO, such as
the post grant review of patents, the IP authorities see their adjudicatory powers extended, which
at the same time provides an additional forum ex post to challenge the exclusionary effect of
patents, by contesting their validity, thus dealing with the eventual competition law problems
that might arise from the awarded patent within an IP setting. Second, as the discussions over
vesting the USPTO with substantive rule-making authority at the passage of the America Invents
Act show, patent offices may potentially become the hub of an innovation centred regulatory
nexus, comprising competition authorities, sector specific regulators (e.g. telecom regulator), the
food and drug administration, among others, with the aim to develop a coherent innovation
policy that employs all the legal instruments at the disposal of the state in order to promote
innovation to the benefit of consumers and society at large.
Finally, a regulatory approach to IP enables the consideration of the tensions between
incentives to innovate and dissemination of innovation on a conceptual neutral theoretical
framework. IP law and policy has a specific function and should not be considered as a facet of
competition policy581.
581 See the recent judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-274/11 & C-295/11, Spain v. Council and Italy
v. Council [April 16, 2013, not yet published], para. 22, on the shared or exclusive nature of the competence of the
EU in the establishment of a unitary patent protection, following the enhanced cooperation initiatives of some
Member States, the Court held that the relevant provision for the creation of centralised IP rules fell outside Articles
101 to 109 TFEU [the EU competition rules] and thus the exclusive competence of the EU, noting that “[a]lthough it
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The intersection of IP law with competition law has also led to a re-examination of
competition law’s traditional focus on static allocative efficiency. Dynamic analysis has made
inroads into merger analysis and is increasingly considered as essential also for the competition
law assessment of unilateral conduct, at least theoretically. Practically, however, there are few
instances competition law has incorporated systematically dynamic analysis and the focus on
dynamic efficiency. There are many reasons for this.
First, from an institutional perspective, courts are considered as less able to conduct the
sophisticated analysis required in this context.582 The adjudicative process limits the type of
evidence heard by the court: this should relate directly to the dispute and is brought by the parties
to the dispute. This may not include the effect of the specific practice on consumers in related
relevant markets, future generations of consumers or the general public. Competition authorities,
the dominant enforcement actor in Europe, are better placed than courts to conduct this type of
complex polycentric economic analysis, as they dispose of in house economic expertise and the
powers to investigate different sectors of the economy (through sector inquiries). Their
intervention as amicus curiae in IP law related judicial disputes, each time competition law
concerns arise, may be an effective way to influence the IP adjudication process to a more
competition friendly approach. Their collaboration with the patent and other IP offices within the
innovation regulatory nexus may also enhance a more systematic consideration of dynamic
efficiency concerns in competition law analysis, in particular if the IPO offices conduct periodic
empirical and economic analyses on the effect of patents on the level of innovation in various
industries. The constitution of a common evidence base between competition authorities and IP
offices, resulting from the competition authorities’ and IP offices’ sector inquiries, which would
feed in their rulemaking and adjudicatory process constitutes an additional means to ensure the
congruence of their action.
Second, from a substance perspective, competition authorities do not dispose of the means,
tools and methods to conduct systematic dynamic competitive analysis on a case-by-case basis.
Authorities operate in an adjudicatory context with strict deadlines and a limited timeline for
making decisions. Dynamic analysis is occasionally added after the competition authority has
completed a static analysis, but it is not incorporated directly in their economic analysis of the
competitive situation at the outset.583 At the same time, in what has been named the “new
economy”, network effects are prevalent and in combination with intellectual property rights
they may harm consumers and ultimately innovation.584 Yet, the use of the tools of dynamic and
is true that rules on intellectual property are essential in order to maintain competition undistorted on the internal
market, they do not, for all that […] constitute ‘competition rules’ for the purpose of Article 3(1)(b) TFEU”.
582 Geoffrey A Manne and Joshua D Wright, ‘Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust’ (2010) 6 Journal of
Competition Law & Economics 153.
583 Joseph A Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (Routledge 1986, first published in 1954), p. 1126, noting
the importance of sequence analysis and observing as to the history of economic thought that “however important
those occasional excursions into sequence analysis may have been, they left the main body of economic theory on
the ‘static’ bank of the river; the thing to do is not to supplement static theory by the booty brought back from these
excursions but to replace it by a  system of general economic dynamics into which statics would enter as a special
case”.
584 Daniel J Gifford and Robert T Kudrle, ‘Antitrust Approaches to Dynamically Competitive Industries in the
United States and the European Union’ (2011) 7(3) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 695; Ilya Segal and
Michael D Whinston, ‘Antitrust in Innovative Industries’ (2007) 97 American Economic Review 1703.
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stochastic efficiency analysis is not widespread among competition authorities and the data
required for doing a more sophisticated analysis are unavailable in most cases. The law of
evidence may also pose hurdles to the submission of econometric evidence, which is the
statistical complement of a dynamic theory of competition.585
The different presumptions and rules on inferences applying in competition law and IP law
operate thus as a second best, less costly but of course more prone to errors, option to an
extended and complex dynamic economic analysis that the current institutional setting and the
tools at its disposal may not be ready to provide. Consequently, both disciplines should take
stock of their own imperfections in their mutual interaction with each other.
Yet, what appears important for both disciplines to take into account is the changing
environment of the sources of innovation. Schumpeter emphasized the role of the entrepreneur
and opposed the active role she or he plays in the innovative process to the passive role of the
consumer.586 His point was that most innovation is entrepreneur-generated. This view
accommodates the perception that the main actor in the innovation process is the inventor (or
more broadly the entrepreneur) and that law should provide the right set of tools in order to
enhance his or her inventive activity. One could compare this entrepreneur/inventor centered
view of innovation to the increasing role of consumer-generated innovation. As it has been noted
in the Hargreaves report, the focus on services instead of products is one of the major
characteristics of the “new innovation process”:
“(s)ervices are usually produced at the point at which they are consumed: the act of
consumption rather than invention is the focal point for innovation […] (n)ew services are
developed using a ‘market facing’ approach, often connected to information databases
generated by people and organisations that articulate and express their requirements and
demands as they experience the innovation. This is sometimes described as a more
democratic approach to innovation, where companies trial different approaches – such as
beta versions of web pages – and respond to user feedback”.587
Users participate to the development of innovation in the market.588 This should
presumably get them a better share of the surplus innovation creates (in the form of choice, lower
prices etc) Sometimes, the fact that innovation was consumer driven may affect the way
competition law is enforced: in the IMS/NDC Health case relevant to the application of Article
102 to a refusal to license (see our analysis above), the Court of Justice of the EU observed that
the brick structure to which NDC Health wanted to have access was created with the assistance
585 See, for instance, the empirical analysis of Ioannis Lianos and Christos Genakos, ‘Econometric Evidence in EU
Competition Law: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis’ (1 October 2012) CLES Research Paper series 06/12.
Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2184563> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2184563> accessed 28
April 2013.
586 Schumpeter (n 6).
587 Hargreaves (n 20) 14.
588 Eric von Hippel (n 21); Fred Gault and Eric von Hippel, ‘The Prevalence of User Innovation and Free Innovation
Transfers: Implications for Statistical Indicators and Innovation Policy’ MIT Sloan School of Management.
Research Paper No. 4722-09 (January 2009) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1337232 accessed 28 April 2014; Strandburg K J, ‘Users as
Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine’ (2008) 79 University of Colorado Law Review 467.
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of consumers who provided data on their consumption habits and became for that reason an
indispensable input for the provision of the services in the downstream market of regional sales
data on pharmaceutical products.
Another important source of change is what some have called “IP without IP”,
intellectual production without intellectual property in order to describe the many instances in
which the process of creativity does not rely as such on the award of intellectual property
rights.589 The open access movement in software,590 the “piracy paradox” in the fashion
industry,591 to name but a few examples, illustrate that innovation may the product of
cooperation and sharing without the protective net of exclusivity rights and that the quest of
monetary profits is not the only determinant of incentives to innovate.592 As it noted in the
Hargreaves report,
“The nature of services innovation implies that answers to technical problems will not lie
exclusively within research institutions or companies with proprietary R&D cultures and
the means to manage and protect IP. Instead, they will emerge through integration of
ideas from a wide range of organisations, some of whom may consider managing IPR to
be an unacceptable obstacle in a high value business, raising further challenges to
traditional concepts of ownership of IP”.593
Although it is clear that these open innovation systems are “functionally dependent” on
copyright, patent, trademark, or trade secrecy law,594 relying on the traditional “property rights”
approach to IP presents the risk that this important dimension of this “new innovation process”
will be ignored. The regulatory perspective to IP law mitigates that risk and provides a richer
theoretical framework for the intersection of competition law with IP law.
589 Dreyfuss, ‘Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm’
(n 22) referring to a term coined by Mario Bagioli.
590 See, for instance, Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, ‘The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and
Beyond’ (2005) 19 Journal of Economic Perspectives 99.
591 See, for instance, Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman, ‘The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual
Property in Fashion Design’ (2006) 92 Vanderbilt Law Review 1687.
592 Yochai Benkler, ‘ “Sharing Nicely": On shareable goods and the emergence of sharing as a modality of economic
production’ (2004) 114 Yale Law Journal 273; Lerner and Tirole (n 590).
593 Hargreaves (n 20) 14.
594 Dreyfuss, ‘Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm’
(n 22).
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